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1. Introduction
1. Introduction
In comparison to other countries in the rest of the world, Germany (as one of the
industrialized countries) is characterized by relatively high living standards in terms
of GDP per capita and wages. German politicians often argue that exports and
innovation are important fields for the German economy to sustain these welfare
achievements. According to the World Trade Organization (WTO), Germany has
ranked as one of the three top exporters (in US value) since 1953 in their time
series of trade statistics. Therefore, the exporting economy is important from a
historical perspective. In addition, Germany achieves a high position (15th out
of 141 countries) for the global innovation index in 2012, according to the World
Intellectual Property Organization (2012).
In the following, this dissertation sheds light on the impact of finance on trade and
the determinants of innovating activities within start-ups. The economic literature
emphasizes an existing relationship between the innovating behavior of firms and
their foreign operations. Many authors distinguish the participation in international
trade between the probability of starting to export and the propensity (exports rela-
tive to total sales) of it in their analysis. Several empirical papers which examine this
interrelation typically find a positive relationship between innovation and trading
patterns of firms (e.g., Damijan et al. (2010), Roper and Love (2002), Sterlacchini
(2001), Wagner (2001) or Wakelin (1998)) but the direction of causality remains un-
clear. Here, the focus is not on this explicit link between both fields but on different
aspects within them.
Chapter 2 starts with the provision of a comprehensive and detailed literature re-
view on finance and trade. In particular, we concentrate on various aspects which
are relevant for the subsequent three chapters: the general differences between ex-
porters and non-exporters, the interrelation between finance and trade flows and the
literature on trade in services.
The following three chapters rely on a data set (MiMiK) which collects data on bank-
firm relationships and is provided by Deutsche Bundesbank. The massive decline
in international trade in 2008/09 (known as the ‘Great Trade Collapse’) is often
attributed to the global deterioration in financial conditions after the bankruptcy
of a US investment bank, Lehman Brothers. In a first step, Chapter 3 estimates
the exporter premium in bank lending and highlights potential differences between
exporters and non-exporters (independent of the financial crisis). We examine credit
relationships in Germany, covering all loans of more than 1.5 million euro over the
period from 2005 to 2010. The MiMiK data base itself provides only information
about the (quarterly) credit exposure between borrower and lender. Therefore, we
1
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establish a unique data match with another data set which is also provided by
Deutsche Bundesbank, Ustan. It contains (yearly) balance sheet information of
firms, including export sales.
Chapter 4 primarily focuses on the empirical importance of external (bank) finance
for exporters during (and after) the financial crisis. The previous MiMiK-Ustan
match is extended with bank balance sheet data from BAKIS. We use this infor-
mation to identify banks which are especially ‘affected’ by the financial crisis. The
chapter investigates in a descriptive manner whether a correlation between exports
and credit supply exists and whether banks which are classified as ‘affected’ de-
creased their credit exposures. Finally, we perform a nearest neighbor matching to
identify similar firms which engage in foreign operations. Then, we examine whether
firms which have a relationship with a bank which is ‘affected’ by the financial cri-
sis experienced a larger drop in exports compared to firms which receive external
finance from a healthy financial institution.
Chapter 5 extends the previous analysis by estimating the exporter premium in
bank lending for goods and service exporters separately. The MiMiK-Ustan match
is enlarged with detailed transaction level data about service exports, the German
International Trade in Services (SITS) statistics. Therefore, we are able to iden-
tify firms which primarily export services or goods and can evaluate our previous
results on a more disaggregated level. First, we estimate the export premium in
bank lending for goods exporters vs. non-exporters. Then, we examine whether ser-
vice exporters depend more on external finance than goods exporters which would
coincide with higher entry barriers for service exporters.
Furthermore, we analyze the determinants of innovations within start-ups in a sepa-
rate section. Chapter 6 deals with the question whether entrepreneurs with technical
education are more innovative than economists in high-tech industries. Until now,
the field of entrepreneurship has been relatively unexplored due to data limitations.
To analyze this question, we examine a novel data set (KfW/ZEW Start-Up Panel)
which contains a random cross-section of German start-up companies for 2007 and
2008. It provides information about entrepreneurial characteristics, especially de-
tails about the subject that was studied prior to the foundation of the start-up.
In addition, the KfW/ZEW Start-Up Panel was exclusively designed to analyze
research questions in the field of innovation. For this reason it contains multiple
proxies to measure the innovating behavior of entrepreneurs.
Finally, Chapter 7 provides a summary of the main results, highlights the essential
contributions to the literature and proposes suggestions for future research.
2
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This chapter provides a comprehensive literature review about issues closely related
to finance and trade. We proceed in several steps to emphasize the most important
findings for each of the following chapters.
First, we start with the literature about general differences between exporters and
non-exporters because we estimate the so-called exporter premium in Chapter 3.
From a theoretical perspective, the export premium was irrelevant for a long time
period. The ‘old’ trade theory concentrates exclusively on trading patterns between
countries and neglects the existence of firms at all. According to this, countries pos-
sess a comparative advantage and specialize in the production of particular goods
when the relative opportunity costs are lower in comparison to the other country.
The literature distinguishes between two main causes for the existence of compar-
ative advantage: Ricardian models explain trading patterns across countries with
differences in technologies (see Dornbusch et al. (1977)), while Heckscher-Ohlin mod-
els highlight differences in factor endowment as the main determinant for trade (see
Heckscher and Ohlin (1991)). In contrast, the ‘new’ trade theory regards individ-
ual firms as decision makers but typically assumes a representative firm within a
monopolistic competition framework (see Krugman (1979)). As a result, all firms
export in equilibrium (see Bernard et al. (2007)). Consequently, neither the ‘old’
nor the ‘new’ trade theories are able to explain why we observe empirical differences
between exporters and non-exporters. The first formalization of a theoretical model
that is in line with the empirical observation of disparities among exporters and
non-exporters is proposed by Melitz (2003). He assumes heterogeneous firms which
differ in their firm productivity. In a first step, firms pay an entry cost and then
draw their productivity from a distribution which is known to all firms. Then, they
choose whether to operate only on the domestic market or whether to also sell their
products abroad. Before firms participate in international trade, they have to bear
fixed entry costs (in addition to variable costs which include transportation) and
only firms which are highly productive (above a certain cut-off level) and able to
cover these costs start exporting.
A (by now) sizable empirical literature identifies economically large and statistically
significant differences between firms that export and firms selling exclusively on the
domestic market. The first contribution which uses detailed firm-level data to esti-
mate the export premium is provided by Bernard et al. (1995). They use detailed US
plant-level data from the Census Bureau’s Annual Survey of Manufactures (ASM)
between 1976 and 1987. Their results highlight the fact that only a certain fraction
of US firms engage in exports, which is true for different industries, and that the
3
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average exporter pays higher wages (by about 14%). Furthermore, exporters use dif-
ferent input factors than non-exporters: they employ a higher capital intensity and
undertake more investment per employee. Several studies re-examine and strongly
confirm this finding for a broad range of indicators of firm activity. There are also a
large number of papers which aim to replicate this observation for various countries,
obtaining similarly affirmative results1.
The literature which estimates the export premium is also applied in different
contexts: one branch examines whether exporters are more productive than non-
exporters before market entrance or whether exporting itself causes an increase in
productivity. There is a large debate about the direction in which the causality
actually moves. For instance, Bernard and Jensen (1999) argue that firms which
start serving the foreign market are already more productive than firms selling ex-
clusively on the domestic market. Nevertheless, exporting is beneficial because the
probability of plant survival increases. In contrast, De Loecker (2007) suggests that
exporting led to enhanced productivity for Slovenian firms between 1994 and 2000.
Another branch highlights the difference between single and multi-product firms.
Bernard et al. (2010) estimate the export premium for US manufacturing firms be-
tween 1987 and 1997. They show that exporting multi-product firms produce more
output, are larger and more productive (in terms of labor productivity and total fac-
tor productivity) than single-product exporters. In addition, dynamic adjustments
towards the market environment (e.g., the adding and dropping of products) are
more present in multi-product firms. Finally, Lawless (2009) provides descriptive
evidence and reveals that exporters differ in the number of destination countries.
The number of markets which an exporter serves is positively related to firm size,
productivity and average wages for Irish exporters between 2000 and 2004.
For Germany, our country of interest throughout this dissertation, Bernard and
Wagner (1997) document sizable and robust exporter premia for various plant char-
acteristics. Based on a regional sample of firms, they find that German exporting
plants are more productive than non-exporters (with a premium of about 20%), have
a higher capital intensity (by about 12%) and invest more per worker (about 8%)
than non-exporters. Firms also employ more workers and pay higher wages, with
the premia varying by the type of worker. Holding constant for the characteristics
of both the worker and the workplace, Schank et al. (2007) estimate that employees
working in a plant with an export-sales ratio of 60% earn about 1-2% more than
similar employees in otherwise identical non-exporting plants. Finally, export activ-
1Given that relevant firm-level data sets often differ in design across countries and are not
always readily accessible, few surveys seek to combine and summarize findings for various countries
(see Mayer and Ottaviano (2007)).
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ity is also associated with measures of firm performance and firm success. Fryges
and Wagner (2010) argue that exporting has a positive causal effect on profitability.
By contrast, the role of financial variables (which is a key interest in the follow-
ing analysis) for firm export behavior was initially emphasized primarily in theory.
Building on the assumption that entry into foreign markets involves sunk costs, it is
hypothesized that only firms with (access to) sufficient financial resources are able
to start exporting. Chaney (2005) and Manova (2008), among others, formalize this
idea, adding liquidity constraints to a standard heterogeneous firm model of inter-
national trade (in the fashion of Melitz (2003)). Specifically, Chaney (2005, p. 5)
argues that “one [additional] dimension of heterogeneity along which exporters may
differ from non-exporters is their ability to access financial intermediaries”, with less
financially constrained firms being more likely to export.
The few empirical studies which aim to analyze the exporter premium for financial
variables typically find evidence in support of this hypothesis2. However, since these
studies often examine measures of the financial health of firms, such as firm liquidity,
they seem to provide only limited insights. For one thing, financial health, which is
the most comprehensive outcome measure of a firm’s business policies, depends on
many factors, including the decision to export itself. In fact, given the seemingly
robust finding of significant differences in financial positions between exporters and
non-exporters, the empirical analysis mainly focuses on causality, with mixed re-
sults. Analyzing a panel of British manufacturing firms over the period from 1993
to 2003, Greenaway et al. (2007) find that participation in export markets improves
firms’ financial health, while export starters display low liquidity. In contrast, Bel-
lone et al. (2010) find for a sample of French firms that exporters are already more
liquid before entry, with no further growth in financial variables relative to non-
exporters in the following years. More notably, measures of financial health are only
a very imperfect proxy for the variable of interest, access to external finance. For
instance, a large stock of liquidity may reflect weak fundamentals rather than easy
credit when firms are forced to hoard cash in times of financial constraints. As a
result, the association between a firm’s financial position and its access to external
financial funds seems to be generally ambiguous.
Second, we review the relevant literature on trade and finance, which is the main
focus of Chapter 4. In comparison to the proceeding, this literature does not con-
2A related literature in finance explores the capital structure decisions of firms, including the
use of external finance. For instance, examining a broad range of financing sources, Beck et al.
(2008) find that exporters tend to use more bank, leasing and supplier finance.
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centrate on general differences between firms but tries to explain trade flows with
financial variables. It delivers many different approaches and ideas to examine this
potential interrelation. The special importance of external financial conditions for
international trade activities has been highlighted in recent research on the ‘Great
Trade Collapse’. The sharp decline in world trade in 2008/09 is widely attributed
to a drop in the provision of trade finance by troubled financial intermediaries in
the aftermath of the recent financial crisis. Interestingly, this pattern does not only
evolve aggregated world level but is also present in individual countries.
A recent formal attempt to analyze the effects of trade finance was undertaken by
Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2011), who studies the optimal choice of payment contracts. He
divides the payment contracts into three classes: exporter finance (open account),
importer finance (cash in advance) and bank finance (letter of credit). Equilibrium
contracts are then determined by financial market characteristics and the contract-
ing environment. Specifically, it is shown that increased enforcement probabilities
lead to more trade, whereas increased financing costs, which likely occur in the
presence of a financial crisis, lead to fewer trade activities. Ahn (2011) proposes a
related hypothesis from the bank’s point of view, arguing that it is more costly for
banks to monitor exporting companies. The uncertainty evolves from the fact that
the bank cannot verify whether the firm which applies for the loan repays with a
high or a low probability, since only the general distribution over all firms is known.
The probability of repayment depends on the trading partners of this particular
firm. Ahn (2011) suggests that an enterprise which trades with another firm in the
same country provides a less noisy signal about its real type than a firm with a
foreign trading partner because the bank is in a better position to receive informa-
tion from the domestic trading partner. Due to these higher monitoring costs, an
exporter receives exogenously a higher probability of default than a non-exporter,
making the firm more vulnerable to a financial shock. Both papers link the export-
ing decision of a firm to the financial environment. Another attempt to formalize
the idea why exporters face tighter credit constraints in comparison to domestic
sellers is proposed by Feenstra et al. (2011) who extend the theoretical model by
Melitz (2003) with the inclusion of a financial sector. One particular assumption is
that firms rely on working capital for their production. The model stresses three
reasons for potential differences between domestic sellers and exporters: longer time
lag between production and sales for exporters, the general nature of higher risks
in exporting (e.g., difficult contract enforcement across borders) and the additional
fixed costs which an exporter has to bear by entering the foreign market. The au-
thors use panel data from Chinese manufacturers between 2000 and 2008, which is
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provided by China’s National Bureau of Statistics. Their results confirm the hy-
pothesis that exporters face tighter credit constraints compared to domestic sellers
and that the recent financial crisis increased them even further. Finally, Eck et al.
(2012) suggest a theoretical framework which aims to explain whether the provi-
sion of trade credit has an effect on international trade. Trade credit involves two
forms of contracts between firms: cash in advance, where the importing firm first
has to pay its bill before the good is shipped across borders, and supplier credit,
where the firm first produces the good and receives the payment after a certain time
period (typically between 30 and 90 days after the importer received the good),
such that the importer is able to confirm the product quality. The model shows
that trade credit averts information asymmetries and therefore fosters international
transactions. The empirical findings confirm that the usage of trade credit contracts
leads to higher exports and imports, using data from the Business Environment and
Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) for 1,196 German firms in 2004.
In the context of trade and finance not only the decision of firms to export but
also of the bank to provide credit is an important determinant. We provide insights
from the literature of relationship lending because we are dealing with bank-firm
relationships in our empirical analysis. Berger et al. (2005) investigate whether
organizational differences in banks lead to a comparative advantage in lending to
specific firms. From a theoretical point of view, the likelihood that a relationship
between a firm and its bank is an exclusive one should decrease with bank size (see
Stein (2002)). The authors make use of two different US data sources: information
about firm characteristics from the Federal Reserve’s 1993 National Survey of Small
Business Finance (NSSBF) and bank data from Consolidated Report of Condition
and Income and the FDIC Summary of Deposits. The empirical findings indicate
that the probability of a single lending bank decreases as firm size increases. There-
fore, the larger the size of the firm the greater the number of banks it engages with
and the larger the loans. Accordingly, exporters who are on average larger (ap-
proximated by firm size) should also hold multiple bank lending ties. Memmel et al.
(2007) obtain another perspective and analyze whether information asymmetries can
be mitigated by relationship banking and how the firm’s credit quality influences
the likelihood of selecting one particular (principal) bank. They employ the same
data sets (MiMiK, Ustan and BAKIS), which we use in the later chapters, with
German firm and bank balance sheet information from Deutsche Bundesbank3. The
results suggest that small, young and R&D intensive firms as well as firms with a
3The main differences in the empirical implementation are the approach to match the data sets
(MiMiK and Ustan) and the selection of years for the analysis.
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high credit quality choose a relationship lender. Another proxy for the measurement
of relationship lending is proposed by Bonis et al. (2010), who examine whether the
length of banking relationships has an influence on the international operations of
firms. The activities on foreign markets are defined as foreign direct investments,
offshoring and exports. The authors employ Italian firm balance sheet data between
1998 and 2003 from the Survey of Manufacturing Firms (SMF) of Unicredit and
bank balance sheet data from Banca d’Italia prudential statistical returns. The
findings indicate that the length of banking relationships has a positive effect on
foreign direct investments and offshoring. In contrast, the length does not influ-
ence the exports of Italian firms. Instead of focusing on the length of relationships,
Ongena and Smith (2000) examine which firm characteristics are able to explain
the number of (domestic) bank-firm relationships. They use survey firm-level data
for 1996 from GlobalCash-Europe96 which covers 20 European countries and 1,079
firms. In contrast to previous results, the findings reveal that firms with larger
exports are associated with a lower number of bank relationships (while domestic
sales as possible proxy for firm size are positively correlated). The authors explain
this observation with the argument that exporters have the possibility to switch to
other financial institutions abroad. Other empirical papers focus on possible trans-
mission channels of the recent financial crisis. For instance, Carvalho et al. (2011)
investigate how relationship lending affects the lending costs of firms during finan-
cial shocks (e.g., especially from problems stemming from Bear Stearns and Lehman
Brothers). According to theoretical ideas, firms which receive finance from one bank
only are more dependent on this particular partner such that a financial shock leads
to higher borrowing costs because the enterprises are not able to use other financial
institutions as substitutes. The analysis is based on data from different sources:
for publicly listed firms the authors employ loan data between January 2003 and
December 2006 from Dealscan and stock return data for the borrowing firms from
DataStream during July 2007 and October 2008. In general, the data set includes
1,564 non-financial borrowing firms from 34 countries. The findings reveal that the
losses in stock returns are largest for firms which have just one relationship with
a financial institution. Using more detailed information, Iyer et al. (2010) analyze
how the financial crisis changes the credit supply for firms in Portugal. The au-
thors use the Central Credit Register from the Portuguese Central Bank between
the second quarter of 2007 and the second quarter of 2009 which covers all granted
loans above the threshold of 50 euro. In addition, they match (monthly) bank bal-
ance sheet data with (yearly) firm balance sheet information. The dependence on
the interbank market to refinance the bank’s operations is used as a measure for
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‘affected’ banks and the freeze of the interbank market in August 2007 is defined
as the exogenous shock for the Portuguese banks. The estimates show that banks
which rely more on funding from the interbank market cut credit supply to firms
more than other financial institutions. Especially small and young firms with weak
banking relationships face larger credit reductions in contrast to larger established
companies.
Empirical studies generally provide two explanations for the recent decline in the
world trade-to-GDP ratio: the decline in demand due to higher unemployment
and/or lower income4, and the worsening of financial conditions for the suppliers.
However, it is unclear which of the two effects is quantitatively more important,
with different papers providing different conclusions. In the following, we briefly
summarize the most relevant findings from the recent literature.
Several studies explore historical evidence, aiming to establish a set of stylized facts
that potentially help to deal with the effects of the recent financial crisis. For
instance, Freund (2009) analyzes the effects of four global downturns on trade pat-
terns, focusing in particular on the demand for goods. Using monthly data from
the IMF BOP Statistics between January 1960 and March 2009 for 31 countries,
the findings suggest that the large drop in exports can be partly explained by an
increase in the elasticity of trade to GDP (from 2 to 3) over time. Thus, consumers
nowadays react more strongly if a financial shock occurs. As a consequence, the
demand component explaining the fluctuations has increased. In contrast, Iacovone
and Zavacka (2009) focus on the supply conditions of exporters. They investigate
the influence of banking crises on exports from manufactures between 1980 and
2006, identifying 23 banking crises. The analysis employs yearly aggregated export
data from UN Comtrade for 21 countries and 81 industries. The methodology re-
lies on Rajan and Zingales (1998) who identify the external financial dependence
of industries. They use information from Standard and Poor’s Compustat about
balance sheet data from publicly listed firms in the US and define the dependence
on external finance as the share of investment which cannot be financed by internal
cash flows. Alternatively, they calculate the measure as capital expenditures minus
operative cash flow divided by capital expenditures5. Iacovone and Zavacka (2009)
argue that industries relying more on external finance exhibit larger export declines
than other industries. Furthermore, not all financial channels are affected alike.
4Another channel which is closely connected to the decline in (final) demand is the drop
in intermediate goods. If products which require many intermediate inputs (e.g., cars) are less
demanded by consumers, a large number of firms will be affected because many car components
are delivered from abroad (value chains of large corporations).
5One central assumption by Rajan and Zingales (1998) is that the dependence on external
finance is constant over time.
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Finally, the observed demand shocks seem to be independent of the financial condi-
tions. Other contributions try to establish general facts between finance and trade
flows. Beck (2003) investigates whether the development of financial markets within
a country provides a comparative advantage for industries which depend more on
external finance (according to Rajan and Zingales (1998)) than others. To analyze
this question, he uses industry-level data from the COMTRADE data base for 36
industries and 56 countries. Furthermore, the World Development Indicators (WDI)
from the World Bank serve as basis to deflate the nominal values. The results sug-
gest that countries with a higher financial development (approximated by private
credit relative to GDP, market capitalization or total capitalization) do indeed ex-
perience higher export shares in industries which depend more on external finance.
In a similar fashion, Manova et al. (2011) examine whether credit constraints have
an impact on international trade but they concentrate on the effect of ownership
structure on exports. They use detailed Chinese customs data for 2005 which is
reported to the Chinese Customs Office. They differentiate between various owner-
ship structures: purely Chinese-owned firms, joint ventures with foreign companies
and foreign-owned affiliates. According to the authors, firms which have access to
other financing sources (such as joint ventures and foreign affiliates) should have a
comparative advantage in exporting because they can use internal cash flows inside
the corporation. In addition, this advantage is larger the more the sector depends
on external finance. To analyze whether these two arguments indeed hold, they
also employ the methodology used by Rajan and Zingales (1998) to measure the
dependence on external finance for different sectors. The findings suggest that Chi-
nese firms with a foreign ownership perform better than Chinese firms with a purely
Chinese ownership. In addition, sectors with higher need of external finance have a
larger comparative advantage than other industries.
Other studies highlight the importance of trade finance for developing countries.
Berman and Martin (2010) focus on sub-Saharan African countries and examine
whether these countries are affected differently by banking crises than others. An-
alyzing US industry import data (from the COMTRADE and CEPII data base)
between 1976 to 2002, they find that the channel of trade finance (‘disruption ef-
fect’) is more important for explaining the vulnerability of these countries than the
lower demand (‘income effect’) using a gravity approach. One possible explanation
is that African countries are more dependent on trade finance compared to countries
with a more developed financial system. In a similar fashion (but with other data
sources), Kohler and Saville (2011) investigate the effect of trade finance on trading
patterns of South Africa. They use monthly trade data between 2006 and 2009
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from South Africa’s Department of Trade and Industry with the 20 most important
trading partners (measured by trade values). Trade finance is approximated by the
monthly short-term interbank lending rate (see also Chor and Manova (2012)). The
findings are in line with prior research: higher costs of trade finance which can be
interpreted as tighter financial constraints lead to lower exports. Finally, Auboin
(2007) follows a broader approach, aiming to identify similar patterns for developing
countries in general (according to the WTO definition). Differences in the progress
of the liberalization of goods and financial markets can lead to an excess demand of
trade finance. If a financial shock occurs, these countries are particularly affected
because there is only modest confidence in the banking system. Furthermore, devel-
oping countries lack the opportunity to attract new entrepreneurs by imposing high
barriers of entry. Consequently, supply-side conditions seem to be more important
for developing countries than demand factors.
The recent financial crisis in 2008 is also examined to identify the impact of finance
on trade. Damijan and Kostevc (2011) provide a summary of recent empirical
contributions about entering and surviving in the export market and the role of
financial conditions. They conclude that, during a financial crisis, trade finance plays
an important role for (especially) small firms. These firms face tighter requirements
due to lower internal funds, and it is therefore harder for them to obtain credit
compared to larger companies which also often have access to other sources. In
addition, Chor and Manova (2012) use (aggregated) monthly US industry import
data from November 2006 to October 2009 to identify channels that are responsible
for the sharp decline in trade. Focusing on the cost of capital, which is approximated
by the interbank interest rates, and distinguishing between industries, they argue
that a higher dependence on external finance of the industry leads to a larger decline
in trade during a financial crisis. Finally, Ahn et al. (2011a) provide suggestive
evidence, showing that the prices of seaborne-shipped goods, which are likely to
be most dependent on trade credit, rose relative to the prices of goods sent by
alternative modes of transportation.
Other empirical studies analyze the economic importance of demand factors which
could be responsible for the ‘Great Trade Collapse’. For instance, Alessandria et al.
(2010) examine whether inventory adjustments play a role. They propose a two-
country general equilibrium model in which inventory holdings evolve endogenously
towards a change in domestic and foreign financing costs. In their empirical analysis,
the authors focus on the automobile industry because it experienced a large drop in
exports during the recent financial crisis and it is relevant for industrialized countries
from an economic point of view. Their data sources are from BEA (Bureau of Eco-
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nomic Analysis) and the Ward’s data base and provide information about domestic
and foreign sales, the number of orders and the inventory holdings. The descriptive
analysis shows that the drop in inventory holdings was lower than the drop in im-
ports during the financial crisis. The findings suggest that trade itself is more volatile
than trade-weighted production such that inventory holdings play an important role
for this adjustment. Furthermore, the authors conclude that the trade dynamics in
the current crisis are not unusual in comparison to prior recessions (but the mag-
nitude is larger). Another idea is the consideration of global supply chains. Bems
et al. (2010) provide a theoretical framework and empirical evidence that the drop
in demand within the US and Europe after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in
September 2008 transmitted to other countries as well through lower trade volumes.
The key idea of this argument is based on Yi (2003) who reveals that the vertical
specialization of countries increased in the recent decades. The main problem of
bilateral export data lies in the disregard of intermediate inputs which are imported
from other countries in the presence of global supply chains. The authors use the
GTAP 7 data base which is provided by the Global Trade Analysis Project at Perdue
University. This data set covers bilateral trade volumes and input-output tables in-
cluding 94 countries, 19 composite regions and 57 sectors in 2004. Furthermore, the
IMF’s Global Data Source, the OECD and national data sources are considered for
the analysis. A very crucial assumption for the results is that different shares which
are computed from the various data sources do not change over time and are also rep-
resentative for the crisis period in 2008/09. The empirical results suggest that about
70% of the observed trade elasticity can be explained by their theoretical framework.
Eaton et al. (2011) compare supply and demand conditions and evaluate which are
responsible for the large drop in international trade during the recent financial crisis.
They employ a general equilibrium framework and use different simulations for their
analysis. The investigation relies on various data sources for 23 countries: bilateral
trade data from the Global Trade Atlas Database, the OECD input-output country
tables, the IMF International Financial Statistics database, DataStream, the OECD
Structural Analysis Database (STAN) and the United Nations National Accounts
and Industrial Statistics Database (UNIDO). The findings reveal that the decline
in demand for durable goods accounts for 80% of the overall drop. In addition, in-
creased trade frictions aggravate the situation in China and Japan. Gopinath et al.
(2012) examine whether the sharp drop in international trade of the US economy
was driven by price or quantity adjustments. The analysis is mostly based on de-
scriptive evidence. The International Pricing Program (IPP) of the US Bureau of
Labor Statistics from 1993 to 2009 with monthly import and export price data for
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about 20,000 goods serves as data source. The results suggest that the decline in
trade of differentiated manufacturing goods is explained by lower demand while the
prices remain stable. In contrast, the prices of homogeneous manufacturing goods
indeed decreased. Moreover, the prices of durable and non-durable manufacturing
goods did not change. However, the demand for durable goods experienced a sharp
decline. Finally, the authors provide evidence that during the financial crisis the
frequency and size of price adjustment changed as well. Similarly, Haddad et al.
(2010) itemize the decline in world trade for imports of Brazil, the European Union,
Indonesia and the US along different dimensions: product entry and exit, adjust-
ment in prices and quantities and the distinction between extensive and intensive
margin. The trade data are available on a monthly basis between January 2007 and
November 2009. Various data sources are employed for the different destinations:
import data for Brazil are provided by the Ministry of Development, Industry, and
International Trade (MDIC), for the European Union by Eurostat, for Indonesia
by BPS-Statistics Indonesia (BPS) and for the US by the US International Trade
Commission (USITC). The findings suggest that almost all countries face a drop in
new products, an increase in product exit and a decline in quantities for products
on aggregate level. Moreover, the intensive margin seems to be more important for
explaining the drop in world trade than the extensive margin. However, the prod-
ucts are heterogeneously affected: for instance, the price drop is due to commodity
goods. In addition, differences in the trading relationships among countries and the
type of shipment are present. Altogether, the decline in (almost) all quantities shows
that the drop in demand seems to be the most important factor in explaining the
sharp drop in trade. Finally, Levchenko et al. (2010) provide descriptive evidence
for the drop in US trade after the financial crisis. Aggregate trade (exports and
imports) and production data are provided by the US National Income and Product
Accounts (NIPA). In addition, the Bureau of Economic Analysis’ Trade in Goods
and Services Database reports trade flows and prices at sector level, while the US
International Trade Commission’s Tariffs and Trade Database differentiates between
the trading partners (countries). The authors highlight that the recent collapse in
trade is economically large in comparison to other crises. Furthermore, the results
indicate that the drop in exports and imports was huge in the automobile sector,
in durable industrial supplies and capital goods. Finally, the outcome suggests a
strong support for the role of vertical linkages, as well as for compositional effects. In
contrast, financial variables (e.g., trade credit) do not provide explanatory evidence
for the decline in US trade. In addition to evidence from aggregate studies, other
contributions try to establish a causal finance-trade relationship based on micro-
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level evidence. The academic literature agrees that lower demand is able to explain
a certain fraction of the sharp drop in trade flows. In contrast, there is mixed evi-
dence concerning the supply conditions. For instance, Amiti and Weinstein (2011)
use firm-level data from the database of unconsolidated corporate reports of Devel-
opment Bank of Japan (DBJ) between 1986 and 1999. In addition, Nikkei NEEDS
FinancialQuest provides firm information from 2003 to 2010. Bank data is obtained
from the Pacific Basin Capital Markets database for the early years (1986 to 1999)
and from Nikkei for the recent period (2003 to 2010). The authors are able to match
micro data from banks and companies in Japan due to the Japan Company Hand-
book which reports linkages between enterprises and financial institutions. They
define the largest bank as the main reference bank which most probably undertakes
the provision of finance for international transactions. The findings suggest that
a worsening in financial conditions can explain (and even cause) the large drop in
relative trade flows. In contrast, Paravisini et al. (2011) analyze matched micro
data from Peru and compute the elasticity of exports. The authors use bank and
firm information from Peruvian bank regulator Superintendence of Banking, Insur-
ance, and Pension Funds (SBS) between July 2007 and June 2009. Furthermore,
customs data are obtained from the Peruvian tax agency (Superintendence of Tax
Administration). The shortage in credit supply is able to explain only 15% of the
decline in exports. Other studies do not incorporate the bank dimension in their
analysis. Behrens et al. (2010) analyze the export behavior of Belgian companies
using annual balance sheet data from Business Registry and monthly export and
import reports of firms from Intrastat (intra-EU trade) and Extrastat (extra-EU
trade) of the National Bank of Belgium (NBB). The authors compare the change
in exports before the crisis in the first season (S1-2007 to S1-2008) with the first
season after the crisis (S1-2008 to S1-2009). The focus on the first half is justified
by potential seasonality problems that could arise otherwise. The results reveal that
the sharp drop in trade relative to GDP is mainly due to the intensive margin. In
contrast to Amiti and Weinstein (2011), financial conditions are not the most im-
portant factor for explaining this observation. The reduction in demand is much
more influential. Finally, domestic suppliers are as affected as exporters by the fi-
nancial shock. That is why the authors argue that there is no trade crisis but an
overall output crisis. In a similar manner, Bricongne et al. (2012) use monthly ex-
port information from French Customs and data about credit constraints (from the
FiBEn database of Banque de France) of French companies between January 2000
and April 2009. They aim to explain how financial health, external finance and the
extensive/intensive margin help to explain the decline in exports. The results illus-
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trate that lower demand and the intensive margin for large firms are found to be the
most important determinants. In addition, credit constraints aggravate the trade
environment. Another approach is to analyze individual contracts. Antra`s and Fo-
ley (2011) analyze transaction data from one exporting firm in the US which exports
frozen agricultural products to about 140 countries from 1996 to 2009. They have
detailed information about the financing mode (cash in advance, open account and
letter of credit) of each transaction and can evaluate how the financial crisis affected
the choice of contracts. The use of letters of credit is rather low in the whole data set
because they incorporate additional costs for the trading partners6. Consequently,
the authors conclude that the financial shock affects the mode of trade finance:
more cash in advance contracts are observed between the trading partners after the
financial crisis. However, the effect of bank finance on trade does not seem to be as
strong as other researchers suggest (at least for this particular company). Overall,
the empirical findings for different countries seem to be mixed. Whereas for Japan
the supply-side conditions play an important role for explaining the large drop in
exports, companies from France, Belgium and Peru appear to be much less affected.
As a result, country-specific factors possibly affect the underlying results. Another
line of research investigates the effect of guarantees. Badinger and Url (2012) exam-
ine which kind of firms engage in usage of export credit guarantees and whether the
guarantees provide a positive influence on export performance. They obtain a cross
section for 178 Austrian firms in 2008 from O¨sterreichische Kontrollbank (OeKB)
which is the Austrian export credit agency. This survey consists mostly of small
and medium-sized enterprises where the effects of financial constraints are expected
to be tight. According to the estimations, domestic firms which engage in R&D
activities and undertake risky projects apply for the export credit guarantees. Fur-
thermore, the guarantees indeed foster exports (increase of about 100% to 130%).
For Germany, Felbermayr and Yalcin (2011) investigate whether public export guar-
antees (provided by EulerHermes) have an effect on trade flows, especially during
the financial crisis in 2008. They use Hermes guarantees on sectoral level from 2000
to 2009 and employ bilateral export data from the world trade BACI database from
CEPII Paris. The findings illustrate that the provision of public export guarantees
boosts trading activity, especially during the financial crisis in 2008. However, the
economic effect is relatively small compared to previous results in the literature.
6The low usage of letters of credit does not need to be representative. Auboin (2007) argues
that some forms of bank insurance or guarantees are used in 90% of all trade transactions.
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Finally, we provide a literature review which covers the topic of trade in services,
which is the main focus of Chapter 5. This chapter deals with differences between
goods and service exporters, especially whether service exporters rely more on ex-
ternal (bank) finance and face stricter entry barriers. Standard textbooks of inter-
national trade (mostly) do not cover trade in services because services are defined
as non-tradable products. Hill (1977) provides a detailed overview about funda-
mental differences between goods and services. Theoretical trade models, which are
discussed in the literature, deal with the exchange of goods between countries. A
service itself cannot be exchanged or be put in stock, in comparison to goods which
are storable. Furthermore, services can influence the conditions of goods (e.g., the
repair of a car) and the mental conditions of persons (e.g., provision of health ser-
vices). Taken together, goods and services are not complementary due to these
fundamental differences. Hill (1977) concludes that theoretical trade models need
to consider the fundamental differences between goods and services.
In the recent past, services have become more tradable due to technological progress.
For instance, Freund and Weinhold (2002) provide empirical evidence by showing
that the provision (and prevalence) of the Internet has indeed fostered trade in ser-
vices, especially in the US since 1995. They use aggregate trade statistics from the
US International Transactions Accounts, which are provided by the Bureau of Eco-
nomic Analysis, as starting point for their analysis. Other empirical contributions
also rely on this kind of data and aim to investigate the determinants of trade in
services. Lennon (2009) examines the differences of determinants for trade in goods
and services using a standard gravity approach for 28 OECD countries between 1999
and 2002. She employs data from the OECD database on bilateral trade in services.
The findings suggest that bilateral trust, better contract enforcement, networks, la-
bor market regulations and variables denoting technology of communication seem
to be more important for trade in services in comparison to goods. This kind of
analysis is also conducted for other countries as well. Karam and Zaki (2012) inves-
tigate the determinants of trade in services for the Middle East and North African
(MENA) region between 2000 and 2009. They extend the standard gravity equa-
tion by including WTO membership and WTO commitments as main explanatory
factors. Different data sources are used for the analysis: the WTO dataset, ‘Trade
Map’ by the International Trade Center (ITC), the World Development Indicators
database, the CEPII data and the Doing Business dataset by World Bank. The out-
come reveals that both WTO membership and the number of commitments have a
positive effect on the amount of trade in services. Moreover, they provide descriptive
evidence for heterogeneity among different countries.
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Instead of dealing with these aggregated trade statistics, the recent empirical liter-
ature uses detailed transaction-level data to understand the underlying mechanisms
of service trade patterns. Most of these empirical studies contribute to the literature
by providing some descriptive stylized facts about the nature of trade in services. For
instance, Ariu (2012) compares firm characteristics of goods exporters with service
exporters from Belgium between 1995 and 2005, using data from the National Bank
of Belgium. He concludes that firms which export services are different to goods
exporters (in quantitative terms). The participation rate among service exporters
is lower, which implies higher fixed costs that have to be covered. Nevertheless,
goods exporters and service exporters share some qualitative similarities: only a
small fraction of firms participate in trading activities and firm heterogeneity plays
a key role to explain this observation. Due to these reasons, trade models with
heterogeneous firms (like Melitz (2003)) seem to be a good starting point for inves-
tigating trade in services further from a theoretical perspective. Similarly, Breinlich
and Criscuolo (2011) examine goods and service exporters for the UK between 2000
and 2005. They employ two data sets: the Annual Respondent Database (ARD)
and the International Trade in Services Inquiry (ITIS) which are provided by the
UK Office for National Statistics (ONS). Many findings for manufacturing firms
(see Bernard et al. (1995)) are also present for service firms. Trade in services is
concentrated among the largest firms and the average service exporter is larger (in
terms of employment), pays higher wages and is more productive than a firm in
the service sector which does not participate in international transactions. As a
result, the authors recommend that heterogeneous trade models, which focus on the
exchange of goods, are also useful for the analysis of trade in services. In addition,
Federico and Tosti (2012) examine Italian manufacturers and service firms between
2008 and 2009. The Bank of Italy provides information based on a survey. The
authors confirm previous results that trade in services (exports and imports) are
concentrated among few firms. Moreover, they describe the composition of trade:
most firm-level variation in trade is explained by the intensive margin, while the
extensive margin and standard gravity variables (market size, distance) account for
the country-level variation.
The analysis in Chapter 5 relies upon German trade in services transaction-level data
from Deutsche Bundesbank. Previous empirical papers also employ this data set and
match it with the Micro Database Direct Investments (MiDi), which provides infor-
mation about foreign affiliates7. Biewen et al. (2012) examine the determinants of
7The implementation of this match is unproblematic because both data sets share the same
firm identifier.
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service offshoring for German multinationals between 2003 and 2008. Their findings
reveal that firms do not start importing services in the presence of cost pressures.
In contrast, existing linkages are intensified with higher cost pressure. Finally, the
authors argue that firms which participate in service trade are less dependent on
external finance and that financial constraints do not explain service imports. Kelle
et al. (2012) study the choice of export mode (cross-border trade vs. foreign affiliate)
for 2005 using the same matched data set as Biewen et al. (2012). The most pro-
ductive firms8 export via foreign affiliate to circumvent policy barriers (e.g., tariffs).
In addition, firms tend to trade services with high-wage countries, while high wages
in the importing country foster cross-border trade.
The recent literature in trade and finance, which we reviewed above, debates whether
financial conditions of firms are able to explain the large (worldwide) drop in trade
flows. One important question evolving from this discussion is whether trade in
services is differently affected than trade in goods. Borchert and Mattoo (2009)
illustrate evidence that services were indeed crisis-resilient after the financial shock
in 2008. The authors argue that the drop in demand for services was less pronounced
than the decline in goods. Accordingly, service exporters are less dependent on
external finance than exporting manufacturers. The potential explanation lies in
the nature of the non-storage property of services and that certain services are also
demanded during an economic crisis. Subsequent to the literature review, which
provides the most important insights for the following chapters, we start with the
examination of the export premium in bank lending.
8Firm productivity is measured by the number of foreign markets that is served by the firm.
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3. Extra Credit: Bank Finance and Firm Export
Status in Germany9
3.1. Motivation
The dramatic decline in world trade in 2008/09 after the bankruptcy of Lehman
Brothers (‘Great Trade Collapse’) has led to a growing interest in the procedures of
trade financing, highlighting the role of financial factors for trade activity. The recent
literature on international trade documents (and emphasizes) sizable trade-related
differences across firms. Firms not only vary strongly by trade activity. Typically,
only a small fraction of a country’s firms engage in exports and imports. More
notably, firms that export also differ significantly from non-exporters in (almost)
all other relevant firm characteristics. Exporters are larger in size, more productive
and pay higher wages than non-exporters (see Bernard et al. (2007)). Exporters also
tend to produce a wider range of products and are less likely to cease operations
(see Bernard and Jensen (2007)).
In this chapter, we examine the difference between exporters and non-exporters
along another dimension: access to (and use of) bank credit. We aim to describe
the association between finance and cross-border trade in further detail, analyzing
empirically to what extent the provision of bank loans is affected by firm-specific
characteristics, including the firm’s export status. Our analysis is based on a novel
data set of firm-bank relationships in Germany. Specifically, we match information
from the German credit register (which covers the credit exposure of banks towards
individual borrowers) with detailed balance sheet data on the borrower. This data
set serves as the foundation for the subsequent chapters where we extend it with
additional data sources about banks (see Chapter 4) and firms (see Chapter 5). The
resulting, newly-compiled data set has, for our purposes, three key advantages. First,
the database covers all large-scale credit relationships in Germany. Since lenders are
required by law to report their credit exposure with a borrower exceeding a certain
threshold to the German central bank, the Deutsche Bundesbank, our results are
derived from a full sample of bank-firm credit linkages. Second, due to the pair-wise
structure of the credit register, the lender is properly identified. This structure allows
controlling directly for bank-specific features of credit provision such as differences
in lending policies or profitability. Third, the balance sheet data covers, along with
other firm data, information on the borrowers’ foreign sales. Based on this data, we
compute measures of a firm’s (aggregate) export activity. Previewing our results,
9This chapter is mainly based on a revised version of Goldbach and Nitsch (2013b).
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we find large exporter premia in bank lending. Our estimates indicate that Ger-
man exporting firms take on average 15% larger loans than non-exporters, holding
constant for other factors. To the extent that we properly control for firm-specific
determinants of access to external finance, these findings appear to provide broad
support for the trade finance channel between banks and exporters, which suggests
that exports are particularly sensitive to financial conditions. For instance, Amiti
and Weinstein (2011) emphasize that international trade involves higher default risk
and higher working capital requirements. Exporters rarely properly evaluate default
risk (turning instead to banks to provide insurance) and need more working-capital
financing because of long delivery times.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Subsection 3.2 describes the
data set, defines the main variables of interest and provides summary statistics,
followed by a presentation of the empirical results in Subsection 3.3. Finally, Sub-
section 3.4 summarizes the main results.
3.2. Data and Summary Statistics
To analyze bank-firm relationships in Germany, we use two different data sets, pro-
vided by Deutsche Bundesbank. For reasons of confidentiality, the micro data re-
quire a special status: the data are accessible, often in anonymized form, only at the
Bundesbank headquarters in Frankfurt. We begin by describing the data sources in
detail.
Our main source of data is the Bundesbank’s credit register, named MiMiK, which
was established in 1993. The register contains information on all loans in excess
of 1.5 million euro granted by banks in Germany to firms worldwide. According
to section 14 of the German Banking Act (Kreditwesengesetz ), banking institutions
based in Germany are required to report their large exposures on a quarterly basis to
allow the central bank to monitor indebtedness. Schmieder (2006) provides a more
detailed description of the database10. For each bank-firm relationship, the size and
composition of the credit exposure (both on and off balance sheet) is provided, along
with the name and address of the borrower as well as information on the lender.
The frequency of the data is quarterly, with information provided at the end of the
quarter. Our sample covers the period from 2005 to 2010.
The second source of information is the corporate balance sheets database of the
Bundesbank, Ustan. The Bundesbank has collected, mainly for refinancing pur-
10The German credit register was initially established in 1934, but reporting requirements were
occasionally adjusted to take account of inflation (raising the regulatory reporting threshold) and
structural changes in banking and financing techniques (e.g., adding credit derivatives to the defi-
nition of credit exposure).
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poses, extensive data on individual firms11. The data are often taken from financial
statements, but may also have been obtained from a mandatory questionnaire, based
on balance sheet and profit and loss accounts data12. Most notably for our purposes,
the database includes information on firms’ export sales. The balance sheets data
is on an annual basis. We merge the data with our information from the credit
register by the corresponding year (such that annual firm data is matched with the
loan data in each of the four quarters in a given year).
Unfortunately, the firm identifiers differ between the two data sets. Therefore, we
develop a propensity score matching algorithm, based on the name of the firm,
its legal form and its location. In the practical implementation of this matching
procedure, we use a cut-off minimum score of 90%. In total, the matching quote
between the two data sets is approximately 55%. In the following, we provide more
detailed information about the matched data set.
3.2.1. Definition of Variables
Before we estimate the exporter premium in bank lending, Table 3.1 illustrates a
brief description of the variables (and the data source). These include mostly bank-
firm specific variables (credit exposure, on balance sheet credit exposure and off
balance sheet credit exposure) from MiMiK and firm characteristics from Ustan.
11The Deutsche Bundesbank extended this data set over time by adding commercial data from
Hoppenstedt and Creditreform.
12As Sto¨ss (2001, p. 132) notes, these accounts are used for an examination of the creditworthi-
ness of parties to bills of exchange, since the Bundesbank Act requires the central bank to purchase
bills “backed by parties known to be solvent”.
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Table 3.1: Description of Variables
Variable Description Mnemonic Source
Credit exposure Total liabilities (including on bal-
ance sheet credit exposure, off bal-
ance sheet credit exposure, deriva-
tives, and debt guarantees) at the
end of the quarter
gesamt MiMiK
On balance sheet
credit exposure
Liabilities that have to be reported
on balance (e.g., credits, bonds)
forderungen MiMiK
Off balance sheet
credit exposure
Liabilities that do not have to be re-
ported on balance (e.g., securitized
assets)
außerbilanziell MiMiK
Exports Export sales AP30 Ustan
Export Share Share of foreign activity on overall
turnover
AP30/AP144 Ustan
Sales Total sales (without value added tax
and after sales deduction)
AP144 Ustan
Employment Average number of employees dur-
ing the business year (or, alterna-
tively, at the date of account)
AP34 Ustan
Productivity Value added (gross profit minus
rental and lease expenses minus
other operating expenses minus
taxes) divided by the number of em-
ployees
(AP153-
AP161-AP162-
AP159)/AP34
Ustan
Age Year of financial statement minus
establishment year
AGJ-AP7 Ustan
Multi-plant firm Annual financial statement is in-
cluded in a consolidated financial
statement
AP36 Ustan
Foreign equity
holdings
Foreign equity capital AP32 Ustan
Equity Equity capital AP137 Ustan
Debt Total debt (sum of short-term debt
and long-term debt)
AP111+AP128 Ustan
Assets Total assets (balance sheet total) AP88 Ustan
Industry Industry classification (WZ 2003) at
the 2-digit level
AP20 Ustan
Legal form Legal form ARECHT Ustan
State Federal state (by postal code of firm
headquarter)
plz MiMiK
Notes: The table describes the definitions of the variables and their data sources. All
data are obtained from Deutsche Bundesbank. MiMiK is the credit register, while Ustan
is the corporate balance sheet statistics.
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3.2.2. Descriptives
Table 3.2 presents a brief overview of the data. In total, the Bundesbank’s credit
register contains information on almost one million bank-firm pairs for the 24 quar-
ters from 2005 through 2010. For the large majority of the 14,800 loan-taking firms
in the data set, we also have complementary information on firm characteristics.
In fact, we lose only about 20% of the total number of (loan-quarter) observations
through our matching procedure. Most notably, the matched data set does not dif-
fer significantly from the full credit register data. For instance, the pair-wise credit
exposure consistently averages at about 8 million euro.
Table 3.2: Data Sets
MiMiK MiMiK-Ustan
Loan-quarter pairs 933,612 799,104
Firms 14,854 14,545
of which: Exporters 5,839
Banks 2,275 2,170
Mean loan value (1,000 euro) 8,145 8,148
Median loan value (1,000 euro) 2,250 2,305
Sales (bn. euro) 8,190
of which: Exports (bn. euro) 2,162
Notes: The table describes samples based on the German credit register and a
matched data set to which information on borrowers is added. The data cover the
period from 2005 to 2010 in quarterly frequency. All data are obtained from
Deutsche Bundesbank. MiMiK is the credit register, while Ustan is the corporate
balance sheet statistics.
Table 3.3 presents the summary statistics of the MiMiK-Ustan match which we use
for the estimation of the export premium in bank lending. For (almost) all variables
we have approximately 800,000 observations13. The average bank-firm credit expo-
sure features 8 million euro, while a large part of it (6 million euro) reflects classical
debt instruments which enter the balance sheet. In addition, exports account on
average for a modest part (42%) of overall total sales although only a certain frac-
tion of all firms in the data set actually export (34%). However, the average export
share on firm-level dimension is much lower (13%). The mean firm employs 2,630
employees and receives 2.698 million euro as value added per employee. We cover
mostly large firms which are established in their industry (mean age of 50 years), and
many belong to a larger cooperation (about 59%). Moreover, the balance sheet data
13The only exception is firm productivity because we exclude negative values in our analysis.
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illustrate that the average firm finances itself primarily through debt (68%). The
high standard deviations indicate a large variation among bank-firm relationships.
Table 3.3: Summary Statistics of Variables
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Credit exposure 799,104 8,147 35,990
On balance sheet 799,104 6,103 25,351
Off balance sheet 799,104 1,825 21,871
Exports 799,104 434,986 3,592,742
Export Share 799,104 0.131 0.239
Sales 799,104 1,034,939 5,733,372
Employment 799,104 2,630 15,031
Productivity 763,272 2,698 32,273
Age 799,104 50.32 77.09
Multi-plant firm 799,104 0.591 0.492
Foreign equity holdings 799,104 966 11,172
Equity 799,104 793,789 4,238,876
Debt 799,104 1,691,438 7,098,630
Assets 799,104 2,485,228 10,800,000
Notes: The table provides number of observations, mean and standard deviation of
the relevant variables. All data are obtained from Deutsche Bundesbank.
We aim to describe trade-related bank-firm relationships in more detail. To identify
possible differences in bank lending between exporters and non-exporters, we run
regressions of the following general form:
ln(Loanijkt) = α + βExporterijt +
∑
γXijt + φj + ηt + σk + νi + ijkt (3.1)
where Loanijkt is a measure of the credit exposure of bank k to firm i in indus-
try j at time t, Exporterijt is a measure of the firm’s export activity, typically a
dummy variable that takes the value of one if a firm has positive foreign sales (and
zero otherwise), Xijt covers a number of other firm characteristics, φj are industry-
specific, ηt time-specific, σk bank-specific and νi firm-specific fixed effects and ijkt
is the residual. Bernard et al. (2007) use a similar approach to quantify exporter
premia for other firm characteristics. As potentially relevant firm-specific variables
for lending other than export status, we consider firm size (approximated by total
sales and the number of employees), firm age, equity, foreign equity holdings, and
whether the firm belongs to a larger corporation. In addition, we experiment with
the inclusion of controls for firm location (federal state), the legal form of the firm,
and the lending entity (bank). In our most demanding specification, we also use a
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comprehensive set of firm-specific fixed effects, thereby identifying the association
between exports and lending from the variation in a firm’s export status over time
only.
3.3. Empirical Results
3.3.1. Baseline Regressions
Firm-specific information on large-scale loans by financing entities allows us to di-
rectly identify the exporter premium in external finance. Benchmark estimation
results are tabulated in Table 3.4. Each of the four columns reports the results of a
different regression specification of equation (3.1), gradually increasing the number
of additional explanatory variables to control for differences in bank lending across
firms.
Column (1) presents our basic specification, in which we regress the log value of
a bank’s credit exposure to a firm on the export status of the borrower, holding
constant for differences in lending relationships across (two-digit) industries and
over time. The estimated β coefficient on the exporter dummy takes a significantly
positive sign and the effect is economically large. According to our most parsimo-
nious specification of equation (3.1), the point estimate of β indicates that being an
exporter tends to increase the credit exposure of a firm by about 37%.
The next two columns show that about one-half of this effect is explained by firm
characteristics other than export participation. In column (2), we control for firm
size, firm age and structure of the firm (whether the firm belongs to a corporate
group, foreign asset holdings and firm equity). We additionally include fixed effects
for the location and legal form of the firm as well as lender-specific fixed effects in
column (3). While the estimated γ coefficients on the auxiliary variables assume
the expected sign and are statistically and economically significant, with larger and
older firms taking more loans while multi-plant firms and firms with access to foreign
capital (or capital within a firm group) often use alternative sources of financing, the
estimated β coefficient falls to about 0.15. These estimates suggest that exporters
take about 15% larger loans than non-exporters, holding other things constant.
In a final perturbation, we add to our specification a comprehensive set of firm-
specific fixed effects. Since this estimator takes account of all time-invariant firm
characteristics and exploits only variations in factors over time, the association be-
tween external finance and trade is exclusively identified from switches in a firm’s
trade activities. Unfortunately, there are only few changes in the exporter status
of firms in our sample. We observe 23,626 episodes (of bank-firm pairs) in which
25
3. Extra Credit: Bank Finance and Firm Export Status in Germany
a firm starts exporting and 19,797 export stops (representing in total a fraction of
5.4% of our sample of about 800,000 observations). Still, the estimate of β remains
positive and significant, again indicating that foreign sales are positively associated
with bank lending. Specifically, the point estimate of 0.02 implies that a financial
institution tends to increase its credit exposure to a firm that becomes an exporter
by about 2%14.
Table 3.4: Exporter Premium in Bank Lending
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables ln(Loan) ln(Loan) ln(Loan) ln(Loan)
Exporter 0.369*** 0.165*** 0.154*** 0.024**
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010)
ln(Sales) 0.060*** 0.070*** 0.046***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004)
ln(Age) 0.163*** 0.142*** 0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.029)
Multi-plant -0.478*** -0.413*** 0.023**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.010)
ln(Fdi) -0.018*** -0.009*** -0.011***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
ln(Equity) 0.183*** 0.173*** -0.015***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE No No Yes Yes
Legal FE No No Yes Yes
Bank FE No No Yes Yes
Firm FE No No No Yes
Observations 799,104 799,104 799,104 799,104
R2 0.052 0.103 0.194 0.730
Notes: OLS estimation. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes
significance at 1%, ** significance at 5% and * significance at 10%.
3.3.2. Robustness Checks
We perform extensive sensitivity analyses. The columns tabulate the result of a
different regression specification, corresponding exactly to those of Table 3.4.
14If we employ yearly data (e.g., mean values of bank-firm relationships or just keep the data
for the forth quarter) instead of the quarterly frequency we receive the same results regarding the
signs, magnitudes and levels of significance. The only difference is an insignificant coefficient in
column (4) due to the lower variation of the switches.
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We begin by varying our measure of export activity, replacing the plain export
dummy with the log share of foreign sales in total sales15. Using the export share as
explanatory variable takes the importance of exporting into account. The findings
can be obtained from Table A.1. Neither sign nor significance change in comparison
to our baseline results. According to our most parsimonious specification, an increase
in the export share by 1% increases the credit exposure by more than 1%. This effect
is statistically and economically highly significant. The elasticity becomes weaker
(0.4%) as soon as further control variables are considered. However, even in our
most demanding specification in column (4) the export share remains positive and
highly significant. The signs of all control variables remain the same in comparison
to Table 3.4.
We also experiment with using employment instead of sales as our proxy for firm
size. Table A.2 provides the estimation parameters. The choice of this other proxy
has no qualitative effect on our results. The signs and magnitudes are almost the
same as before. The only difference is reflected in the last column because the export
dummy now becomes (only) weakly significant.
Previous literature finds a positive correlation between firm size and firm produc-
tivity. Therefore, several empirical papers (e.g., Ahn et al. (2011b)) only include
firm size as explanatory variable for exporting because they cannot measure pro-
ductivity (due to lack of data). In addition, to control directly for firm size, we add
a separate control for firm productivity16. Table A.3 reports the results. We find
similar signs and magnitudes for our export dummy variable compared to our base-
line regression. Again, the exporter dummy becomes only weakly significant in the
last column, similar to Table A.2, where we use employment as proxy for firm size.
Firm productivity is positively correlated with the amount of credit exposure. This
coefficient becomes negative and highly significant only in the last column. Overall,
the prior results of a positive exporter premium (of about 15%) are confirmed.
Next, we split the sample into two sub-periods. Table A.4 presents the export
premium before the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 (Q3/2008),
while Table A.5 focuses on the crisis period. We show that the exporter premium
has become smaller since the beginning of the financial crisis (from about 18%
to 12-14%). However, while the magnitude of the decline depends on the exact
regression specification, our finding that exporters take out significantly larger loans
15Before taking logs, we increase foreign sales by the value of one to deal with the problem of
zero entries. Therefore, the number of observations remains constant.
16We compute a productivity measure from accessible firm-level information in the Bundes-
bank’s corporate balance sheet statistics (see Mu¨ller and Buch (1986)). Note that the number of
observations decreases because we exclude negative firm productivity from our sample.
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than otherwise identical non-exporters remains consistently unchanged. We also
split our sample along other lines. To investigate whether censoring plays a critical
role or not, we choose a loan volume of 2 million euro as splitting threshold17. Table
A.6 reports the coefficients below this threshold, whereas Table A.7 illustrates the
outcome for firms with a larger credit exposure. The point estimates of β turn
out to be particularly strong for firms with low credit exposure while for firms
above the threshold they become smaller. In addition, columns (2) and (3) in Table
A.7 even hint to a negative export premium. Consequently, for firms with large
credit exposure the evidence seems to be mixed. Overall, the findings indicate that
censoring should not be an issue.
Similarly, we divide the total credit exposure into direct credit debt (see Table A.8)
and off balance sheet liabilities (see Table A.9). The results become slightly less
robust. Table A.8 reveals that a positive exporter premium is present for classical
credit debt between 4-8%. However, the estimates in Table A.9 (of about 33-54%)
indicate that the overall exporter premium in bank lending from the baseline re-
gression is mainly due to an exporting firm’s access to a wider range of financing
instruments (e.g., derivatives and guarantees).
The specification seems to become even more demanding, with mixed estimation
results, when we use credit shares instead of credit values as dependent variable18.
We use credit exposure relative to total debt (from the balance sheet data) and
relative to total assets to further incorporate potential firm size effects. Table A.10
presents the outcome relative to total debt, Table A.11 focuses on total assets. If
we do not consider any control variables, we find a negative and highly significant
export premium. However, the inclusion of additional firm characteristics, state-
fixed effects, legal-fixed effects and bank-fixed effects leads to a positive coefficient
for the exporter dummy. All in all, the results hint at a positive (but economically
small) relationship.
Moreover, we want to attenuate the potential of reverse causality. Instead of arguing
that exporters are more dependent on external finance, more financial resources
could cause engagement in foreign market. We use lagged explanatory variables to
address this problem with a time lag of one period (year)19. The results can be
obtained from Table A.12. The evidence suggests that our benchmark estimates
remain essentially unaffected.
17This threshold is chosen because it lies near the reporting limit and the median value in the
sample.
18In particular, it should be noted that our data set covers credit exposure at the bank-firm
level.
19All explanatory variables are provided on annual basis.
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Finally, we allow for time-variant industry and bank-fixed effects. It might be ar-
gued that banks which are chosen primarily by non-exporters have been differently
affected by the financial crisis than banks which provide finance primarily to ex-
porting firms. To deal with the extremely large number of fixed effects, we apply
the algorithm used by Guimaraes and Portugal (2010). Table A.13 offers the out-
come for this regression. Again, the results remain unchanged and hint at a positive
export premium in bank lending.
3.4. Summary
The sudden drop in world trade after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September
2008 has led to growing interest in procedures of trade finance. A growing body of
evidence seems to suggest that export-related activities of firms do indeed depend
disproportionately on finance from external sources.
This chapter contributes to this recent literature by examining differences in bank
lending between exporters and non-exporters. Examining a novel data set of credit
relationships in Germany covering all loans of more than 1.5 million euro over the
period from 2005 to 2010, we find that exporting firms take on average about 15%
larger loans than non-exporters, holding constant for a wide range of other firm and
bank characteristics.
The sensitivity of export activities to the availability (and the cost) of external
capital has clear policy implications. A reduction in access to trade credit (and a
tightening of credit conditions) is likely to hit hard on financially vulnerable ex-
port industries. As a result, policy measures and interventions that improve the
strength of the domestic banking and financial sector and thereby help avoiding fi-
nancial market disruptions are expected to have a measurable impact on a country’s
international trade.
Despite their overall consistency, our estimation results are still subject to limita-
tions. For instance, a potential issue might be omitted variables bias. Trade finance
could be obtained from financial markets abroad. Unfortunately, we are not able
to identify these bank-firm relationships. The estimated exporter premium may be
mainly due to characteristics of the exporting firm (some of which are potentially
unobserved) rather than the nature of the export activities, a critique that appears
to be generally less relevant for our specification which includes firm fixed effects.
Another obvious issue, open for future research, is to establish causality. The next
chapter concentrates on the effect of the financial crisis (instead of general differences
between exporters and non-exporters) on trade flows.
29
4. Cutting the Credit Line: Evidence from Germany
4. Cutting the Credit Line: Evidence from Germany20
4.1. Motivation
As highlighted above, the massive decline in world trade in the fourth quarter of 2008
(‘Great Trade Collapse’) has led to a growing interest into the procedures of trade
financing. Figure 4.1 illustrates the sharp drop in economic activity in Germany
after the collapse of Lehman Brothers.
Figure 4.1: Exports and Production in Germany, 2005-2011
Notes: The graphs plot seasonally adjusted monthly data as well as quarterly and
yearly averages. Aggregate data is provided by Deutsche Bundesbank.
With the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, financing conditions deteriorated dra-
matically. Now, we investigate whether this financial shock is able to explain the
immense drop in trading activities for German firms. If external finance is of greater
relevance for exports than for domestic sales, this asymmetry may explain why trade
has fallen more than GDP.
Based on this reasoning, a number of papers have recently examined empirically the
link between financial factors and trade activity. Amiti and Weinstein (2011) find
that the deterioration of the financial position of Japanese banks caused a decline
in their client firms’ exports relative to their domestic sales. At industry level,
20This chapter is mainly based on a revised version of Goldbach and Nitsch (2013a).
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Bricongne et al. (2012) and Chor and Manova (2012) conclude that the decline
in exports was stronger in sectors which are more heavily dependent on external
finance. Finally, Ahn et al. (2011a) argue that trade financing needs differ by mode
of transportation, with external financing being particularly important for shipments
by sea. Their results suggest that goods shipped by sea did indeed experience an
increase in prices relative to goods shipped by air or land during the crisis period.
From a theoretical point of view, Ahn (2011) provides a first formalization of the idea
that cross-border trade transactions are particularly sensitive to financial shocks.
Specifically, he argues that international trade finance loans are riskier than domes-
tic trade finance loans. In the model, the banks’ screening tests for a borrower,
the borrower’s domestic trading partners and its foreign trading partners differ in
precision levels (or, more precisely, costs). As a result, “international transactions
are subject to higher default risks than domestic transactions because the screening
test for foreign firms is more likely to misclassify bad firms as good.” (Ahn (2011,
p. 17))
In this chapter, we examine empirically various assumptions concerning the associ-
ation between financial conditions (the firm’s access to external finance) and firm
activity (especially exports). We make use of the same data set (MiMiK-Ustan)
which matches detailed information on pair-wise bank-firm relationships from the
Bundesbank’s credit register with information on lender and borrower characteris-
tics. Moreover, we consider additional information from banks using another data
set, BAKIS, to identify banks on the micro-level which were especially ‘affected’ by
the financial crisis.
Previewing our main results, we find that finance has an effect on domestic and
total sales but not on exports for German firms. In addition, banks which were
strongly ‘affected’ by the financial crisis indeed lowered their credit exposure. Fi-
nally, exporting firms which receive finance from ‘affected’ banks do not experience
a larger export decline compared to firms which participate in international trade
and finance their operations through healthy financial institutions.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Subsection 4.2 provides
a detailed description of the additional data source. The heart of this chapter is
Subsection 4.3, which motivates our empirical methodology and presents the results.
Finally, Subsection 4.4 briefly summarizes the main implications.
4.2. Data and Summary Statistics
This chapter relies on the previous MiMiK-Ustan match, which we described in
Chapter 3, and extends it with the prudential information system on banks, BAKIS.
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This data set contains information on a wide range of bank characteristics (e.g.,
equity and total assets), mainly taken from financial statements and quantitative
audit reports. Reports to the Bundesbank (as a German supervisory authority) are
mandatory for banks, often with a monthly frequency. BAKIS data are reported
with an annual frequency, reaching back to 1993.
4.2.1. Definition of Variables
The main focus in this section is the definition of what an ‘affected’ bank means.
There is no consensus in the academic literature as to which variable is the most
suitable to classify banks as strongly influenced by a financial shock. Paravisini
et al. (2011) use the share of foreign funding as identification strategy for Peruvian
firms. If a bank receives much funding from abroad (defined as above the mean value
of all financial institutions one year before the recent financial crisis occurred) it is
declared to be ‘affected’. For Peru this method seems reasonable because it is a small
open economy where firms mostly receive funding from one or two banks and shocks
from outside have an impact on the decision making of firms. For German banks
this approach seems not reasonable because the institutional settings are completely
different. We observe that German firms receive finance from multiple institutions
and Germany is highly integrated within Europe21. Another approach undertaken
by Rose and Wieladek (2011) is to use a bank-by-bank Google search with bank
name and ‘nationalization, nationalize or privatize’ as identification strategy. In
total, they classify approximately 150 banks as ‘affected’ in Great Britain.
Due to the fact that there is no academic consensus on how to define an ‘affected’
financial institution, we employ six different measures (four dummy variables and
two continuous variables) and analyze whether the results are strongly influenced
by our definitions. The first strategy is to classify banks as ‘affected’ which received
governmental help by the fund SoFFin (Financial Market Stabilization Fund). This
fund was established in October 17th, 2008 with the purpose of stabilizing the
financial system in Germany. The main instruments it provides are guarantees,
recapitalization and resolution agencies. The first column of Table 4.1 gives an
overview of which banks received governmental help22. As second measure we em-
21Germany is known for its Three Pillar banking system consisting of private institutions, sav-
ings and cooperatives. The market share in the provision of credit supply is especially large among
the savings and cooperatives (about 70%) because they are also present in regions with low popu-
lation density. Furthermore, within both these pillars the regional principle applies: savings within
a special region are not allowed to compete with our savings institutions (and the same is true for
cooperatives). Krahnen and Schmidt (2004) provide a detailed description of the German financial
system.
22The data set does not contain the names of the financial institutions but only bank identifiers
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ploy the SoFFin list including the bank’s subsidiaries. The third attempt to define
‘affected’ banks uses financial institutions which are part of the stress tests of the
European Banking Authority (EBA) in London. Column (2) of Table 4.1 illustrates
which banks are regarded as important/systematic by EBA. Some financial institu-
tions occur on both lists but the EBA sample covers more banks. The forth proxy
considers again the subsidiaries, but now from the EBA list.
Table 4.1: SoFFin and EBA
SoFFin EBA
Aareal Bank BayernLB
BayernLB Commerzbank AG
Commerzbank AG Dekabank
Corealcredit Bank AG Deutsche Bank AG
Du¨sseldorfer Hypothekenbank DZ Bank AG
HSH Nordbank Helaba
Hypo Real Estate HSH Nordbank
IKB Deutsche Industriebank Hypo Real Estate
Volkswagen Bank Landesbank Berlin
WestLB LBBW
NordLB
WestLB
WGZ Bank
Notes: The table describes recapitalized German banks using the Financial
Markets Stabilization Fund (SoFFin) and German banks covered by the European
Banking Authority (EBA) stress test exercise. The banks are sorted in alphabetic
order.
Another idea to describe banks which are especially hit by the financial crisis is to
use bank’s balance sheet measures. Our fifth identification strategy employs the
leverage ratio (defined here as equity ratio as in other empirical papers). Federico
and Vazquez (2012) use Bankscope data and show that a larger leverage ratio (or
equivalently a lower equity ratio) increases the probability of default for a set of
European banks. We use the leverage ratio with a time lag of one year23. The last
measure is non-performing loans. Higher write-offs are associated with banks that
were especially hit by the financial shock. We use the non-performing loans also
with a time lag of one year.
for external researchers. Fortunately, we received the information on which bank identifiers are on
the SoFFin list (the same holds true for EBA).
23The drawback of this measure is that the portfolio risk is not considered. It is possible that
banks operate with a high leverage ratio but the institution holds mostly safe assets with low risk
of default.
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4.2.2. Descriptives
Table 4.2 provides an overview of the various combinations of matched data sets. In
total, the Bundesbank’s credit register contains information on almost one million
bank-firm pairs for the 24 quarters from 2005 to 2010. For the large majority of
the 14,000 firms and 2,000 banks in the data set, we also have complementary
information on firm and bank characteristics. While the number of observations
decreases by about a fifth in the matched data sets, the number of firms and banks
is often considerably more robust24. Most notably, the subsamples based on the
matched data sets do not differ significantly from the raw data. The pair-wise
credit exposure consistently averages at about 8 million euro.
Table 4.2: Data Sets
MiMiK MiMiK-Ustan MiMiK-Ustan-BAKIS
Loan-quarter pairs 933,612 799,104 698,280
Firms 14,854 14,545 14,380
of which: Exporters 5,839 5,787
Banks 2,275 2,170 1,590
Mean loan value (1,000 euro) 8,145 8,148 7,584
Median loan value (1,000 euro) 2,250 2,305 2,170
Sales (bn. euro) 8,190 7,936
of which: Exports (bn. euro) 2,162 2,098
Notes: The table describes samples based on matched data sets. All data are
obtained from Deutsche Bundesbank. MiMiK is the credit register. Ustan is the
corporate balance sheet statistics. BAKIS is the prudential information system on
banks.
Figure 4.2 shows that financing conditions did indeed deteriorate in Germany after
the fourth quarter in 2008. After a strong expansion in previous quarters, total
credit measurably declined in 2009. The number of loans continued to increase, but
at a much smaller pace. Appendix B provides more details about the evolution of
bank-firm credit relationships in our sample (see Figure B.1).
In addition, Figure 4.3 shows that our firm-level data follows aggregate developments
quite well25. There is a (remarkably) close match between total exports and foreign
sales in our matched micro data sets.
Finally, we provide summary statistics about the different definitions of ‘affected’
24We observe a drop in the number of banks (about a quarter) between the MiMiK-Ustan and
MiMiK-Ustan-BAKIS match. The reason for this is the consolidation of savings and cooperatives
(and merging of other private institutions, e.g. Commerzbank and Dresdner Bank).
25This observation is astonishing because the reporting of the export sales is voluntary.
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Figure 4.2: Bank-Firm Credit Relationships in Germany, 2005-2010
Notes: The quarterly data are taken from the Bundesbank’s credit register for loans
of 1.5 million euro or more.
Table 4.3: Summary Statistics of Definitions
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev.
SoFFin 698,280 0.188 0.391
SoFFin (w/subsidiaries) 698,280 0.252 0.434
EBA 698,280 0.301 0.459
EBA (w/subsidiaries) 698,280 0.448 0.497
Equityt−1 584,318 0.024 0.030
NPLt−1 584,318 3,760,328 5,092,733
Notes: The table provides number of observations, mean and standard deviation of
the definitions of ‘affected’ bank. All data are obtained from Deutsche
Bundesbank.
bank in Table 4.3. The first four variables are approximated as dummy variables.
The data set contains about 19% of bank-firm relationships related to banks which
are on the SoFFin list. Accordingly, the ten banks (out of about 1,600) provide
credit to multiple firms and are important from an economic point of view. This
share increases if we extend the SoFFin list with its subsidiaries. Then, about 25% of
all observations are defined as ‘affected’. The EBA list contains more banks, which
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Figure 4.3: Firm-Level and Aggregate Data
Notes: The graphs are based on quarterly data from the Bundesbank’s credit register
matched with the Bundesbank’s corporate balance sheet statistics.
is also reflected in the higher share (30%) of bank-firm relationships. If we enlarge
this list with its subsidiaries, 46% of all observations are ‘affected’. These statistics
suggest that the data set provides enough variation in the treatment variable. In
addition, the equity ratio of about 2.4% is relatively low (high leverage ratio), while
the non-performing loans are relatively high (over 3 billion euro).
4.3. Empirical Results
4.3.1. Baseline Regressions
In our empirical analysis of bank-firm relationships in Germany, we proceed in steps.
First, we examine the association between credit supply and exports in more detail.
As starting point, we investigate the data set in its full dimensions (time, bank and
firm)26. In particular, we aim to analyze whether the sharp decline in world trade
is explained by a deterioration in the financing conditions of (exporting) firms27. In
addition, we compare these results with the relationship between credit and domes-
26The robustness checks section reduces the complexity of the data set with its three dimensions
by eliminating one of those.
27This descriptive approach is similar to Paravisini et al. (2011).
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tic/total sales. To estimate the first step, we use the following model:
∆ln(Yijt) = α + β∆ln(Loanik,t−1) + φjt + σk + νi + ijkt (4.1)
where Yijt is export sales (or export share), domestic sales or total sales of firm i
in industry j at time t (year), Loanik,t−1 is the credit exposure of bank k to firm i
at time t − 1 and we include a full set of industry-time specific (φjt), bank-specific
(σk) and firm-specific (νi) fixed effects. Equation (4.1) considers the bank-firm level
where multiple (annual) bank-firm relationships28 are present.
Table 4.4 reveals the regression results. Column (1) is defined as our baseline specifi-
cation which only includes the industry-time specific fixed effect as control variable.
The estimated coefficient of -0.047 is insignificant and implies that the change in
credit exposure has no impact on the change in export sales. In column (2), we
use the log of export share (defined as export sales relative to total sales) to con-
sider the importance of foreign operations relative to firm size. Reassuringly, the
estimation results remain virtually unchanged. In contrast, columns (3) and (4)
indicate positive and significant results if we use the change in domestic and total
sales as dependent variables. Consequently, a reduction in credit supply does not
affect export sales (or export share) but indeed lowers domestic and total sales.
Moreover, the descriptive analysis considers different fixed effects. The inclusion of
firm-specific fixed effects does not change the results, as the fifth column illustrates.
Furthermore, we distinguish between total sales for exporters and non-exporters to
examine whether both types of firms are differently affected in overall operations.
Columns (6) reveals that total sales of non-exporters decline more if credit provision
is reduced in comparison to exporters which obtain a less significant estimate and
a smaller magnitude in column (7). Altogether, there seems to be no correlation
between credit supply and exports, while the credit exposure has indeed an impact
on domestic and total sales.
28Our original data set MiMiK is based on quarterly data with information about the credit
exposure. We aggregate this quarterly credit exposure on an annual basis by calculating the mean
value if a bank-firm relationship persists several quarters within a year. In addition, the fourth
quarter was tested for robustness checks but the results remain unchanged.
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Table 4.4: Credit Exposure and Exports, Domestic Sales, Total Sales
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Variables ∆ln(Exportsijt) ∆ln(Export Shareijt) ∆ln(Domesticijt) ∆ln(Totalijt) ∆ln(Exportsijt) ∆ln(Totalijt) ∆ln(Totalijt)
(Non-Exporter) (Exporter)
∆ln(Loanik,t−1) -0.047 -0.001 0.013*** 0.011** -0.056 0.013** 0.007*
(0.033) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.041) (0.005) (0.004)
Industry-Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE No No No No Yes No No
Observations 13,740 13,740 35,950 35,999 13,740 22,259 13,740
R2 0.007 0.012 0.025 0.031 0.290 0.015 0.106
Notes: OLS estimation. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes significance at 1%, ** significance at 5% and * significance at
10%.
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Second, we examine whether banks which are classified as ‘affected’ , according to the
definitions we described above, lowered their credit exposure after the bankruptcy of
Lehman Brothers in September 2008. To analyze this question, we run the following
regression:
∆ln(Loanikt) = α + βaffectedk · crisist + ηt + σk + νi + ikt (4.2)
where Loanikt is the credit exposure of bank k to firm i at time t, affectedk is a
dummy variable that indicates whether the bank is ‘affected’ or not, crisist is a
dummy variable that equals one when the year is at least 2008 and ηt are time-
specific, σk bank-specific and νi firm-specific fixed effects and ikt is the residual.
Table 4.5 illustrates the regression results for equation (4.2). Each column repre-
sents a different definition of ‘affected’ financial institutions. Our baseline measure
is shown in column (1), which uses the SoFFin list. According to the estimation,
banks on the SoFFin list did indeed lower their credit exposures by 12% after the
financial shock. The consideration of SoFFin subsidiaries in column (2) does not
change the significance level but the coefficient becomes economically smaller (6.3%).
Column (3) presents the results for banks which are part of the EBA stress test exer-
cise. Again, β is statistically highly significant which indicates that ‘affected’ banks
restrict their credit supply by about 10.8%. The inclusion of EBA subsidiaries does
not have an impact on the qualitative result, but again the estimate is lower (about
7%). Column (5) shows that banks with higher leverage ratio (lower equity ratio)
in the past increase their lending positions (1.8%). This result is surprising because
we would expect that banks with a high leverage ratio prior to the bankruptcy of
Lehman Brothers in 2008 have to abandon some positions from their portfolio29.
Finally, banks which experienced higher write-offs cut their credit positions, as col-
umn (6) suggests. As a result, we observe that banks which are defined as ‘affected’
(with the only exception of the leverage ratio) engage less in lending operations after
the financial crisis.
29As noted before, we do not know whether the risk of the portfolio is adjusted.
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Table 4.5: Bank Health and Lending
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables ∆ln(Loanikt)
SoFFin·crisis -0.120***
(0.025)
SoFFin (w/subsidiaries)·crisis -0.063***
(0.022)
EBA·crisis -0.108***
(0.021)
EBA (w/subsidiaries) ·crisis -0.069***
(0.019)
Equityt−1 -1.80***
(0.690)
NPLt−1 -7.48e-09**
(3.41e-09)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 138,490 138,490 138,490 138,490 138,490 138,490
R2 0.382 0.382 0.382 0.382 0.382 0.382
Notes: OLS estimation. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes significance at 1%, ** significance at 5% and * significance at
10%.
4. Cutting the Credit Line: Evidence from Germany
While correlations between variables may be interesting, we are particularly inter-
ested in the direction of causality in the relationship. Instead of credit affecting
exports (investment due to fixed costs), the causality may also run the other way
around (exporters have characteristics which are attractive for banks, e.g. high prof-
itability). The key difficulty with the reported measure of credit exposure is that it
represents an equilibrium outcome. An agreed credit line is the result of matched
credit supply and credit demand between a lender and a borrower. To deal with this
endogeneity, we make use of the financial crisis as an exogenous shock which affects
the provision of credit because the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September
2008 was unexpected. Now, we aim to understand whether firms which receive credit
from ‘affected’ banks export less than similar firms which have a relationship with
a healthy institution after the financial crisis. We employ propensity score matching
as estimation strategy30, which is the subject of growing interest in the recent empir-
ical literature. The idea is to identify an optimal counterfactual in non-experimental
data in the sense that both exporters are identical in several characteristics and only
differ in the outcome variable (change in exports) and the treatment (whether the
firm receives funds from ‘affected’ financial institutions). In a first step, we estimate
the probability of treatment using a probit estimator. To determine the score, we
use the same time (third quarter of 2008)31, industry, firm size (approximated by
the number of employees) and credit exposure. Then, we employ nearest neighbor
matching32: the absolute difference between the probabilities of one firm which is
treated and another that is non-treated is minimized. We choose the SoFFin list as
baseline measure for ‘affected’ banks33 in the following. The empirical implemen-
tation of this estimation procedure requires the bank dimension to vanish from our
bank-firm data set34. Due to this fact, we now define firms as ‘affected’ instead of
banks. We employ three different definitions for ‘affected’ firm: at least one bank is
‘affected’, only firms with one bank-firm relationship (and this bank is ‘affected’) are
kept in the data set and the share of credit exposure from ‘affected’ banks is larger
than 50%. After identifying the optimal counterfactual, we pool all industries to-
30It was first proposed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) in the context of medicine.
31Exports, domestic and total sales are reported on an annual basis. Accordingly, the drop in
operations can only be observed for 2008 because in 2009 the world economy recovered.
32Becker and Ichino (2002) provide an overview about different approaches to estimate the
average treatment effect.
33The experimentation with the other definitions provides similar insights. We employ dummy
variables for leverage ratio and non-performing loans and define banks as ‘affected’ if the equity
ratio is lower than the 25% percentile and if the non-performing loans are greater than the 75%
percentile in 2007.
34The time panel structure is excluded by focusing exclusively on Q3/2008. In addition, we
aggregate the credit exposure at firm-level.
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gether and compare the change of exports, domestic and total sales between control
and treatment group in 2008 (compared to 2007 before the financial crisis). Table
4.6 illustrates the results for the different definitions of ‘affected’ firm. According
to economic theory, ∆ln(Exports) should be negative and statistically significant.
However, we do not find any evidence for differences between control and treatment
group. This also holds true for domestic sales in column (2) and for total sales in
column (3) as dependent variables. This finding reveals that exporting firms which
receive credit from ‘affected’ institutions do not experience larger drops in exports
than firms which have a relationship with a healthy bank. As a result, the supply
conditions do not seem to be the main driving force for the explanation of the ‘Great
Trade Collapse’ for Germany35.
Table 4.6: Propensity Score Matching
(1) (2) (3)
Definitions ∆ln(Exports) ∆ln(Domestic) ∆ln(Total) Treatment Control
At least one -0.037 -0.021 -0.020 4,211 2,076
bank ‘affected’ (0.064) (0.021) (0.021)
Firms with one -0.069 -0.025 -0.029 693 568
bank-firm relation (0.133) (0.049) (0.047)
Share of ‘affected’ -0.052 -0.041 -0.039 1,693 1,413
> 50% (0.089) (0.028) (0.028)
Notes: Propensity score matching (nearest neighbor). Robust standard errors in
parentheses. *** denotes significance at 1%, ** significance at 5% and * significance at
10%.
4.3.2. Robustness Checks
In the following, we use the same equations as before but reduce the complexity
by eliminating different dimensions. Again, we start with the association between
credit and exports36. We approximate the (overall) firm-level debt as explanatory
variable, for which we aggregate the (annual) credit exposures of all banks into one
variable. Therefore, every firm receives only one value as level of (overall) debt and
equation (4.3) omits the bank dimension (which was labeled as k). The regression
model takes the following form:
∆ln(Exportsijt) = α + β∆ln(Loani,t−1) + φjt + νi + ijt (4.3)
35We also experimented with different estimation methods (radius, kernel and stratification
matching). The results remained the same.
36Now, we only consider exports because the main focus of this chapter is the analysis of foreign
operations. The results for domestic and total sales remain unchanged.
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where Exportsijt is exports of firm i in industry j at time t, Loani,t−1 is the ag-
gregated credit exposure of firm i at time t− 1, while φjt are industry-time-specific
and νi denote firm-specific fixed effects and ijt is the residual. Table B.1 provides
the estimated coefficients. The first column includes only industry-time fixed effects
as additional control variable. β remains insignificant and confirms our previous
findings. Column (2) shows that the bank-specific fixed effects also do not have an
impact on the significance level. Consequently, we find no evidence for a correlation
between the change in exports and in credit exposure.
Next, we repeat the examination of whether ‘affected’ banks lowered their credit
exposure. Now, we aggregate the granted loans of banks and omit the firm dimension
(which was labeled as i). A formal representation is given in the following equation:
∆ln(Loankt) = α + βaffectedk · crisist + ηt + σk + kt (4.4)
where Loankt is the credit exposure of bank k at time t, affectedk is a dummy
variable that indicates whether the bank is ‘affected’ or not, crisist is a dummy
variable that equals one if the year is at least 2008, ηt are time-specific and σk
bank-specific fixed effects and kt is the residual.
Table B.2 provides the regression results for equation (4.4). The column structure is
in line with Table 4.5 where every column reflects a different definition of ‘affected’
financial institution. As before, column (1) suggests a negative and highly significant
impact of being on the SoFFin list but the economic effect is higher (19%) compared
to the disaggregated case (12%). Adding the subsidiaries in column (2) changes the
results slightly. The effect is still negative but now with a lower significance level and
a higher magnitude (28%). Moreover, banks on the EBA list lowered their credit
exposure by 9.7%, as column (3) highlights. Again, the consideration of subsidiaries
in column (4) leads to a weaker significance and a higher coefficient. In contrast
to our previous findings, columns (5) and (6) offer insignificant results. Therefore,
banks with lower equity ratio (higher leverage ratio) and higher non-performing loans
do not adjust their credit positions in comparison to other financial institutions.
Altogether, the majority of definitions (SoFFin, SoFFin with subsidiaries, EBA and
EBA with subsidiaries) confirm our previous estimates.
Finally, the last robustness check concerns the propensity score matching. A possible
explanation for the insignificant findings in the baseline regression is the presence of
heterogeneity among industry sectors which we cover in the whole data set. For this
reason, we repeat the propensity score matching and report the findings for each
industry separately. The robustness check employs the SoFFin list as measure for
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‘affected’ banks, just as in our baseline analysis37. Tables B.3 and B.4 illustrate the
outcome for the first definition of ‘affected’ firm (at least one bank in the portfolio
is ‘affected’). In the following, we discuss only the differences in changes of exports
because they are the main focus of this chapter. The majority reveals insignificant
results which largely confirms the prior findings. However, we find some exceptions,
where disparities between control and treatment group actually occur. ‘Affected’
firms in industries 14 (other mining and quarrying) and 23 (manufacture of coke,
refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel) export more after the financial crisis,
but the significance level is weak. Moreover, in industry 51 (wholesale trade and
commission trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles) this positive difference
is highly significant. These findings suggest that German firms export more basic
materials and especially benefit from wholesale trade. In contrast, industries related
to chemistry suffer from the financial crisis. The drop in exports is weakly signifi-
cant for industry 21 (manufacture of pulp, paper and paper products), while more
significant for industry 24 (manufacture of chemicals and chemical products).
To generalize these insights, Tables B.5 and B.6 employ the second definition of
‘affected’ firms which keeps merely firms with one bank relationship in a subsample.
Unfortunately, different results emerge. We find that industries 25 (manufacture of
rubber and plastic products) and 63 (supporting and auxiliary transport activities)
export more, but this difference is only weakly significant. In contrast, firms in
industry 52 (retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles) export less,
while the significance level is stronger for industry 29 (manufacture of machinery
and equipment).
At last, Tables B.7 and B.8 provide the results for the third definition (the share of
‘affected’ credit exposure exceeds 50% of the complete portfolio). Now, we only find
positive and significant results for industries 32 (manufacture of radio, television and
communication equipment) and 34 (manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-
trailers). Altogether, heterogeneity among the different industries and definitions for
‘affected’ firm is indeed present. However, we do not find any significant differences
for the majority of industries which confirms our baseline results.
4.4. Summary
The sudden drop in world trade after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September
2008 is often labeled as the ‘Great Trade Collapse’. Puzzled by this dramatic and
unexpected decline in cross-border trade activity, a number of recent papers aim
37We also employ the other five measures. The insights from these additional robustness checks
remain unchanged.
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to explain this pattern, applying different data sources. For instance, Amiti and
Weinstein (2011) identify a causal link between trade and financial conditions for
Japanese firms. The deterioration in financial conditions of banks can partly explain
the large drop in trade flows. In contrast, Behrens et al. (2010) conclude that finan-
cial conditions are not the most important factor for explaining the trade pattern
for Belgian firms. They suggest that the fall in demand has had a much stronger
impact. Bricongne et al. (2012) argue that lower demand and the intensive margin
for large firms are the most important determinants. As a result, empirical findings
appear generally mixed. Based on three matched micro data sets (MiMiK-Ustan-
BAKIS) from the Deutsche Bundesbank, we identify various linkages between firms
and banks in Germany. In addition, we are able to classify financial institutions as
‘affected’ by the financial crisis.
First, the results suggest that there is no correlation between exports and credits.
However, the credit exposure has a positive impact on other operations (domes-
tic and total sales). Differentiating the total sales for exporters and non-exporters
reveals that total sales of non-exporters are more affected by the provision of fi-
nance. This descriptive analysis illustrates that German exports are not that much
influenced by the changing environment of the (domestic) financial market.
Second, we provide six different measures which define ‘affected’ bank and show
that ‘affected’ financial institutions indeed lowered their credit exposures after the
financial crisis. This outcome is not trivial because the overall development of the
financial market (see Figure 4.2) illustrates that the aggregate credit exposure does
not drop by about 20% (as exports do) between 2008 and 2010, while the number
of bank-firm relationships even increases after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers
in September 2008.
Finally, the propensity score matching leads to the insight that German exporting
firms which have a relationship with an ‘affected’ bank do not export less than
comparable firms which obtain finance from healthy institutions. Even if we consider
each industry separately (instead of pooling all results together) the same picture
emerges.
The findings are not surprising for the following reasons: we observe an increase in
the number of bank-firm relationships after September 2008. The majority of them
appears between banks and exporters. One possible explanation is that exporters
are seen as valuable borrowers (due to different firm characteristics) to financial
institutions. Alternatively, the cause lies in the general institutional structure of
the German financial system. Although large (and mostly private) banks lowered
their credit exposure, more savings and cooperatives stepped into the market to
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help German firms. Altogether, we conclude that (trade) finance does not influence
foreign operations in Germany. Therefore, other factors (e.g., lower demand from
abroad) seem to explain the large drop during the ‘Great Trade Collapse’. This
result is in line with other European countries such as Belgium (see Behrens et al.
(2010)) or France (see Bricongne et al. (2012)) and Peru (see Paravisini et al. (2011)).
However, the results have to be interpreted with some caution. We do not know
how the firms actually use the credit they receive from banks. Therefore, we have
to assume that some part of the credit exposure finances foreign operations. In
addition, the credit exposure can change for various reasons: there is no information
about the interest rate which is paid for different credits, about the number of loans
which are granted from a particular bank and about the duration of credit lines.
Finally, we do not observe foreign bank-firm relationships (e.g., a firm could export
some goods to India and uses an Indian branch of a German financial institution).
Nevertheless, our data set is a good starting point for investigating the link between
the financial characteristics of banks and the real economy.
The previous analysis in Chapter 3 dealt with the estimation of export premia in
bank lending and found positive evidence (in the sense that exporters depend more
on external finance than non-exporters). In the following chapter, we want to extend
this investigation by distinguishing between goods exporters and service exporters.
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5. Export Premium in Germany: Goods vs. Services
5.1. Motivation
The share of services in the overall value creation (GDP) and the employment force
has risen in many industrialized countries during the last decades38. Due to this
observation, the economic impact of services receives more attention in the scien-
tific debate because they differ fundamentally from the characteristics of goods. An
important aspect within this discussion is the role of services in the recent trade
literature. According to standard textbooks, services are non-tradable products
because they possess high transportation costs. The consumption of several ser-
vices needs proximity to customers (e.g., a haircut or health services by a doctor).
Based on this reasoning, the textbooks on international trade do not cover theo-
ries or empirics about services at all. However, the recent development of trade
flows indicates that more and more services nowadays are indeed traded across bor-
ders. Francois and Hoekman (2010) emphasize that technological progress (e.g., the
spread of the Internet) leads to a decrease in trade costs of services, which boosts
foreign operations. For Germany, we also observe the growing importance of ser-
vices in international transactions39. Figure 5.1 illustrates the (monthly) evolution
of aggregated trade flows for goods and services exports from 2005 to 2013. Using
January 2005 as reference point, services indeed experienced a larger increase than
trade in goods (in relative terms). Moreover, service exports are characterized by
a seasonal component: a peak emerges every year in December (which is not due
to a higher transaction number between Germany and other countries40). In addi-
tion, we observe that trade in services did not experience such a large drop during
the recent financial crisis in comparison to exports of goods. Figure C.1 illustrates
that heterogeneity among service sectors is present (e.g., the cyclical overall pattern
is dominated by the financial service sector and other services while other sectors
reveal different developments). As a result, the analysis of trade in services across
countries is highly relevant from an economic point of view. Until now, we do not
know much about the determinants of service exports41.
38Jensen (2011) provides an extensive description of the development of services for US data.
39Germany is known for its strong export economy. According to the balance of payments,
Germany has a trade surplus in goods but a trade deficit in services, meaning that Germany
imports more services from abroad than exports. However, this deficit in services has become
weaker over time.
40This argument is based on the SITS transaction data of service exports which we use in this
chapter.
41In recent years, trade in services transaction level data were made accessible for different
countries.
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Figure 5.1: Evolution of Goods and Services Exports
Source: Aggregate monthly trade statistics by Deutsche Bundesbank.
Especially the role of external finance for service exporters is unclear. Recent contri-
butions (see Ariu (2012)) argue that a lower participation rate in exports of service
firms in comparison to manufactures hints at higher entry barriers. On this account,
service exporters depend more on external finance to cover the fixed entry costs. We
do not know any single paper which addresses this problem directly.
This chapter examines whether service exporters are indeed more dependent on
external finance than goods exporters. We extend our previous MiMiK-Ustan match
with another data set which is provided by Deutsche Bundesbank, the International
Trade in Services Statistics (SITS). This new data set identifies service exporters
and quantifies the value of service exports. The findings reveal that goods exporters
receive on average 16% larger credit exposures from financial institutions compared
to non-exporters. In addition, service exporters are more dependent on external
finance with a premium of about 17% relative to goods exporters.
This chapter proceeds as follows: Subsection 5.2 provides information on the ex-
tended data match and summary statistics. Subsection 5.3 covers the baseline re-
gression results and several robustness checks, while Subsection 5.4 highlights the
main insights.
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5.2. Data and Summary Statistics
We merge our MiMiK-Ustan match from Chapter 3 with another data set, which
is the German International Trade in Services (SITS) statistics and is also provided
by Deutsche Bundesbank, to identify service exporters42. SITS covers all trade
transactions (exports and imports) above a defined threshold (12,500 euro) and
is part of the Balance of Payments (BoP) system in Germany. Section 26 of the
Foreign Trade and Payments Act (Außenwirtschaftsgesetz ) and Section 56a ff and
59ff of the Foreign Trade and Payments Regulation (Außenwirtschaftsverordnung)
serve as legal basis for the mandatory reporting of firms. The General Agreement
on Trade in Services (GATS) defines four different modes of trade in services: cross-
border trade (mode 1), consumption abroad (mode 2), commercial presence (mode
3) and presence of natural persons (mode 4). All modes are included in SITS
with only one exception: mode 3 is part of the Micro Database Direct Investments
(MiDi). SITS was made available recently for research purposes. Biewen et al.
(2013) provide an overview of the data set and some stylized facts (e.g., whether
trade in services increased through the extensive or intensive margin over time).
Unfortunately, the SITS data set only covers export (and import) values, product
classification, destination country and firm identifier on a monthly frequency. It
does not contain further firm characteristics which could explain the determinants
of trade in services43. As for the MiMiK data set, the firm identifier in SITS and
Ustan are not the same due to different (independent) data generating processes.
First, we match SITS with Ustan by using again a propensity score matching pro-
cedure, taking the firm’s name and place of headquarters into account. Fortunately,
the Ustan firm identifier for the MiMiK-Ustan and the SITS-Ustan match are identi-
cal. For this reason the implementation of a MiMiK-Ustan-SITS match is generally
unproblematic, once the SITS-Ustan match is conducted. Altogether, we are able to
identify 1,155 firms with detailed information about their relationships to banks and
detailed services trade data. For the estimation of the export premium of service
exporters, we only match the service export transaction data and neglect the import
transactions as mentioned before.
42The data set also reports information about service imports. However, we do not use this
here because we want to compare the findings with our previous results.
43The only exception, which was mentioned before in the literature review, is the interrelation
between SITS and MiDi. Both employ the same identifiers for the firms such that matching these
two data sets is unproblematic.
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5.2.1. Definitions of Variables
The main focus in this section is the definition of service exporter. We observe
detailed (quarterly)44 information about exports in services due to the reporting
threshold of 12,500 euro, which is mandatory in SITS, and (annual) total exports
which is provided voluntarily by Ustan. Unfortunately, Ustan does not report de-
tailed information about the nature of the export sales. For this reason we have to
impose certain assumptions for the following empirical section: a firm with positive
service exports from SITS is defined as service exporter, even if the reporting entry
of export sales in Ustan equals zero. One potential problem with this definition is
that manufacturing firms, which generate a huge part of their revenues from the
export of goods (e.g., the seller of a PC may also provide custom services like an IT
support), are also classified as service exporters. A possible solution is to calculate
the (annual) share of service exports on overall export sales and impose different
thresholds (25% percentile, median or 75% percentile) to examine whether the find-
ings change significantly45. In contrast, a firm is classified as goods exporter if the
firm reports positive export sales to Ustan but does not belong to SITS.
5.2.2. Descriptives
We admit that two problems could arise from the definition above: first, the firm ex-
ports services but does not report the transaction to Deutsche Bundesbank because
the transaction value is below the threshold of 12,500 euro. Due to the findings
of the recent literature (e.g., trade in services is concentrated among the largest
enterprises), we do not think that this problem poses a large endogeneity issue. Sec-
ond, the propensity score matching procedure does not match the firm based on firm
name, location and legal form. Figure 5.2 presents the comparison between the SITS
and the matched SITS-Ustan46 data set. Both graphs show similar developments
over time. Therefore, we argue that the SITS-Ustan match provides a reasonable
representation for the overall development of trade in services in Germany. In the
following, we use a combination of the SITS-Ustan data set with the MiMiK-Ustan
match.
Table 5.1 illustrates the characteristics of this MiMiK-Ustan-SITS match in compar-
44SITS is reported on monthly basis but we aggregate the data on a quarterly frequency.
45We impose these different definitions and re-estimate the service exporter premium. Neither
the level of significance nor the sign or the magnitude change much. For this reason, we use the
least restrictive definition and do not impose any threshold for the share of service exports on
overall foreign sales in the following regressions.
46The SITS-Ustan match reveals a matching quote of about 20%. Nevertheless, a large fraction
of the overall transaction value is obtained through the match.
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Figure 5.2: Transaction Data and Match
Notes: The graphs are based on quarterly data from the Bundesbank’s SITS data
set matched with the Bundesbank’s corporate balance sheet statistics Ustan.
Table 5.1: Data Sets
MiMiK MiMiK-Ustan MiMiK-Ustan-SITS
Loan-quarter pairs 933,612 799,104 105,212
Firms 14,854 14,545 1,155
of which: Exporters 5,839 1,155
Banks 2,275 2,170 1,309
Mean loan value (1,000 euro) 8,145 8,148 16,418
Median loan value (1,000 euro) 2,250 2,305 3,517
Sales (bn. euro) 8,190 2,960
of which: Exports (bn. euro) 2,162 1,157
of which: Service exports (bn. euro) 9,258
Notes: The table describes samples based on matched data sets. All data are
obtained from Deutsche Bundesbank. MiMiK is the credit register. Ustan is the
corporate balance sheet statistics. SITS is the transaction information on trade in
services.
ison to our previous MiMiK-Ustan match from Chapter 3. The loan-quarter pairs
drop to about 105,212 observations and we observe only 1,155 service exporters.
About half of all observations (55,721) also reveal positive export sales from Ustan.
51
5. Export Premium in Germany: Goods vs. Services
The mean and median credit exposure illustrate that there seems to be some se-
lection bias towards large firms. For the empirical analysis in the next section, we
append the unmatched firms from MiMiK-Ustan to the MiMiK-Ustan-SITS data
set. Altogether, we again have a data set with 799,104 observations but with the
additional information whether a firm is classified as service exporter and the value
of service exports.
5.3. Empirical Results
5.3.1. Baseline Regressions
In this section, we aim to reveal whether service exporters depend more on external
finance in comparison to goods exporters. We proceed in two steps and run the
same regressions of the following general form as before:
ln(Loanijkt) = α + βGoodsijt +
∑
γXijt + φj + ηt + σk + νi + ijkt (5.1)
where Loanijkt is a measure of the credit exposure of bank k to firm i in industry
j at time t, Goodsijt is a dummy variable indicating whether the firm is a goods
exporter47 or not exporting at all, Xijt covers the same set of firm characteristics
as in Chapter 3, φj are industry-specific, ηt time-specific, σk bank-specific and νi
firm-specific fixed effects and ijkt is the residual. For the estimation of equation
(5.1) we only consider goods exporters and non-exporters. In the second step, we
are interested in the following relationship:
ln(Loanijkt) = α + βServiceijt +
∑
γXijt + φj + ηt + σk + νi + ijkt (5.2)
where Serviceijt is a dummy variable indicating whether the firm is a service ex-
porter (then the dummy takes value one) or a goods exporter and all other variables
are defined as in equation (5.1). Therefore, equation (5.2) reflects the premium of
service exporters in comparison to goods exporters. The estimation structure is
identical to Chapter 3 which focused exclusively on the general difference between
exporters and non-exporters. The strategy which we employ in this chapter has the
advantage to compare the findings directly with previous results.
Table 5.2 provides the estimation results from equation (5.1). We include additional
control variables in each specification as before. Column (1) presents the bench-
mark result if we only use the goods exporter dummy variable, industry-specific
and (quarterly) time fixed effects. The β coefficient is positive and statistically
47The definition of ‘goods exporter’ can be obtained from the prior section.
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highly significant hinting at a goods exporter premium of about 32% relative to
non-exporters. About one half of this premium vanishes by including other firm
characteristics, as column (2) indicates. The findings illustrate that larger firms (in
terms of sales), older firms and firms with more equity receive more bank finance,
while firms that belong to a corporate group or possess foreign asset holdings use
different financial sources. The consideration of locational, legal and bank-fixed ef-
fects does not have any qualitative effect on the results. Column (3) shows a positive
and highly significant goods exporter premium of about 16%. Even if we include
firm-specific fixed effects, the level of significance and the sign do not change (but
the magnitude drops to about 3%). Altogether, we find a positive and robust export
premium for goods exporters. The results are qualitatively and quantitatively in line
with our estimations from Chapter 3. Even the control variables possess equal signs
and almost equal magnitudes.
Table 5.2: Exporter Premium for Goods Exporters vs. Non-Exporters
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables ln(Loan) ln(Loan) ln(Loan) ln(Loan)
Goods 0.325*** 0.160*** 0.164*** 0.033***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010)
ln(Sales) 0.065*** 0.076*** 0.045***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004)
ln(Age) 0.144*** 0.129*** -0.007
(0.003) (0.004) (0.030)
Multi-plant -0.534*** -0.444*** 0.028***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.010)
ln(Fdi) -0.012*** -0.004* -0.005*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
ln(Equity) 0.183*** 0.172*** -0.016***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE No No Yes Yes
Legal FE No No Yes Yes
Bank FE No No Yes Yes
Firm FE No No No Yes
Observations 694,351 694,351 694,351 694,351
R2 0.061 0.111 0.197 0.742
Notes: OLS estimation. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes
significance at 1%, ** significance at 5% and * significance at 10%.
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Table 5.3: Exporter Premium for Service Exporters vs. Goods Exporters
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables ln(Loan) ln(Loan) ln(Loan) ln(Loan)
Service 0.539*** 0.168*** 0.171*** 0.002
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.022)
ln(Sales) 0.052*** 0.061*** 0.086***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.018)
ln(Age) 0.243*** 0.186*** 0.060
(0.005) (0.006) (0.065)
Multi-plant -0.317*** -0.352*** 0.052***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.016)
ln(Fdi) -0.025*** -0.017*** -0.008***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
ln(Equity) 0.135*** 0.139*** -0.012**
(0.002) (0.003) (0.005)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE No No Yes Yes
Legal FE No No Yes Yes
Bank FE No No Yes Yes
Firm FE No No No Yes
Observations 321,073 321,073 321,073 321,073
R2 0.030 0.060 0.178 0.695
Notes: OLS estimation. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes
significance at 1%, ** significance at 5% and * significance at 10%.
Next, we discuss the estimation results from equation (5.2) which are reported in
Table 5.3. Again, we find a positive and significant β coefficient in the first column
which is also economically large (about 54%) and means that service exporters
depend more on external finance than goods exporters. This effect persists if we
control for other firm characteristics, but the magnitude becomes smaller. The
control variables in column (2) show the same (expected) signs as before. The
service export premium itself drops to about 17%. The inclusion of additional
location-specific, legal-specific and bank-specific fixed effects in column (3) does not
have an impact on the outcome. The service export premium remains robust at
about 17%. In contrast, the most demanding specification, which considers firm-
specific fixed effects, leads to an insignificant service export premium. This last
finding is not surprising because we observe only few switches of service exporters
becoming goods exporters and vice versa (only 7,408 of overall 321,073 observations
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which corresponds to about 2%)48. Overall, the findings suggest a positive service
exporter premium of about 17% compared to goods exporters.
5.3.2. Robustness Checks
We perform exactly the same sensitivity analyses as in Chapter 3. The columns
tabulate the result of a different regression specification, corresponding exactly to
those in Table 5.2 and Table 5.3.
We start with the discussion of the goods exporter premium relative to non-exporters.
We vary the measure of export activity and use the log share of foreign sales in total
sales. The regression results can be obtained from Table C.1 which confirm the find-
ings of the baseline specification. An increase in the export share by 1% increases
the credit exposure by more than 1%. This elasticity becomes weaker as soon as
further control variables are included in the following two columns. Even the con-
sideration of firm-specific fixed effects in column (4) does not change the sign and
the level of significance.
Again, we also use employment as proxy for firm size. Table C.2 provides the estima-
tion parameters. The choice of this other proxy has no qualitative and quantitative
effect on our results. The signs and magnitudes are almost the same as for the
benchmark case.
Table C.3 reports the regression results if we control directly for a productivity
measure. We obtain the same signs and magnitudes for all four columns compared to
our baseline regression. The previous outcome of a positive goods exporter premium
(of about 16%) is confirmed.
Next, we split the sample into two sub-periods. Table C.4 presents the goods export
premium before the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 (Q3/2008),
while Table C.5 focuses on the crisis period. Again, the exporter premium becomes
smaller after the crisis. Taking firm-specific fixed effects into account, the difference
between goods exporters and non-exporters even vanishes, as the last column of
Table C.5 reflects.
As before, we consider the threshold of 2 million euro to evaluate whether censor-
ing matters for the findings. Table C.6 provides the results below this threshold,
whereas Table C.7 illustrates the outcome for firms with a larger credit exposure.
In comparison to previous findings, the evidence is mixed for goods exporters. All
four columns provide positive and highly significant results for loans below 2 million
euro. In contrast, the goods export premium becomes negative for the majority of
48The argument is that both types of exporters do not adjust their management strategy in the
short-run, even if we use the least restrictive definition of being a service exporter.
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columns above this threshold. Similarly, we divide the total credit exposure into
direct credit debt and off balance sheet liabilities. Table C.8 reveals that goods
exporters possess higher classical credit debt than non-exporters. This relationship
is strong and robust among all four specifications. In addition, the estimates in
Table C.9 indicate that a larger part of the overall goods exporter premium in bank
lending stems from the firm’s access to a wider range of financing instruments (e.g.,
derivatives and guarantees). The magnitudes of these coefficients are larger but
become insignificant if we include firm-fixed effects.
Moreover, we use credit exposure relative to total debt (from the balance sheet
data) and relative to total assets to further incorporate potential firm size effects.
Table C.10 presents the outcome relative to total debt and hints at a positive goods
exporter premium. The only exceptions are the first column with a negative sig-
nificant result and column (4) with no significant difference. Table C.11 focuses on
total assets and provides exactly the same findings as Table C.10.
In addition, we want to attenuate the potential of reverse causality and use lagged
explanatory variables to address this potential endogeneity. The outcome from Table
C.12 suggests that our benchmark estimates remain essentially unaffected with the
exception of column (4) which reveals insignificant results.
Finally, we allow for time-variant industry and bank-fixed effects. Table C.13 offers
the outcome for this regression. Again, the results remain unchanged and hint at a
positive export premium. Altogether, we can conclude that most results of Chapter
3 are confirmed for goods exporters.
Now, we compare the robustness checks of service exporters relative to goods ex-
porters in the following. Instead of the export share, we employ the service export
share on overall reported exports49. The regression results from Table C.14 shows
weak results compared to previous findings of a positive exporter premium. Only
the first column reveals a positive and significant coefficient.
Table C.15 provides the estimation parameters if we use employment as proxy for
firm size. The choice of this other proxy has no qualitative and quantitative effect on
our results compared to the baseline coefficients. The signs and magnitudes remain
on equal levels.
Adding productivity as further explanatory variable has also no effect on the out-
come as Table C.16 illustrates.
In contrast, the financial crisis reveals an impact on the service export premium:
we found a decreasing premium for goods exporters relative to non-exporters after
49The number of observations drops because we do not observe reported export sales in Ustan
for all service exporters (only for about half of them).
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the crisis. However, Tables C.17 and C.18 present an increasing service exporter
premium in the aftermath of the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers.
Furthermore, the split across the threshold of 2 million euro shows contrasting find-
ings: while the service export premium below the threshold seems to be negative
according to Table C.19, we observe a positive service export premium for loans
above 2 million euro in Table C.20. Therefore, the findings reveal that the censoring
threshold delivers mixed results.
Aside from this observation, the use of classical credit debt, which is shown in Table
C.21, is less relevant for service exporters than for goods exporters. These differences
are robust among all four specifications. Instead, Table C.22 illustrates that service
exporters engage primarily in off balance sheet financing instruments. Again, these
findings are strong and robust.
The consideration of credit exposure relative to total debt (from the balance sheet
data) and relative to total assets to further incorporate potential firm size effects.
Tables C.23 and C.24 show similar patterns. The majority of specifications hint at
a negative and significant service export premium.
The outcome from Table C.25 provides the coefficients for the lagged explanatory
variables. Again, the signs and magnitudes do not change compared to the baseline
results. As a result, reverse causality does not pose a problem for the analysis.
Finally, we allow for time-variant industry and bank-fixed effects. Table C.26 offers
the outcome for this regression. The results remain unchanged and hint at a positive
service export premium. All in all, we conclude that service exporters are indeed
more dependent on external finance in comparison to goods exporters. However,
they mainly use alternative financing instruments in the form of derivatives and
guarantees, while goods exporters rely more on classical debt financing.
In a non-reported robustness check, we also experiment with the inclusion of the
number of products and the number of destination countries (e.g., firms which export
to multiple countries need to cover additional fixed entry costs, as Lawless (2009)
shows). Unfortunately, we only have this information for the service exporters and
not for the goods exporters. For this reason, we impose the assumption of one
product and one country for all goods exporters. The consideration of these two
additional control variables does not change the baseline results.
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5.4. Summary
Services have received more attention in the recent literature. The share of services
in the overall value creation (GDP) and the employment force has risen in many
industrialized countries during the last decades. One important aspect of this dis-
cussion is the role of services in the recent trade literature. According to standard
textbooks, services are non-tradable products because they possess high transporta-
tion costs. Francois and Hoekman (2010) emphasize that technological progress
(e.g., the spread of the Internet) led to a decrease in trade costs of services, which
boosts foreign operations. For Germany, we also observe the growing importance of
services in international transactions.
This chapter examines the role of external finance for service exporters in covering
the fixed entry costs. We extend our previous MiMiK-Ustan match with another
data set which is provided by Deutsche Bundesbank, the SITS. This data set iden-
tifies service exporters and quantifies the value of service exports.
The findings illustrate that goods exporters receive on average 16% larger credit
exposures from financial institutions compared to non-exporters. In addition, service
exporters are more dependent on external finance with a premium of about 17%
relative to goods exporters. We observe that service exporters engage more in off
balance sheet activities and less in traditional debt contracts.
The analysis reveals some limitations which have to be kept in mind: potential prob-
lems may arise from the matching procedure. Although the data match represents
the evolution of service exports and of total exports quite well, we cannot rule out
whether a possible selection bias is present or not. In addition, the robustness checks
reveal that censoring could be a potential problem for the service export premium50.
Finally, the same shortcomings as in Chapter 3 are present, e.g. the establishment of
causality. Nevertheless, we think that the analysis provides important insights into
the nature of service exporters, which serve as a good starting point for research
in the future. According to our results, service exporters depend more on exter-
nal finance, which reflects higher entry barriers in comparison to goods exporters,
which contrasts with various recent contributions (see Ariu (2012) and Biewen et al.
(2012)). Now, we shed light on the determinants of innovating behavior within
start-ups. The literature on innovation and exports, which was mentioned in the
motivation, hints at the observation that a start-up does not export immediately
and has to be innovative in a first step. We discuss this issue in the last chapter
because it covers a smaller part of the dissertation.
50In contrast, the results for censoring in Chapter 3 were more robust.
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Effect’?51
6.1. Motivation
Policy makers are interested in fostering economic growth and employment. They
argue that education (see Barro (1991)) is one important factor in achieving these
goals. Indeed, a large macroeconomic growth literature shows that human capital
is positively correlated with economic growth52. In contrast, it is less well known
through which channels education supports economic growth. One potential channel
is technological change in the form of innovative products or processes. Hasan and
Tucci (2010) show that innovation is essential, especially for industrialized countries.
In the recent literature, small ventures meet with growing interest because start-ups
have a comparative advantage in fostering break-through innovations (see Acs and
Audretsch (2005)) in contrast to large corporations, which mostly enforce incremen-
tal changes (see Baumol (2005)). These insights contradict earlier contributions to
the literature (see Schumpeter (1942)) where large corporations are the only agents
who can sustain R&D expenditures through market power. Therefore, it is impor-
tant to understand how innovation can be fostered in an effective way.
This chapter investigates the transmission effect of education on innovating activities
within start-ups. We want to understand whether entrepreneurs with technical edu-
cation are indeed more innovative in high-tech industries compared to economists53.
We focus on the high-tech industries because we know that not every start-up is in-
novative (see Reynolds (2005)) and because entrepreneurs are more likely to engage
in innovating behavior in these industries compared to others. We label the potential
advantage of individuals with technical education as the ‘nerd effect’ throughout
this chapter. The investigation of this transmission channel is essential because it
specifies the role of entrepreneurs within start-ups: does the education of the en-
trepreneur determine innovating behavior or do other factors matter (e.g., employing
the required workforce)?
We examine a novel data set (KfW/ZEW Start-Up Panel) which contains a random
cross-section of German start-up companies for 2007 and 2008. Two independent
regressions are conducted for entrepreneurs54, one for university degree and one for
51This chapter is mainly based on a revised version of Goldbach (2012).
52Krueger and Lindahl (2001) provide a literature overview on this topic.
53Economics (‘Wirtschaftswissenschaften’) is here defined as overall study category. It contains
two disciplines: business administration (‘BWL’) and economics (‘VWL’). The term ‘economics’
specifies the overall category in the following.
54The education classifications for technical university degree (three categories) and technical
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apprenticeship as highest qualification. Having controlled for several entrepreneurial
and firm characteristics, we find evidence for a ‘nerd effect’ for entrepreneurs pos-
sessing a university degree in natural science (higher probability of about 11-15% for
conducting R&D and about 25-29% for conducting higher-scope innovations) but
not for individuals with an apprenticeship. Our findings reveal that the transmis-
sion channel within start-ups is relatively complex, since the ‘nerd effect’ depends on
the underlying definition of innovating behavior and on the organizational structure
(single vs. team entrepreneurship).
The chapter proceeds as follows: Subsection 6.2 reviews the relevant literature.
Subsection 6.3 describes the data set, definitions and provides summary statistics.
Subsection 6.4 presents the regression results and several robustness checks. Sub-
section 6.5 summarizes the main results.
6.2. Literature
First, we highlight the interdependence of innovation and education in the economic
literature. Krueger and Lindahl (2001) provide a literature review about the role of
education on economic growth from different perspectives: the microeconomic liter-
ature concentrates on private returns and quantifies the ‘return to education’. More
years of schooling (which are interpreted as approximation of better education) re-
sult in higher productivity, which translates into higher earned wages. By contrast,
the macroeconomic growth literature discusses the importance of social returns and
what kind of positive externalities higher education implies. Especially, endogenous
growth models highlight this argument. Romer (1990) shows that economies with a
skill abundant labor force generate higher growth due to more ideas. Hence, tech-
nological change in the form of innovation is regarded as one possible externality.
Rauch (1993) and Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) estimate this positive externality
and quantify it between 3% to 6% of income growth. A more recent model by Aghion
et al. (2009) extends this approach and distinguishes the transmission channel be-
tween technological innovation and imitation to investigate the education-growth
relationship. The authors assume that innovation requires more highly educated
individuals compared to imitation. Their empirical evidence suggests that innova-
tion generates positive externalities55. However, not only the amount of education
seems to matter but also the studied subject. To illustrate this aspect, Murphy
et al. (1991) introduce two sectors in their theoretical growth model which contains
apprenticeship (one category) differ to some extent. For this reason we regress them separately.
55They regress patents per thousand persons on spending in education (US states) and find a
positive correlation.
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human capital: one sector stimulates rent-seeking, the other promotes economic
growth. The authors define college students enrolled in engineering as persons who
initiate technological progress, while those registered in law are characterized as rent
seekers. According to their estimates, more engineers boost economic growth, while
more lawyers decrease it. Based on this reasoning, individuals with an engineering
degree foster technological change in comparison to others. All demonstrated argu-
ments show that education is highly relevant for economic growth, while innovation
itself can be understood as one important channel for achieving it.
Second, we review the recent literature that describes the determinants of innovation.
Several papers analyze the role of education as an essential driver but there is no
consensus about it. Baumol (2005) proposes anecdotal evidence that most break-
through innovations were discovered by individuals without higher education (e.g.,
Thomas Edison and Bill Gates). However, he argues that the minimum requirement
for future innovation increases over time because the complexity of products and
processes rises as well. Empirical evidence based on data is provided by Keizer et al.
(2002). They analyze Dutch small and middle sized enterprises (SMEs) and do not
find an influence of higher education on innovation efforts in the metal-electro sector.
In contrast, other contributions provide different empirical results. For instance,
Koellinger (2008) finds a positive relationship between the amount of education and
innovating behavior for 30 countries between 2002 and 2004. Furthermore, de Mel
et al. (2009) concentrate on years of schooling and find that these play an important
role in explaining innovation (besides ability, which is measured by IQ), using data
from Sri Lanka for 2008. Other studies employ the type of education as main
determinant for innovation: Toivanen and Va¨a¨na¨nen (2011) investigate whether
an engineering degree has a positive influence on the registration of patents. This
is indeed valid for Finnish data between 1988 and 1996. Moreover, Romero and
Mart´ınez-Roma´n (2012) report a positive relation between business education and
product/process innovation for Andalusian SMEs in 2007.
Third, the analysis in this chapter relies on a data set containing only entrepreneurs.
For this reason we discuss the relevant literature on the market entry decision of
start-ups as entrepreneurs differ in comparison to employees56. The main deter-
minants of the literature to explain market entrance are education and skills. For
instance, Lazear (2005) provides one central contribution for skills by introducing
the so-called Jack-of-all-trades hypothesis. According to this, entrepreneurs have
to possess diversified skills compared to a specialist. It is not sufficient to propose
56Due to data limitations we can only investigate innovating behavior of start-ups (but not of
established companies).
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an idea for a new product or a new production line which operates more efficiently
(process) but also to manage the main operations (e.g., marketing, hiring or ac-
counting). MBA alumni data from Stanford Business School confirm this described
hypothesis. However, Lazear (2005) is not able to discriminate between different
fields of study57. His hypothesis is also tested for other countries. Two versions are
provided by Wagner (2003) and Wagner (2006), who examine a German random
sample for 1998 and 1999, which confirm the hypothesis. In contrast, Silva (2007)
uses a panel of Italian households and argues that this supportive finding is due to
the cross-sectional nature of the data sets used by the researchers. He concludes
that the balanced skills do not matter once fixed effects are included, while gen-
eral ability seems to be a more important determinant to explain market entrance.
A˚stebro and Thompson (2011) provide an alternative view on the balanced skills of
entrepreneurs: using data on 830 Canadian inventors, their analysis reveals that en-
trepreneurs receive utility from a greater variety of skills. The results confirm those
of Lazear (2005), although the skills themselves are not interpreted as investments.
In addition, Hartog et al. (2010) establish that some abilities are more valuable for
entrepreneurs compared to employees. Entrepreneurs exhibit higher mathematical,
social and technical abilities58.
Until now, the entrepreneurship literature which deals with education concentrates
more on start-up performance than on innovating behavior itself. Again, the litera-
ture defines education in various ways. For instance, Parker and van Praag (2006)
use years of schooling for Dutch start-ups in 1994. Their findings provide evidence
for a direct (higher expertise) and an indirect effect (fewer capital constraints) of
more education on performance. Alternatively, Davidsson and Honig (2003) differ-
entiate human capital into explicit (formal education) and tacit knowledge (know-
how). Using Swedish data, the authors find that the two types of education do
not influence performance59. Another interpretation of education is a quality signal.
Backes-Gellner and Werner (2007) explore whether eduction serves as such a signal
for banks and employees for German start-ups in 1998 and 1999. The authors em-
phasize a potential disparity between high-tech and non-high-tech start-ups. The
evaluation of high-tech start-ups with innovative technological ideas is much more
uncertain because the comparison with other established companies is not possi-
ble. The results indeed suggest positive signal effects in the high-tech industry but
57The specialization is measured only within business courses: number of courses in finance,
accounting, ...
58Independent from the entrepreneurial entrance decision, Caner and Okten (2010) investigate
the career choice determinants of Turkish students in 2002. They conclude that male students
with high ability have a higher probability of studying engineering.
59In contrast, the entry decision is affected by both variables.
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not in the traditional industries. Finally, Dutta et al. (2011) distinguish educa-
tion in specialized and diversified knowledge and analyze entrepreneurship alumni
data between 1988 and 2008 from public universities in Northeast USA. Specialized
knowledge is defined as entrepreneurship courses which are explicitly designed for
nascent entrepreneurs. In contrast, diversified education describes the attendance
of courses which are not necessarily related to entrepreneurship. Both types of
knowledge have no impact on profits.
All in all, many studies hint at a positive relation between education and perfor-
mance. However, performance and innovating behavior are not identical. Empirical
studies illustrate a positive correlation between performance and innovation but its
magnitude is much smaller than one60. As a consequence, being innovative does
not always coincide with being successful in a monetary sense. This finding can be
interpreted as patents with a zero business value. Moreover, Gilbert and Newbery
(1982) argue that companies can register a patent without ever using it. This deci-
sion is strategically motivated because these firms want to prohibit competition and
maintain their market power.
The reviewed literature supports our central argument in this chapter61: entrepreneurs
with technical education are more innovative in high-tech industries compared to
economists.
6.3. Data and Summary Statistics
We use a novel data set (KfW/ZEW Start-Up Panel) which is a random sample that
contains data for German start-ups in 2007 and 2008. The start-ups are identified
using a larger data set which is provided by Creditreform. In general, the KfW/ZEW
Start-Up Panel is designed as a panel. However, only the cross-sections for 2007 and
2008 can be used due to data limitations62. We focus on the high-tech industries
because innovating activity is more crucial to them in comparison to non high-tech
industries. Fryges et al. (2010) describe further details regarding the data generating
process. The KfW/ZEW Start-Up Panel defines an entrepreneur as someone who
belongs to the group of persons who established the start-up. We begin with the
definitions of the variables of interest.
60For instance, Gompers et al. (2005) show that the R&D elasticity of output is less than one.
61We emphasized that Romero and Mart´ınez-Roma´n (2012) report a positive correlation be-
tween business education and innovation. However, they provide no comparison with a technical
reference category. We are able to distinguish between different fields of studies in a manner similar
to that of Toivanen and Va¨a¨na¨nen (2011).
62The complete data set contains information on start-ups between 2005 and 2008. Unfortu-
nately, our central variable of interest (innovating behavior) was not measured in 2005 and 2006.
63
6. Education and Innovation: Is there a ‘Nerd Effect’?
6.3.1. Definitions of Variables
The literature discusses different methods and strategies for measuring ‘innovation’.
Acs and Audretsch (2005) argue that innovation and technological change is a pro-
cess which is not easily tractable. They mention attempts to measure innovation
more accurately by using independent experts in the technological field who are able
to evaluate the overall quality of innovations (or whether an innovation is indeed
present). The most common approximations in the empirical literature are input
and output variables. One agreeable feature of the KfW/ZEW Start-Up Panel is its
original purpose of examining innovating behavior of entrepreneurs. For this reason
the data set is well suited for this study. We approximate innovating activity across
different dimensions. Nevertheless, the potential problems of measuring innovation,
which are present in the economic literature, cannot be ruled out completely. The
basic measures for innovation are two binary variables: the first indicates whether
R&D was conducted (r&d) and the second provides information on whether some-
thing new has been released on the market since the foundation (mrel). In addition,
we define four other proxies of innovating activity for the robustness checks. To com-
pare our findings with prior empirical evidence, we employ R&D expenditures per
worker (expend). This variable has the advantage of quantifying innovating activity
in an objective way, as opposed to a potential bias resulting from more subjective
self-reported measures. Another definition of innovating activity is the scope of the
market release (new). It takes value one if there is no new market innovation, for
value two the innovation is present at a regional level, for value three at a national
level and for value four at a worldwide level. Finally, two dummy variables specify
whether a product (prod) or a process (proc) innovation was achieved. These indica-
tors concentrate on the output type of innovation63. The main explanatory variable
in this chapter is education. It is divided along two dimensions: the amount is
measured by the dummy variable uni, which takes value one if the entrepreneur has
a degree from a university and zero if the person completed vocational training64.
The second dimension describes the field of study. We generate dummy variables
for each category: business or economics (econ), natural science (nat), mathemat-
ics or informatics (mathinf ), engineering (eng) and other subjects (other). These
categories are only available for entrepreneurs with a university degree65. Practi-
63Klepper (1996) argues that product innovation is more important for start-ups, while process
innovation typically occurs at later stages of the product life cycle.
64If an individual has completed an apprenticeship and received a degree from a university, only
the university degree is considered. The data set reports only the highest degree that was obtained.
65If an entrepreneur studied two subjects in different fields (e.g., economics and natural sci-
ence) both dummy variables econ and nat have value one. A commercial computer scientist
(‘Wirtschaftsinformatiker’) is categorized as information scientist, while an industrial engineer
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cal education specifies its categories slightly in a different way. We examine the
determinants of innovation for university degree and apprenticeship separately due
to these differences. Apprenticeship obtains the following categories: commercial
(comm), technical (tech), social (social), other services (othserv) and other profes-
sions (other job). The complete educational background of all entrepreneurs (the
foundation of a start-up can be established by multiple individuals) is available in
the data. However, all other personal characteristics are only maintained from the
person that was interviewed.
Romero and Mart´ınez-Roma´n (2012) stress in their empirical analysis that the en-
trepreneur’s personal traits are important for innovation. To control for them, we
include nationality (german) and sex (male) as dummy variables. Moreover, we con-
sider experience, prior employment situation and foundation motivation. Experience
is present as a categorical variable66: less than seven years (exp7 ), more than seven
and less than 13 years (exp7 13 ), more than 13 and less than 20 years (exp13 20 )
and more than 20 years (exp20 ). The employment situation immediately before
the establishment of the venture is approximated by dummy variables as well: an
entrepreneur was either self-employed (sit e), employed (sit em), registered as un-
employed (sit unem) or not working (sit ne). The main motivation why the start-up
was established also seems to be an important determinant of innovation. Sauer-
mann and Cohen (2010) emphasize the role of incentives in this context. Motives are
important but they differ in their effects: intellectual challenge and independence
show a strongly positive effect, while job security and responsibility seem to have a
negative impact. Romero and Mart´ınez-Roma´n (2012) confirm this finding and em-
phasize the role of intrinsic motivation on innovation within start-ups. They provide
evidence for a positive correlation between intrinsically motivated entrepreneurs and
process innovation. We generate for the categorical variable motivation dummy vari-
ables in the following way: working independently (ind), realizing a business idea
(idea), improper employment opportunities (improper), escape from unemployment
(escape), encouragement by former employer (encourage) or tax incentives (tax ).
Beside the described personal traits, several firm characteristics also determine in-
novating behavior. We consider whether the start-up was founded by a single en-
trepreneur or by a team (team). We keep start-ups with team entrepreneurs in
the data set and compare the regression results with a subsample where team en-
trepreneurs are excluded in one robustness check. Differences between single and
team entrepreneurs are present, which the empirical literature confirms (e.g., Mu¨ller
(‘Wirtschaftsingenieur’) belongs to the group of economists.
66In the following, we generate dummy variables for all categorical variables.
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(2009) shows differences for the success of academic spin-offs and Cantner and
Stu¨tzer (2010) find disparities for the establishment of social capital). Romero and
Mart´ınez-Roma´n (2012) show that firm size affects product and process innovation
in a positive manner. We approximate firm size as the number of employees (em-
ployment). In addition, we measure the quality of the labor force67: the number of
employees with no apprenticeship (sh l) and the number of employees who completed
an apprenticeship (sh m) or received a university degree (sh h). Schumpeter (1942)
argues that competition structure may affect innovative activity because only large
corporations are able to bear the costs of R&D. “... the evidence on the relationship
between innovation and competition is also ambiguous” as Tang (2006, p. 69) points
out. The competition intensity can take different forms: low competition (comp l)
when the start-up faces less than six other companies as direct competitors, medium
competition (comp m) when between six and twenty competitors are present and
high competition (comp h) is defined as more than twenty competitors. Further-
more, we include two dummy variables which contain information on whether the
firm depends on external finance (external) or whether it received public support
in the form of funding (support). Finally, we also use firm age (fage) as control
variable.
Table 6.1: Industry Classifications
High-technology industries
Cutting-edge technology manufacturing
High-technology manufacturing
Technology-intensive services
Software
Non-high-tech industries
Non-high-tech manufacturing
Skill-intensive services (non-technical, consulting services)
Other business-oriented services
Consumer-oriented services
Construction
Wholesale and retail market
Notes: The table provides industry classifications from ZEW.
ZEW categorizes firms into high-tech and non-high-tech industries. We adopt their
definition, which can be found in Table 6.1, for the following analysis. As we are
interested in high-tech industries, we keep only start-ups which belong to this group.
67This number is only available for a part of the overall employment pool: full-time, part-time
and mini jobber.
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6.3.2. Descriptives
We start with the description of some stylized facts based on the sample. As men-
tioned above, we have two cross-sections for German start-ups which were founded
in 2007 and 2008, with approximately 4,500 observations. Table 6.2 provides an
overview of the six proxies for innovation68. The basic measures show that about
37% of all start-ups are temporarily or permanently engaged in R&D and 28% re-
leased a market innovation since the foundation. Both variables illustrate only a
small part of the complete innovation process. The other proxies describe further
aspects. The average start-up invests 6,084 euro per employee in R&D. The high
standard deviation suggests a remarkable fraction of start-ups which invest no money
at all. The average innovation is relatively small in scope, as the low value of new
shows. 42% of start-up innovations result in product innovation compared to only
28% in process innovation.
Table 6.2: Summary Statistics of Proxies for Innovating Activity
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. 1% 99%
r&d 4,585 0.377 0.485 0 1
mrel 3,123 0.281 0.450 0 1
expend 4,277 6,084.18 25,791.83 0 90,000
new 3,123 1.58 1.01 1 4
prod 3,308 0.421 0.493 0 1
proc 3,322 0.284 0.451 0 1
Notes: The table provides the number of observations, mean, standard deviation,
the 1% and the 99% percentile of all innovation measures. The statistics are
obtained from the ZEW/KfW Foundation Start-Up Panel.
Now, we present the distribution of personal traits in Table 6.3. First, we describe
education in more detail. Approximately 53% of all entrepreneurs possess a uni-
versity degree as highest education. 15% studied natural science, 18% mathematics
or informatics, 57% engineering, 20% economics and 7% another subject. Accord-
ing to these statistics, almost three quarters of all start-ups are founded by indi-
viduals with a technical orientation. We compare these numbers with individuals
who completed an apprenticeship: most have either a commercial (18%) or tech-
nical (68%) background. Some studied social science (15%), while other services
(2%) and other jobs (3%) are almost not present in the high-tech industry. Figure
D.1 illustrates the distribution of education among the four high-tech industries for
68Minimum and maximum values are not reported due to provision restrictions. However, these
values are usually identical compared to the reported 1% and 99% percentiles.
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start-ups with a university degree (see Appendix D). Natural scientists are mostly
represented in the cutting-edge manufacturing industry. The majority of engineers
enter the cutting-edge manufacturing, the high-technology manufacturing and the
services industry. In contrast, most mathematicians/computer scientists operate in
the software industry (as expected). The other fields of study and economists reveal
an even distribution among all four industries. Moreover, we illustrate the type of
apprenticeship among the industries in Figure D.2. Entrepreneurs with technical vo-
cational training prefer the high-tech manufacturing, services and software industry.
Surprisingly, the social scientists engage in the cutting-edge manufacturing sector.
Other services and other jobs are evenly distributed (with low shares), while the
majority of entrepreneurs with a commercial degree join the software industry.
Next, we shed light on the entrepreneurial characteristics. 95% of the entrepreneurs
are German and 87% are male. Prior experience is almost equally distributed, as
exp7 to exp20 demonstrate69. Most entrepreneurs (60%) were employed in a firm
prior to the start-up, while 27% were self-employed. The most relevant motives for
establishing the start-up are working independently (43%), followed by realizing a
business idea (35%). All other categories seem to be of less relevance.
Finally, we report the firm characteristics in Table 6.4. 34% of the ventures were
founded by teams. The average start-up employs three to four employees. The
number of employees with vocational training is highest (1.75), followed by university
degree (0.880) and no degree at all (0.469). 56% face intense competition in their
environment. A low fraction of start-ups is financed with external capital (22%),
while slightly more receive public support (34%). The firm age of the average start-
up is above one year.
69All four categories possess a mean value of approximately 25%.
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Table 6.3: Summary Statistics of Entrepreneurial Characteristics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. 1% 99%
A. Education
uni 4,586 0.529 0.499 0 1
nat 2,405 0.149 0.356 0 1
mathinf 2,405 0.181 0.385 0 1
eng 2,405 0.567 0.496 0 1
econ 2,405 0.199 0.399 0 1
other 2,405 0.076 0.265 0 1
comm 2,323 0.183 0.387 0 1
tech 2,323 0.683 0.466 0 1
social 2,323 0.147 0.354 0 1
othserv 2,323 0.022 0.145 0 1
other job 2,323 0.034 0.181 0 1
B. Other personal traits
ger 4,575 0.951 0.216 0 1
male 4,586 0.869 0.337 0 1
exp7 2,182 0.222 0.416 0 1
exp7 13 2,182 0.276 0.447 0 1
exp13 20 2,182 0.291 0.455 0 1
exp20 2,182 0.210 0.407 0 1
sit e 4,570 0.276 0.447 0 1
sit em 4,570 0.600 0.490 0 1
sit unem 4,570 0.127 0.333 0 1
sit ne 4,570 0.107 0.309 0 1
ind 4,373 0.454 0.498 0 1
idea 4,373 0.367 0.482 0 1
improper 4,373 0.066 0.248 0 1
escape 4,373 0.081 0.273 0 1
encourage 4,373 0.022 0.147 0 1
tax 4,373 0.010 0.098 0 0
Notes: The table provides the number of observations, mean, standard deviation,
the 1% and the 99% percentile of entrepreneurial characteristics. All data are
obtained from the ZEW/KfW Foundation Start-Up Panel.
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Table 6.4: Summary Statistics of Firm Characteristics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. 1% 99%
C. Firm characteristics
team 4,584 0.344 0.475 0 1
employment 4,586 3.35 6.70 0 33
sh l 3,455 0.469 1.69 0 7
sh m 3,454 1.75 3.65 0 13
sh h 3,455 0.880 2.54 0 14
comp l 2,140 0.252 0.434 0 1
comp m 2,140 0.185 0.388 0 1
comp h 2,140 0.563 0.496 0 1
external 2,182 0.223 0.416 0 1
support 4,581 0.341 0.474 0 1
fage 4,586 1.23 0.964 0 3
Notes: The table provides the number of observations, mean, standard deviation,
the 1% and the 99% percentile of firm characteristics. All data are obtained from
the ZEW/KfW Foundation Start-Up Panel.
6.4. Empirical Results
6.4.1. Baseline Regressions
We derived the central hypothesis in the previous literature section: entrepreneurs
with technical education are more innovative in high-tech industries than entrepreneurs
with an economics degree. Accordingly, we use r&d and mrel as dependent vari-
ables in our baseline regressions. r&d can be interpreted as the input and mrel as
the output variable of innovation. As highlighted before, the KfW/ZEW Start-Up
Panel was originally designed to examine innovating behavior. We use the four other
proxies that were described in the former section for robustness checks. Table 6.5
presents the correlation among the dependent variables. The variables are corre-
lated to some extent but multicollinearity can be ruled out. The only exception
is the high correlation between mrel and new. The reason for this observation is
that the first variable is approximated by the second one. Moreover, the positive
correlation among different definitions indicates that the different proxies capture
various aspects from the complete innovation process.
To establish a relationship between innovation and education, we estimate the fol-
lowing equation:
Innovationi = α + βEducationi + γ
∑
Xi + i (6.1)
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Table 6.5: Correlation Matrix
Variable r&d mrel expend new prod proc
r&d 1.00
mrel 0.340 1.00
expend 0.398 0.208 1.00
new 0.383 0.921 0.259 1.00
prod 0.224 0.273 0.069 0.271 1.00
proc 0.191 0.131 0.124 0.127 0.322 1.00
Notes: The table provides the correlations between the different innovation
measures. All data have been obtained from the ZEW/KfW Foundation Start-Up
Panel.
where Innovationi is the proxy for innovation of start-up i, Educationi covers the
main explanatory variables (in this case the dummy variables for education), Xi rep-
resents the control variables (other entrepreneurial traits and firm characteristics)
and i is the error term. We estimate two independent probit regressions, one for
university degree and one for apprenticeship as highest qualification70. Ideally, we
would be able to reveal the relation between education and innovation experimen-
tally71, meaning that the entrepreneurs should be randomly endowed with different
types of education. Since the implementation of such an experiment is obviously
impossible, we have to approximate such a situation as best we can. All estima-
tions include robust Huber-White standard errors. We start the examination of
entrepreneurs who possess a university degree.
Table 6.6 presents the coefficients with r&d as dependent variable. The first column
uses only the education dummies as explanatory variables, while team and indus-
try dummies serve as controls. The reference group which is not included in this
regression is entrepreneurs who possess a degree in economics. Accordingly, we can
interpret the results in relative terms (compared to the outside option). We find a
positive and highly significant coefficient for team, which means that foundations by
teams are more likely (by about 8%) to conduct R&D. Moreover, natural scientists
are more likely (with a probability of about 12%) to behave in an innovative man-
ner than economists. The second column includes other personal traits as additional
control variables. These are experience, the main motive for foundation, gender, na-
tionality and the situation prior to the foundation of the start-up. Again, we need
70We regress the equations separately due to different education classifications among both
education types as explained before.
71The data generating process itself is random. However, not all start-ups which are drawn
from this process answer the questionnaire (between 20 and 25 percent).
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to choose reference groups for all categorial variables and exclude experience less
than 7 years (exp7 ), working independently (ind) and not working (sit ne) from the
regression. Now, team becomes insignificant compared to before. In contrast, the
effect of natural science on innovation is still positive and significant. Furthermore,
intrinsic motivation seems to matter because the realization of a business idea influ-
ences R&D positively (by about 20%). All other variables do not exhibit significant
effects. The last column appends firm characteristics, such as firm age, whether the
start-up received public support, whether it is financed with external funds, firm
size, the quality of the employment pool and the competition structure. We exclude
the share of employees with no apprenticeship (sh l) and low pressure from compe-
tition (comp l) and select them as reference categories. The findings suggest that
natural science remains positive, albeit only weakly significant. The effect of the
realization of a business idea does not change. In addition, competition suggests a
strong determinant of innovating behavior: high intensity is negatively correlated
with R&D. As a result, we indeed find a ‘nerd effect’ for natural scientists which
persists even if we control for further entrepreneurial and firm characteristics.
Table 6.7 illustrates the findings if we employ market release (mrel) as proxy for
innovation. We impose the same column structure as before to compare the results
with R&D and include further control variables in each step. Again, the first column
uses only education as explanatory variable (besides team and the industry dum-
mies). Start-ups founded by teams (about 7%) and natural scientists (about 7%)
are more likely to release output on the market. However, the results are weaker
compared to before due to the lower level of statistical significance. The team effect
becomes insignificant once we control for other entrepreneurial characteristics, while
the significance of natural science remains on its level (and becomes economically
larger to about 9%). In addition, the intrinsic motivation of realizing a business
idea is an important determinant for output. Even if we add firm characteristics,
the importance of this motivation holds. Again, an intense competition structure
is negatively correlated with innovating activity. In contrast to our prior results,
all education variables become insignificant in column (3), which means that there
is no difference between technical background and economics. According to market
release, we find only weak evidence for a ‘nerd effect’ for natural scientists.
Next, we re-estimate equation (6.1) for persons with apprenticeship as highest qual-
ification. The results change, as Table 6.8 illustrates. Column (1) shows that team
entrepreneurs conduct more R&D than single entrepreneurs which coincides with
the previous findings. In contrast, we observe that individuals with technical (8%)
and social (22%) vocational training are less likely to conduct R&D than subjects
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Table 6.6: R&D and Education (University)
(1) (2) (3)
Variables r&d r&d r&d
team 0.079*** (0.020) 0.015 (0.034) 0.008 (0.034)
nat 0.122*** (0.033) 0.150** (0.049) 0.114* (0.050)
mathinf 0.058 (0.032) 0.080 (0.047) 0.078 (0.046)
eng 0.010 (0.027) 0.026 (0.040) 0.032 (0.039)
other -0.023 (0.041) -0.062 (0.060) -0.060 (0.058)
exp7 13 -0.084 (0.043) -0.075 (0.043)
exp13 20 -0.049 (0.043) -0.057 (0.043)
exp20 -0.073 (0.047) -0.062 (0.048)
idea 0.197*** (0.030) 0.150*** (0.031)
improper -0.146* (0.068) -0.144* (0.069)
escape -0.107 (0.060) -0.088 (0.060)
encourage -0.084 (0.094) -0.084 (0.100)
tax -0.069 (0.128) -0.029 (0.123)
ger -0.047 (0.065) -0.045 (0.066)
male 0.045 (0.040) 0.042 (0.040)
sit e 0.044 (0.042) 0.046 (0.042)
sit em -0.013 (0.041) -0.016 (0.042)
sit unem -0.060 (0.059) -0.049 (0.060)
fage -0.010 (0.019)
support -0.014 (0.032)
external 0.056 (0.038)
employment 0.006 (0.005)
sh m -0.013 (0.007)
sh h 0.011 (0.009)
comp m -0.102* (0.043)
comp h -0.160*** (0.034)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,401 1,058 1,033
Log-likelihood -1,542.17 -641.47 -609.65
Notes: Probit regressions. Marginal effects reported at the mean values. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes significance at 1%, ** significance at
5% and * significance at 10%.
with commercial background. If we control for entrepreneurial characteristics these
effects become less significant but the signs do not change. Again, only the intrinsic
motivation of realizing a business idea has a positive effect on innovation, which per-
sists when firm characteristics are included in the regression. Almost all education
variables become insignificant in the last column, the only exception being social
apprenticeship, which is negative and weakly significant. We confirm the previous
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Table 6.7: Market Release and Education (University)
(1) (2) (3)
Variables mrel mrel mrel
team 0.071** (0.023) -0.023 (0.033) -0.043 (0.032)
nat 0.074* (0.037) 0.089* (0.045) 0.076 (0.044)
mathinf -0.008 (0.037) -0.019 (0.044) -0.020 (0.042)
eng 0.018 (0.031) 0.024 (0.037) 0.032 (0.035)
other 0.024 (0.046) -0.017 (0.057) -0.001 (0.056)
exp7 13 -0.077 (0.042) -0.076 (0.041)
exp13 20 -0.036 (0.042) -0.062 (0.041)
exp20 -0.047 (0.046) -0.037 (0.044)
idea 0.224*** (0.029) 0.151*** (0.030)
improper -0.018 (0.072) -0.029 (0.071)
escape -0.040 (0.063) -0.068 (0.063)
encourage 0.061 (0.086) 0.032 (0.089)
tax 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
ger 0.070 (0.071) 0.048 (0.071)
male -0.020 (0.039) -0.021 (0.038)
sit e 0.029 (0.040) 0.019 (0.039)
sit em 0.053 (0.040) 0.045 (0.039)
sit unem -0.039 (0.059) -0.029 (0.060)
fage 0.002 (0.018)
support -0.047 (0.031)
external 0.077* (0.036)
employment 0.014* (0.005)
sh m -0.009 (0.007)
sh h -0.019* (0.008)
comp m -0.097* (0.037)
comp h -0.248*** (0.029)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,617 1,032 1,008
Log-likelihood -988.06 -596.70 -540.75
Notes: Probit regressions. Marginal effects reported at the mean values. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes significance at 1%, ** significance at
5% and * significance at 10%.
results for competition structure: entrepreneurs who face intense competition are
less likely to conduct R&D. Moreover, we find that external funding has a positive
effect on innovation. All in all, there is no evidence for a ‘nerd effect’.
Finally, Table 6.9 presents the estimated coefficients for market release as proxy
for innovation. The same picture emerges as before: team entrepreneurs are more
innovative, but this effect vanishes with the inclusion of additional control variables.
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Table 6.8: R&D and Education (Apprenticeship)
(1) (2) (3)
Variables r&d r&d r&d
team 0.132*** (0.018) 0.077* (0.034) 0.037 (0.035)
tech -0.082*** (0.025) -0.079* (0.036) -0.061 (0.036)
social -0.223*** (0.041) -0.165** (0.059) -0.151* (0.060)
other serv -0.026 (0.066) 0.030 (0.098) 0.064 (0.100)
other job -0.033 (0.051) -0.048 (0.075) -0.028 (0.076)
exp7 13 0.052 (0.040) 0.052 (0.040)
exp13 20 0.055 (0.040) 0.041 (0.041)
exp20 0.047 (0.046) 0.035 (0.046)
idea 0.126*** (0.031) 0.115*** (0.031)
improper 0.011 (0.054) 0.034 (0.055)
escape 0.014 (0.050) 0.029 (0.051)
encourage -0.088 (0.077) -0.100 (0.078)
tax -0.031 (0.128) -0.024 (0.126)
ger -0.045 (0.062) -0.064 (0.062)
male -0.003 (0.041) -0.007 (0.040)
sit e 0.038 (0.043) 0.051 (0.044)
sit em -0.057 (0.040) -0.052 (0.041)
sit unem -0.079 (0.049) -0.079 (0.051)
fage -0.006 (0.018)
support -0.001 (0.029)
external 0.102** (0.032)
employment 0.005 (0.003)
sh m -0.005 (0.006)
sh h 0.018 (0.012)
comp m -0.062 (0.041)
comp h -0.109*** (0.032)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,323 1,079 1,042
Log-likelihood -1,316.13 -619.44 -585.09
Notes: Probit regressions. Marginal effects reported at the mean values. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes significance at 1%, ** significance at
5% and * significance at 10%.
Social scientists are less likely to release a product on the market (about 14%) but
only if we do not consider other entrepreneurial and firm characteristics. Persons
with vocational training in other services are more innovative (about 16-19%) but
this effect is only weakly significant. The findings for competition and intrinsic
motivation persist (in signs and significance) for all specifications. Again, we do not
find a ‘nerd effect’ for apprenticeship.
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Table 6.9: Market Release and Education (Apprenticeship)
(1) (2) (3)
Variables mrel mrel mrel
team 0.081*** (0.022) 0.023 (0.033) -0.008 (0.033)
tech -0.031 (0.029) -0.038 (0.034) -0.010 (0.034)
social -0.145** (0.047) -0.107 (0.056) -0.060 (0.055)
other serv 0.099 (0.070) 0.165* (0.083) 0.194* (0.080)
other job 0.081 (0.060) 0.044 (0.070) 0.077 (0.069)
exp7 13 0.060 (0.037) 0.052 (0.037)
exp13 20 0.052 (0.038) 0.032 (0.037)
exp20 0.075 (0.042) 0.045 (0.041)
idea 0.148*** (0.028) 0.107*** (0.028)
improper -0.029 (0.051) -0.038 (0.052)
escape -0.054 (0.051) -0.071 (0.050)
encourage -0.096 (0.078) -0.113 (0.077)
tax -0.050 (0.128) -0.074 (0.116)
ger -0.089 (0.058) -0.106 (0.056)
male 0.013 (0.038) 0.026 (0.036)
sit e 0.034 (0.041) 0.033 (0.041)
sit em -0.023 (0.037) -0.023 (0.037)
sit unem -0.034 (0.047) -0.031 (0.048)
fage -0.000 (0.016)
support 0.020 (0.027)
external -0.003 (0.032)
employment 0.008* (0.003)
sh m -0.005 (0.005)
sh h -0.002 (0.008)
comp m -0.065 (0.035)
comp h -0.212*** (0.027)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,585 1,075 1,038
Log-likelihood -845.15 -562.65 -511.54
Notes: Probit regressions. Marginal effects reported at the mean values. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes significance at 1%, ** significance at
5% and * significance at 10%.
Until now, we have provided empirical evidence for the two baseline innovation prox-
ies: conducting R&D (r&d) and market release (mrel). In the following robustness
checks, we extend this analysis to other proxies and deal with potential selection
bias72.
72We also conducted OLS instead of probit regressions to compare the signs, magnitudes and
significance levels of the estimated coefficients but do not report the results here. We find no
differences between both estimation procedures. A possible explanation is that many explanatory
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6.4.2. Robustness Checks
The previous regressions support our central hypothesis for entrepreneurs who pos-
sess a university degree. We find that natural scientists are more likely to engage in
R&D and have a higher probability of releasing something new on the market. Now,
we want to find out whether these results rely on the definition of innovation and
whether selection bias poses an endogeneity problem. We start this section with the
estimation of equation (6.1) but now employ the four other proxies for innovation
that were described before. In the following, we concentrate on the estimated edu-
cation coefficients and do not report the complete regression table. As before, we
start with the description of entrepreneurs with a university degree.
Table D.1 applies R&D expenditures per employee as proxy (expend). These costs
can be interpreted as the importance of R&D to the firm which is based on a
metric scale. We use OLS regressions because the proxy is a continuous variable.
Overall, the estimates suggests that that entrepreneurs with technical orientation
are not more innovative than economists. The only exception is natural science in
column (2) which reports a positive and weakly significant effect. Table D.2 presents
the results for the regional scope of the innovation (new). This variable provides
information on an ordinal scale with larger values indicating a higher scope (e.g.,
whether the innovation is worldwide or only regional). For this reason we use ordered
probit estimation. According to the estimates, natural scientists are more likely to
engage in innovations with higher impact (by about 25-29%) than economists. This
finding holds even if we include entrepreneurial and firm characteristics. We do
not find any difference for all other fields of study. The last two proxies prod and
proc are again dummy variables. Therefore, we use a probit estimator, as with the
baseline regression. The first column in Table D.3 hints at a negative correlation
between mathematics/informatics as well as engineering and product innovation.
However, this effect does not hold after the inclusion of other controls. The findings
for process innovation in Table D.4 are even weaker. Among the three specifications
there is no difference at all for any field of study. Altogether, the presence of a ‘nerd
effect’ highly depends on the definition of innovation.
Next, we report the results for apprenticeship as highest degree. Table D.5 shows
that almost all coefficients are negative for expend. The significance vanishes as
more variables are included. The previous results for possessing a university degree
in natural science pointed out that these entrepreneurs are more engaged in higher-
scope innovating activity. This result changes for vocational training (see Table
variables are defined as dummy variables such that almost all fitted values lie in the range between
zero and one.
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D.6). Table D.7, which reports the outcome for product innovation, provides even
weaker results because no differences occur at all. In addition, this holds true for
process innovation in Table D.8. We conclude that there is no ‘nerd effect’ for
entrepreneurs with apprenticeship as highest qualification, independent from the
definition of innovation.
In the following, we discuss two further issues: first, we examine whether the influ-
ence of education on innovating activity of single entrepreneurs differs from team
entrepreneurs in more detail. Until now, we controlled for this difference by includ-
ing the dummy variable team. However, we pointed out in the data description that
the entrepreneurial characteristics are obtained just from one entrepreneur of the
whole team. Therefore, a potential systematic bias could emerge73. Second, the
choice of study could be endogenous in the sense that persons with specific personal
traits choose a certain subject. If we do not control for this fact, we have a correla-
tion between education and the error term, which leads to inconsistent β estimates.
To assess the first problem, we re-estimate equation (6.1) for both university and
apprenticeship as highest education using only single entrepreneurs. Then, we com-
pare these results with the estimates from the baseline regressions. We start again
with university degree, concentrate on both baseline proxies (r&d and mrel) and
report only the education coefficients in the following.
Table D.9 reveals the outcome for r&d. The only significant impact can be found
in column (1), where natural science has a positive sign but is weakly significant.
Comparing this finding with our previous results suggests that R&D is more likely to
be conducted in start-ups with teams where natural scientists are part of this team74.
Next, we present the findings for mrel in Table D.10. Here, a different pattern
emerges: natural science has a positive coefficient and becomes more significant
when additional control variables are included in the regression. Accordingly, the
probability of market release is higher (by about 16-18%) for single entrepreneurs
with natural science degree in comparison to team entrepreneurs. Previous results
suggested no (or only a weak) difference between technical and economic education75
for market release. Overall, the presence of a ‘nerd effect’ not only depends on
the definition of innovation but also on the leadership structure (single vs. team
entrepreneurship).
73Note that this potential bias is only valid for the entrepreneurial characteristics. The education
variable itself and all firm characteristics are complete and therefore not subject to this kind of
endogeneity.
74In non-reported regressions with only team entrepreneurs we indeed find that the coefficient
of natural science is positive and significant.
75In non-reported regressions with only team entrepreneurs all regressions reveal insignificant
coefficients.
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Now, Tables D.11 and D.12 illustrate the findings for apprenticeship. In compar-
ison to the whole sample, there is not much difference between single and team
entrepreneurs for R&D activity, as Table D.11 indicates. Again, we find a nega-
tive and significant (except for the last column) coefficient for technical education76.
Table D.12 reveals that there are no disparities among entrepreneurs with various
backgrounds in market release because all variables are insignificant. Altogether,
the leadership structure is not responsible for us not finding a ‘nerd effect’ for en-
trepreneurs with vocational training as highest degree.
In addition, we discuss the second problem that was mentioned above in more detail.
In an optimal setting, we would have an experiment where the choice of study
is randomly distributed among individuals. However, such a situation does not
exist in reality. There are potential variables (e.g., ability) which affect the career
choice which leads to endogeneity. The literature offers multiple methods on how to
deal with such unobserved heterogeneity: one possibility is to estimate a fixed (or
random) effects estimation model where the unobserved heterogeneity is assumed
to be constant over time. We are not able to employ this strategy here because we
do not have a panel. Moreover, most entrepreneurs in the high-tech industry have
some years of experience in their field such that there is no time variation in the field
of study77. This would only be possible if we observe individuals who form a start-
up during their studies and receive their degree later on. But even then, it is not
really clear how to quantify the effect of the degree on innovating activity because
knowledge grows continuously over time. Consequently, a fixed effect estimation
would drop the main variable of interest in our case.
Another suggested method is to use instrumental variable estimation. One or more
instruments have to be found which are correlated with the choice of study but
not with the error term i in our baseline regression. To employ this strategy, it is
important to have information on households prior to the career choice. Potential
instruments could be the socioeconomic background of the family (e.g., whether
the father or mother work in similar occupations or are entrepreneurs themselves,
household income). Again, we are not able to use this approach because the data
set does not provide this information.
76This is also true when only team entrepreneurs are considered in the regression.
77ZEW provides information about the age of entrepreneurs in their data set in Mannheim. We
work with an aggregated version outside Mannheim which does not provide the age variable due
to data restrictions. In general, the entrepreneurs in the data set are at least in their mid-thirties.
The age variable was not significant for the regressions in Mannheim and all other results remained
the same, which is why we worked with the adjusted data set.
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We employ a different strategy to deal with selection bias: propensity score match-
ing78. Now, the outcome variable is innovation, while the ‘treatment’ is defined
as technical education. Again, we employ nearest neighbor matching and minimize
the absolute difference between the probabilities of one start-up that is treated and
another that is non-treated. We identify control and treatment groups as follows:
we choose economics as control group for the university degree and the treatment
group consists of either natural science, mathematics/informatics or engineering79.
We exclude all observations with more than one degree.
Table D.13 presents the findings of the nearest neighbor matching for entrepreneurs
with university degree. All results have to be interpreted relative to economics.
The first column reveals that start-ups with natural scientists invest more in R&D
expenditures per employee than economists. A different pattern emerges for en-
trepreneurs with mathematics/informatics degree: they are more likely to engage in
R&D in general and to perform innovation on a larger scope. This could be related
to their high presence in the software industry. Column (3) shows that no ‘nerd
effect’ is present for engineers. The last column defines technical education as ei-
ther natural science, mathematics/informatics or engineering and serves as further
robustness check. We find (weak) evidence for a higher probability of market re-
lease and larger-scope innovations. Finally, Table D.14 displays the nearest neighbor
matching for apprenticeship. For all proxies we do not find any difference between
technical and commercial education.
6.5. Summary
Entrepreneurship is one potential channel through which economic growth and em-
ployment are achievable. This chapter focuses on the transmission effect of educa-
tion on innovation within start-ups. The central question is whether entrepreneurs
with technical education are more innovative in high-tech industries compared to
economists. To analyze this question, we examine a novel data set (KfW/ZEW
Start-Up Panel) which contains a random cross-section of German start-up com-
panies for 2007 and 2008. Two independent regressions are conducted for en-
trepreneurs, one for university degree and one for apprenticeship as highest quali-
fication. Having controlled for several entrepreneurial and firm characteristics, we
can conclude that there is evidence for a ‘nerd effect’ for entrepreneurs with univer-
78We explained the intuition of propensity score matching before in Chapter 4.
79We compare one field of study with another one while the others are not considered (e.g., eco-
nomics vs. natural science, economics vs. mathematics/informatics and economics vs. engineer-
ing). In another specification we define natural science, mathematics/informatics and engineering
as technical education.
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sity degree. The baseline regression reveals that natural scientists are more likely
to engage in R&D than economists. This effect is only present for start-ups with
team leadership. Therefore, the organizational form (single vs. team entrepreneur-
ship) seems to be an additional driver of the results. In addition, the outcome
suggest (weak) evidence for a higher probability of market release. We find strong
results that this market release is fostered by single entrepreneurs with natural sci-
ence degree. Moreover, natural scientists engage mostly in large-scope innovations
in comparison to economists. If we consider all types of technical education for the
nearest neighbor matching we can conclude that the findings for market release and
the scope of innovation indeed hold. In contrast, we can reject our central hypothe-
sis for entrepreneurs with apprenticeship. If significant differences between technical
and commercial vocational training emerge, they are negative (hinting at the fact
that entrepreneurs with commercial apprenticeship are more innovative). This find-
ing does not depend on the choice of the innovation proxy, the leadership structure
(single vs. team) or the empirical approach. The outcome suggests that the skills
which are obtained from university and vocational training are indeed different and
only individuals with technical education from university foster innovating activity.
Our results reveal that policy makers should foster technical studies at university.
Potential future research should compare whether the innovating activity of persons
with technical education is more likely within start-ups compared to middle-size and
large companies. Moreover, additional information on the workforce is needed to
investigate whether the education of the entrepreneur himself matters or whether
innovating activity is mainly fostered by the composition of workforce (or a combi-
nation of both).
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7. Conclusion
The goal of this dissertation was to deal with two topics which are important issues
for Germany: the export economy and innovation. Although the literature discusses
whether innovating activities influence exports, the focus here is to investigate cer-
tain questions within both fields. In the following, we summarize (and emphasize)
the central contribution of each chapter to the literature and provide suggestions for
potential future research.
The first (and larger) part of this dissertations examined the relationship between
finance and international trade. All of the three chapters rely on a matched data
set (MiMiK-Ustan) which contains bank-firm relationships and was provided by
Deutsche Bundesbank. The main motivation to deal with this topic was the mas-
sive decline in international trade in 2008/09 (known as the ‘Great Trade Collapse’),
which emerged in the aftermath of the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. In a first
step, Chapter 3 estimated the exporter premium in bank lending and described
potential differences between exporters and non-exporters (independent from the fi-
nancial crisis). We examined the credit relationships in Germany, covering all loans
of more than 1.5 million euro over the period from 2005 to 2010. The exporting
firms take on average about 15% larger loans than non-exporters, holding constant
for a wide range of other firm and bank characteristics. The results are in line
with previous studies which also document positive export premia in bank lending.
Nevertheless, the chosen data set in this chapter has the advantage of tackling the
problem of unobserved heterogeneity more effectively. The recent empirical litera-
ture employs only annual balance sheet data from firms. Besides this information, we
have also access to bank-firm relationship data and can control for influences related
to overall lending policies of financial institutions. Despite their overall consistency,
our estimation results are still subject to limitations. For instance, a potential issue
might be omitted variables bias. Trade finance could be obtained from financial
markets abroad. Unfortunately, we are not able to identify these bank-firm rela-
tionships. Another obvious issue which is open for future research is to establish
causality.
In a next step, Chapter 4 primarily focused on the empirical importance of external
finance for exporters during (an after) the financial crisis and whether the access to
bank finance had an impact on trade flows. The previous MiMiK-Ustan match was
extended with balance sheet data from BAKIS to identify banks which are especially
‘affected’ by the financial crisis. The findings suggest that there is no correlation
between exports and credit provision. In addition, we show that ‘affected’ financial
institutions indeed lowered their credit exposures after the financial crisis. Finally,
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the propensity score matching leads to the insight that German exporting firms
which have a relationship with an ‘affected’ bank do not export significantly less
than comparable firms which obtain finance from a healthy financial institution.
Even if we investigate the results for each industry separately (instead of pooling
all results together) the same picture emerges. The results are in line with earlier
empirical contributions for European countries (e.g., Belgium and France) or Peru
but not for Japan. We contribute to the literature by having more information about
the bank-firm relationship in comparison to Amiti and Weinstein (2011), which is the
most similar paper to this chapter. They use firm and bank balance sheet positions
as main variables. In addition, they use information about linkages between banks
and firms for Japan and assume that the largest bank operates the trade finance
transactions. Our study is able to identify all bank-firm relationships with their
credit exposure. However, our findings have to be interpreted with some caution.
We do not know how the firms actually use the credit they receive from banks.
Therefore, we have to assume that some part of the credit exposure actually finances
foreign operations. In addition, the credit exposure can change for various reasons:
there is no information about the interest rate that is paid for different credits,
the number of granted loans from one bank and about the duration of credit lines.
Future research could address one of these problems (the use of credits for exports)
by matching detailed information about guarantees which firms receive from the
German federal state (e.g., EulerHermes provides data about state guarantees for
exporting firms, as shown in Felbermayr and Yalcin (2011)).
Chapter 5 extended the previous analysis by estimating the exporter premium in
bank lending for service exporters. Until now, not many insights exist about the na-
ture of trade in services. This chapter tries to understand whether service exporters
face larger entry barriers in comparison to goods exporters. The MiMiK-Ustan
match, which covers all bank-firm relationships with a credit exposure of more than
1.5 million euro and corporate balance sheet data over the period from 2005 to
2010, is enlarged with detailed services export data. Therefore, we are able to iden-
tify firms which primarily export services or goods and can evaluate our previous
results on a more disaggregated manner. The findings reveal that goods exporters
receive on average 16% larger credit exposures from financial institutions compared
to non-exporters. In addition, service exporters are more dependent on external
finance, with a premium of about 17% relative to goods exporters. We observe that
service exporters engage more in off balance sheet instruments and less in traditional
debt contracts. Future research could address the role of finance for service exports
during the financial crisis in more detail.
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Finally, in the last section we examined the determinants of innovation within start-
ups. The literature on innovation and exports emphasizes that a start-up does not
engage in foreign operations at the beginning of its life cycle and has to be innovative
at the early stage. We started with the discussion of the impact of finance on
trade because it fills a larger part of this dissertation. Chapter 6 dealt with the
question whether entrepreneurs with technical education are more innovative than
economists in high-tech industries. Entrepreneurship is one potential transmission
channel through which economic growth and employment are achievable. To analyze
this question, we examined a novel data set (KfW/ZEW Start-Up Panel) which
contains a random cross-section of German start-up companies for 2007 and 2008.
Two independent regressions were conducted for entrepreneurs, one for university
degree and one for apprenticeship as highest qualification. The baseline regression
revealed that natural scientists are more likely to engage in R&D than economists.
In addition, the findings suggest (weak) evidence for a higher probability of market
release and more engagement in large-scope innovations. Until now, the empirical
literature, which examines the determinants of innovation and employs education as
main determinant, does not deal with detailed information about the subject under
study, as we highlighted in our literature review. Instead of aggregating different
types of education into one dummy variable, we make use of five categories. However,
our findings have to be interpreted as possible correlation between education and
innovating behavior, which can be viewed as starting point for further research.
In particular, issues related to causality might bring more insights into this field.
Additional background information on the entrepreneurs prior to the subject of
studies could be used as instrumental variables. Furthermore, it would be valuable
to know what kind of education the workforce of start-up possesses (instead of only
the highest qualification).
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Table A.1: Export Share
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables ln(Loan) ln(Loan) ln(Loan) ln(Loan)
ln(Export Share) 1.138*** 0.429*** 0.401*** 0.106***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.030)
ln(Sales) 0.060*** 0.070*** 0.046***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004)
ln(Age) 0.162*** 0.141*** 0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.029)
Multi-plant -0.481*** -0.416*** 0.023**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.010)
ln(Fdi) -0.018*** -0.009*** -0.011***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
ln(Equity) 0.182*** 0.172*** -0.015***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE No No Yes Yes
Legal FE No No Yes Yes
Bank FE No No Yes Yes
Firm FE No No No Yes
Observations 799,104 799,104 799,104 799,104
R2 0.053 0.103 0.194 0.730
Notes: OLS estimation. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes
significance at 1%, ** significance at 5% and * significance at 10%.
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Table A.2: Employment as Firm Size
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables ln(Loan) ln(Loan) ln(Loan) ln(Loan)
Exporter 0.369*** 0.190*** 0.186*** 0.016*
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010)
ln(Employment) 0.106*** 0.116*** 0.058***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
ln(Age) 0.140*** 0.141*** 0.016
(0.003) (0.003) (0.029)
Multi-plant -0.460*** -0.389*** 0.024**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.010)
ln(Fdi) -0.016*** -0.006*** -0.012***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
ln(Equity) 0.158*** 0.155*** -0.015***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE No No Yes Yes
Legal FE No No Yes Yes
Bank FE No No Yes Yes
Firm FE No No No Yes
Observations 799,104 799,104 799,104 799,104
R2 0.052 0.103 0.194 0.730
Notes: OLS estimation. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes
significance at 1%, ** significance at 5% and * significance at 10%.
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Table A.3: Adding Productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables ln(Loan) ln(Loan) ln(Loan) ln(Loan)
Exporter 0.365*** 0.165*** 0.159*** 0.016*
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010)
ln(Productivity) 0.067*** 0.034*** 0.043*** -0.021***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
ln(Sales) 0.067*** 0.078*** 0.053***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.004)
ln(Age) 0.178*** 0.160*** 0.026
(0.003) (0.003) (0.030)
Multi-plant -0.495*** -0.427*** 0.015
(0.006) (0.006) (0.010)
ln(Fdi) -0.023*** -0.013*** -0.009***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
ln(Equity) 0.180*** 0.168*** -0.009***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE No No Yes Yes
Legal FE No No Yes Yes
Bank FE No No Yes Yes
Firm FE No No No Yes
Observations 763,272 763,272 763,272 763,272
R2 0.056 0.108 0.200 0.737
Notes: OLS estimation. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes
significance at 1%, ** significance at 5% and * significance at 10%.
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Table A.4: Before Q3/2008
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables ln(Loan) ln(Loan) ln(Loan) ln(Loan)
Exporter 0.358*** 0.183*** 0.184*** 0.012
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.014)
ln(Sales) 0.061*** 0.071*** 0.039***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.006)
ln(Age) 0.145*** 0.127*** 0.238***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.049)
Multi-plant -0.484*** -0.414*** 0.060***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.015)
ln(Fdi) -0.019*** -0.012*** -0.014***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
ln(Equity) 0.175*** 0.168*** -0.009***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE No No Yes Yes
Legal FE No No Yes Yes
Bank FE No No Yes Yes
Firm FE No No No Yes
Observations 442,660 442,660 442,660 442,660
R2 0.052 0.096 0.190 0.757
Notes: OLS estimation. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes
significance at 1%, ** significance at 5% and * significance at 10%.
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Table A.5: After Q2/2008
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables ln(Loan) ln(Loan) ln(Loan) ln(Loan)
Exporter 0.383*** 0.146*** 0.123*** 0.005
(0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.015)
ln(Sales) 0.059*** 0.069*** 0.035***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.007)
ln(Age) 0.188*** 0.163*** -0.009
(0.005) (0.005) (0.065)
Multi-plant -0.467*** -0.406*** 0.045***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.017)
ln(Fdi) -0.016*** -0.006** -0.006*
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
ln(Equity) 0.191*** 0.181*** -0.010**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE No No Yes Yes
Legal FE No No Yes Yes
Bank FE No No Yes Yes
Firm FE No No No Yes
Observations 356,444 356,444 356,444 356,444
R2 0.055 0.112 0.215 0.820
Notes: OLS estimation. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes
significance at 1%, ** significance at 5% and * significance at 10%.
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Table A.6: Loans ≤ 2 million euro
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables ln(Loan) ln(Loan) ln(Loan) ln(Loan)
Exporter 0.175*** 0.218*** 0.253*** 0.039**
(0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.015)
ln(Sales) 0.001 0.013*** 0.039***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.007)
ln(Age) 0.167*** 0.155*** 0.251***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.045)
Multi-plant -0.815*** -0.669*** -0.016
(0.009) (0.009) (0.016)
ln(Fdi) -0.054*** -0.030** -0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
ln(Equity) -0.005** 0.003 -0.006
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE No No Yes Yes
Legal FE No No Yes Yes
Bank FE No No Yes Yes
Firm FE No No No Yes
Observations 364,725 364,725 364,725 364,725
R2 0.022 0.047 0.215 0.739
Notes: OLS estimation. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes
significance at 1%, ** significance at 5% and * significance at 10%.
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Table A.7: Loans > 2 million euro
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables ln(Loan) ln(Loan) ln(Loan) ln(Loan)
Exporter 0.098*** -0.036*** -0.064*** 0.009**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
ln(Sales) 0.024*** 0.028*** 0.018***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
ln(Age) 0.007*** 0.009*** -0.063***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.012)
Multi-plant 0.192*** 0.119*** 0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
ln(Fdi) 0.016*** 0.007*** -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
ln(Equity) 0.107*** 0.106*** 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE No No Yes Yes
Legal FE No No Yes Yes
Bank FE No No Yes Yes
Firm FE No No No Yes
Observations 434,379 434,379 434,379 434,379
R2 0.075 0.175 0.309 0.882
Notes: OLS estimation. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes
significance at 1%, ** significance at 5% and * significance at 10%.
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Table A.8: On Balance Sheet
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables ln(On Balance) ln(On Balance) ln(On Balance) ln(On Balance)
Exporter 0.078*** -0.001 0.035*** 0.047***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012)
ln(Sales) 0.048*** 0.055*** 0.034***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005)
ln(Age) 0.142*** 0.145*** 0.106***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.033)
Multi-plant -0.712*** -0.533*** 0.020*
(0.008) (0.008) (0.012)
ln(Fdi) -0.078*** -0.055*** -0.016***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
ln(Equity) 0.106*** 0.091*** -0.032***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE No No Yes Yes
Legal FE No No Yes Yes
Bank FE No No Yes Yes
Firm FE No No No Yes
Observations 799,104 799,104 799,104 799,104
R2 0.104 0.120 0.251 0.783
Notes: OLS estimation. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes
significance at 1%, ** significance at 5% and * significance at 10%.
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Table A.9: Off Balance Sheet
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables ln(Off Balance) ln(Off Balance) ln(Off Balance) ln(Off Balance)
Exporter 0.536*** 0.418*** 0.332*** 0.004
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
ln(Sales) 0.017*** 0.030*** 0.026***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004)
ln(Age) 0.149*** 0.111*** 0.078***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.027)
Multi-plant 0.016** -0.117*** 0.006
(0.008) (0.007) (0.009)
ln(Fdi) 0.054*** 0.038*** -0.009***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
ln(Equity) 0.062*** 0.095*** 0.008***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE No No Yes Yes
Legal FE No No Yes Yes
Bank FE No No Yes Yes
Firm FE No No No Yes
Observations 799,104 799,104 799,104 799,104
R2 0.127 0.134 0.300 0.843
Notes: OLS estimation. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes
significance at 1%, ** significance at 5% and * significance at 10%.
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Table A.10: Loan/Total Debt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables ln(Loan/Debt) ln(Loan/Debt) ln(Loan/Debt) ln(Loan/Debt)
Exporter -0.020*** 0.033*** 0.005*** -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
ln(Sales) -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.001***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
ln(Age) -0.006*** -0.003*** -0.011***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Multi-plant -0.055*** -0.044*** -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
ln(Fdi) -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
ln(Equity) -0.012*** -0.010*** 0.001***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE No No Yes Yes
Legal FE No No Yes Yes
Bank FE No No Yes Yes
Firm FE No No No Yes
Observations 799,104 799,104 799,104 799,104
R2 0.094 0.250 0.337 0.877
Notes: OLS estimation. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes
significance at 1%, ** significance at 5% and * significance at 10%.
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Table A.11: Loan/Total Assets
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables ln(Loan/Assets) ln(Loan/Assets) ln(Loan/Assets) ln(Loan/Assets)
Exporter -0.017*** 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
ln(Sales) -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.001
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
ln(Age) -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.011***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Multi-plant -0.038*** -0.033*** -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
ln(Fdi) -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
ln(Equity) -0.013*** -0.012*** -0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE No No Yes Yes
Legal FE No No Yes Yes
Bank FE No No Yes Yes
Firm FE No No No Yes
Observations 799,104 799,104 799,104 799,104
R2 0.107 0.290 0.373 0.890
Notes: OLS estimation. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes
significance at 1%, ** significance at 5% and * significance at 10%.
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Table A.12: Lagged Explanatory Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables ln(Loan) ln(Loan) ln(Loan) ln(Loan)
Exporter 0.361*** 0.162*** 0.144*** 0.007
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011)
ln(Sales) 0.051*** 0.061*** 0.033***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004)
ln(Age) 0.142*** 0.117*** -0.144***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.024)
Multi-plant -0.499*** -0.440*** 0.005
(0.007) (0.007) (0.011)
ln(Fdi) -0.017*** -0.009*** -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
ln(Equity) 0.193*** 0.184*** 0.009***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE No No Yes Yes
Legal FE No No Yes Yes
Bank FE No No Yes Yes
Firm FE No No No Yes
Observations 653,281 653,281 653,281 653,281
R2 0.054 0.105 0.199 0.749
Notes: OLS estimation. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes
significance at 1%, ** significance at 5% and * significance at 10%.
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Table A.13: Industry-time and Bank-time FE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables ln(Loan) ln(Loan) ln(Loan) ln(Loan)
Exporter 0.370*** 0.167*** 0.156*** 0.028**
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.013)
ln(Sales) 0.060*** 0.070*** 0.041***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004)
ln(Age) 0.163*** 0.142*** 0.007
(0.003) (0.003) (0.030)
Multi-plant -0.497*** -0.411*** 0.009
(0.006) (0.008) (0.012)
ln(Fdi) -0.019*** -0.010*** -0.011***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
ln(Equity) 0.184*** 0.176*** -0.015***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
Industry-time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE No No Yes Yes
Legal FE No No Yes Yes
Bank-time FE No No Yes Yes
Firm FE No No No Yes
Observations 799,104 799,104 799,104 799,104
R2 0.055 0.105 0.224 0.461
Notes: OLS estimation. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes
significance at 1%, ** significance at 5% and * significance at 10%.
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Figure B.1: More Details on Bank-Firm Credit Relationships in Germany, 2005-2010
Notes: The graphs are based on quarterly data from the MiMiK-Ustan matched
data sources.
Table B.1: Credit Exposure and Exports
(1) (2)
Variables ∆ln(Exportsijt) ∆ln(Exportsijt)
∆ln(Loani,t−1) 0.027 0.026
(0.017) (0.017)
Industry-Time FE Yes Yes
Bank FE No Yes
Observations 33,412 33,412
R2 0.077 0.097
Notes: OLS estimation. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes significance
at 1%, ** significance at 5% and * significance at 10%.
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Table B.2: Bank Health and Lending
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables ∆ln(Loankt)
SoFFin·crisis -0.193***
(0.059)
SoFFin (w/subsidiaries)·crisis -0.281*
(0.153)
EBA·crisis -0.097**
(0.044)
EBA (w/subsidiaries) ·crisis -0.128*
(0.075)
LRt−1 1.00
(0.624)
NPLt−1 -2.15e-08
(2.54e-08)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5,688 5,688 5,688 5,688 5,688 5,688
R2 0.310 0.310 0.310 0.310 0.310 0.310
Notes: OLS estimation. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes significance at 1%, ** significance at 5% and * significance at
10%.
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Table B.3: Propensity Score Matching: Industry-Specific (Definition 1)
(1) (2) (3)
WZ ∆ln(Exports) ∆ln(Domestic) ∆ln(Total) Treatment Control
1 -0.513 -0.068 -0.093 15 82
(0.623) (0.086) (0.076)
14 0.086* 0.062 0.088 15 26
(0.045) (0.060) (0.058)
15 0.503 0.045 0.053 140 170
(0.330) (0.045) (0.035)
17 -0.120 -0.089 -0.053 56 56
(0.581) (0.073) (0.049)
18 0.008 -0.150 -0.156 33 30
(1.13) (0.518) (0.552)
19 1.79 -0.105 0.057 10 8
(2.10) (0.228) (0.129)
20 -0.123 0.449 0.393 22 61
(1.06) (0.283) (0.278)
21 -2.50* -0.029 -0.136 53 64
(1.33) (0.129) (0.085)
22 -0.150 -0.051 -0.047 33 86
(0.415) (0.042) (0.039)
23 4.09* -0.286* -0.080 5 12
(2.48) (0.161) (0.130)
24 -2.78** 0.087 -0.009 114 84
(1.28) (0.107) (0.053)
25 0.607 -0.005 0.061 121 152
(0.481) (0.118) (0.112)
26 0.046 -0.010 -0.018 48 93
(0.790) (0.060) (0.048)
27 -0.177 -0.076 0.078 111 111
(0.763) (0.142) (0.133)
28 -0.517 0.100 0.102 190 292
(0.407) (0.071) (0.064)
29 -0.505 -0.078 -0.062 382 373
(0.387) (0.082) (0.072)
30 -1.05 0.148 0.255 11 4
(4.15) (0.237) (0.225)
31 -0.462 -0.410 -0.406 70 67
(0.958) (0.481) (0.474)
32 1.17 0.243 0.283 41 44
(0.794) (0.256) (0.251)
33 -0.446 -0.129 -0.022 67 77
(0.475) (0.119) (0.068)
Notes: Propensity score matching (nearest neighbor). Robust standard errors in
parentheses. Definition ’at least one ’affected’ bank’. *** denotes significance at 1%, **
significance at 5% and * significance at 10%.
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Table B.4: Propensity Score Matching: Industry-Specific (Definition 1)
(1) (2) (3)
WZ ∆ln(Exports) ∆ln(Domestic) ∆ln(Total) Treatment Control
34 0.125 0.028 0.035 97 64
(1.00) (0.077) (0.060)
35 0.407 0.059 0.049 16 17
(1.34) (0.334) (0.290)
36 -0.305 -0.072 -0.078*** 33 79
(0.673) (0.053) (0.029)
37 0.561 -0.051 0.008 19 19
(0.479) (0.062) (0.062)
40 0.085 0.041 0.041 139 108
(0.079) (0.047) (0.047)
45 -0.609 -0.017 -0.071 48 207
(0.916) (0.155) (0.138)
50 -0.090 0.024 0.036 219 387
(0.198) (0.025) (0.022)
51 0.745*** 0.035 0.057 560 1,172
(0.254) (0.047) (0.040)
52 -0.601 0.079 0.072 87 220
(0.367) (0.068) (0.068)
60 0.000 0.178 0.178 33 55
(0.000) (0.120) (0.120)
63 0.154 0.007 -0.057 70 93
(0.711) (0.131) (0.107)
64 1.94 0.033 0.060 12 5
(1.32) (0.059) (0.055)
65 0.270 -0.189 -0.076 18 25
(0.308) (0.139) (0.086)
70 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 650 820
(0.012) (0.065) (0.065)
71 -0.042 -0.384 -0.390 70 86
(0.278) (0.387) (0.386)
72 1.71 -0.602 -0.482 18 32
(1.84) (1.54) (1.54)
74 -0.074 -0.188 -0.198 506 420
(0.168) (0.272) (0.279)
85 -0.093 -0.001 -0.001 37 44
(0.093) (0.020) (0.020)
90 0.272 -0.039 -0.039 25 34
(0.346) (0.095) (0.096)
92 0.703 -0.008 -0.079 13 16
(0.863) (0.078) (0.076)
93 -0.106 -0.654 -0.693 4 6
(0.106) (0.996) (0.977)
Notes: Propensity score matching (nearest neighbor). Robust standard errors in
parentheses. Definition ’at least one ’affected’ bank’. *** denotes significance at 1%, **
significance at 5% and * significance at 10%.
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Table B.5: Propensity Score Matching: Industry-Specific (Definition 2)
(1) (2) (3)
WZ ∆ln(Exports) ∆ln(Domestic) ∆ln(Total) Treatment Control
1 0.366 -0.021 0.020 2 63
(0.366) (0.222) (0.221)
15 1.23 0.005 0.064 25 97
(0.815) (0.069) (0.056)
17 0.339 -0.327* -0.062 16 30
(1.05) (0.169) (0.066)
18 0.871 0.604 0.604 4 18
(0.712) (0.689) (0.634)
19 -0.151 0.219 0.456* 4 4
(3.60) (0.437) (0.260)
20 1.72 -0.001 0.163 3 34
(1.42) (0.152) (0.215)
21 0.074 -0.009 0.022 9 41
(0.096) (0.067) (0.054)
22 7.27 0.009 0.073 1 60
(7.21) (1.14) (1.15)
24 -1.88 0.115 0.033 22 53
(1.17) (0.087) (0.050)
25 1.69* -0.001 0.135 23 89
(0.952) (0.119) (0.104)
26 2.50 -0.086 0.203 8 51
(3.80) (0.193) (0.168)
27 -1.88 0.145 0.015 17 62
(1.37) (0.094) (0.050)
28 -0.330 0.017 -0.028 38 190
(0.733) (0.137) (0.116)
29 -1.20** 0.033 -0.080 62 219
(0.561) (0.214) (0.202)
31 -2.60 -1.42 -1.54 13 34
(2.02) (1.17) (1.15)
32 2.96 1.11 1.07 9 23
(1.98) (1.11) (1.11)
33 0.182 -0.020 0.078 15 40
(0.146) (0.160) (0.057)
Notes: Propensity score matching (nearest neighbor). Robust standard errors in
parentheses. Definition ’firms with one bank-firm relationship’. *** denotes significance
at 1%, ** significance at 5% and * significance at 10%.
112
B. Appendix of Chapter 4
Table B.6: Propensity Score Matching: Industry-Specific (Definition 2)
(1) (2) (3)
WZ ∆ln(Exports) ∆ln(Domestic) ∆ln(Total) Treatment Control
34 -0.690 0.612* 0.604* 11 33
(0.860) (0.341) (0.336)
35 2.09 0.439 0.536 3 13
(3.57) (0.303) (0.433)
36 -0.173 -0.001 -0.011 11 51
(1.01) (0.060) (0.053)
40 0.000 0.117 0.117 11 58
(0.000) (0.333) (0.333)
45 0.805 -0.192 -0.136 8 143
(0.503) (0.131) (0.133)
50 -0.287 -0.042 -0.023 57 223
(0.252) (0.035) (0.030)
51 0.187 0.091 0.119* 120 690
(0.345) (0.083) (0.066)
52 -0.108* -0.557 -0.575 15 154
(0.602) (0.796) (0.794)
60 0.000 0.123 0.123 2 30
(0.000) (0.097) (0.097)
63 1.16* 0.011 0.001 15 57
(0.619) (0.050) (0.047)
64 0.041 0.067 0.070 3 3
(0.041) (0.075) (0.075)
70 0.000 -0.113 -0.113 67 425
(0.000) (0.120) (0.120)
71 0.000 -0.386 -0.386 8 43
(0.000) (0.380) (0.380)
72 -2.56 0.231* 0.191 5 20
(1.81) (0.140) (0.145)
74 0.127 0.613* 0.619* 71 241
(0.203) (0.325) (0.329)
85 -0.521 -0.038 -0.039 9 24
(0.433) (0.024) (0.024)
90 0.000 0.138 0.138 2 17
(0.324) (0.109) (0.111)
92 -0.189 0.102 -0.048 4 7
(0.138) (0.113) (0.086)
Notes: Propensity score matching (nearest neighbor). Robust standard errors in
parentheses. Definition ’firms with one bank-firm relationship’. *** denotes significance
at 1%, ** significance at 5% and * significance at 10%.
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Table B.7: Propensity Score Matching: Industry-Specific (Definition 3)
(1) (2) (3)
WZ ∆ln(Exports) ∆ln(Domestic) ∆ln(Total) Treatment Control
1 -1.41 0.023 -0.046 6 91
(1.56) (0.160) (0.121)
14 0.049 0.159* 0.141* 7 34
(0.096) (0.085) (0.082)
15 0.628 -0.037 -0.014 51 259
(0.497) (0.149) (0.146)
17 -0.311 -0.106 -0.095* 31 81
(0.737) (0.090) (0.052)
18 0.748 0.058 0.095 19 44
(1.24) (0.163) (0.137)
19 -2.33 0.370 0.258 4 14
(2.40) (0.303) (0.248)
20 1.24 0.274 0.387 5 78
(0.905) (0.688) (0.670)
21 0.699 -0.132 -0.083 23 94
(1.03) (0.157) (0.111)
22 0.721 -0.046 -0.030 12 107
(0.623) (0.070) (0.069)
24 -0.650 -0.029 -0.031 49 149
(0.749) (0.068) (0.037)
25 0.618 -0.012 0.072 49 224
(0.587) (0.082) (0.051)
26 0.944 0.082 0.046 18 123
(1.45) (0.148) (0.144)
27 -0.929 -0.251 -0.316 45 177
(0.814) (0.391) (0.416)
28 -0.306 0.006 0.052 93 389
(0.533) (0.076) (0.047)
29 -0.071 0.008 0.040 155 600
(0.396) (0.083) (0.065)
30 -0.903 -0.113 0.109 6 9
(2.02) (0.187) (0.213)
31 -1.14 -0.142 -0.216 40 97
(0.906) (0.400) (0.394)
32 1.79** 0.702 0.695 16 69
(0.870) (0.633) (0.626)
33 0.935 0.014 0.052 38 106
(0.596) (0.089) (0.064)
Notes: Propensity score matching (nearest neighbor). Robust standard errors in
parentheses. Definition ’share of ’affected’ banks > 50%’. *** denotes significance at 1%,
** significance at 5% and * significance at 10%.
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Table B.8: Propensity Score Matching: Industry-Specific (Definition 3)
(1) (2) (3)
WZ ∆ln(Exports) ∆ln(Domestic) ∆ln(Total) Treatment Control
34 2.13** 0.102 0.245* 29 132
(0.890) (0.162) (0.145)
35 -2.30 0.233 0.081 11 22
(2.18) (0.225) (0.188)
36 -0.810 -0.023 -0.043 20 92
(0.808) (0.046) (0.037)
37 0.527 -0.095 -0.009 11 27
(0.341) (0.071) (0.072)
40 -0.356 0.056 0.051 41 206
(0.241) (0.105) (0.105)
45 -1.28 0.187 0.045 18 237
(0.924) (0.257) (0.182)
50 0.201 0.017 0.025 163 443
(0.194) (0.023) (0.022)
51 -0.143 0.109 0.099 248 1,484
(0.279) (0.069) (0.065)
52 -0.160 -0.028 -0.024 33 274
(0.407) (0.066) (0.065)
60 0.000 0.050 0.050 14 74
(0.000) (0.051) (0.051)
63 -0.981 0.026 -0.056 28 135
(0.875) (0.073) (0.046)
64 1.65 -0.083 -0.036 6 11
(1.63) (0.056) (0.047)
70 0.000 -0.365*** -0.365*** 162 1,308
(0.031) (0.106) (0.106)
71 0.008 -0.347* -0.347* 18 138
(0.008) (0.209) (0.209)
72 -1.79 -0.211 -0.057 9 41
(1.86) (0.294) (0.199)
74 -0.069 -0.286* -0.299* 176 750
(0.159) (0.162) (0.161)
85 -0.191 -0.018 -0.018 18 63
(0.191) (0.019) (0.019)
90 -0.129 0.048 0.041 6 53
(0.163) (0.076) (0.079)
92 0.200 0.019 0.037 9 20
(0.179) (0.106) (0.095)
93 -0.212 0.415 0.336 2 8
(0.212) (0.437) (0.358)
Notes: Propensity score matching (nearest neighbor). Robust standard errors in
parentheses. Definition ’share of ’affected’ banks > 50%’. *** denotes significance at 1%,
** significance at 5% and * significance at 10%.
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Figure C.1: Evolution of Services Exports
Source: Aggregate monthly trade statistics by Deutsche Bundesbank.
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Table C.1: Goods vs. Non-Exporters: Export Share
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables ln(Loan) ln(Loan) ln(Loan) ln(Loan)
ln(Export Share) 1.064*** 0.444*** 0.433*** 0.123***
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.032)
ln(Sales) 0.065*** 0.076*** 0.045***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004)
ln(Age) 0.144*** 0.129*** 0.009
(0.003) (0.004) (0.030)
Multi-plant -0.537*** -0.447*** 0.027***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.010)
ln(Fdi) -0.013*** -0.004* -0.005*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
ln(Equity) 0.182*** 0.170*** -0.016***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE No No Yes Yes
Legal FE No No Yes Yes
Bank FE No No Yes Yes
Firm FE No No No Yes
Observations 694,351 694,351 694,351 694,351
R2 0.062 0.111 0.197 0.742
Notes: OLS estimation. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes
significance at 1%, ** significance at 5% and * significance at 10%.
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Table C.2: Goods vs. Non-Exporters: Employment as Firm Size
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables ln(Loan) ln(Loan) ln(Loan) ln(Loan)
Goods 0.325*** 0.175*** 0.183*** 0.030***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010)
ln(Employment) 0.125*** 0.135*** 0.057***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
ln(Age) 0.124*** 0.108*** 0.019
(0.003) (0.004) (0.030)
Multi-plant -0.520*** -0.422*** 0.028***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.010)
ln(Fdi) -0.011*** -0.002 -0.005*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
ln(Equity) 0.156*** 0.152*** -0.016***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE No No Yes Yes
Legal FE No No Yes Yes
Bank FE No No Yes Yes
Firm FE No No No Yes
Observations 694,351 694,351 694,351 694,351
R2 0.061 0.113 0.198 0.742
Notes: OLS estimation. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes
significance at 1%, ** significance at 5% and * significance at 10%.
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Table C.3: Goods vs. Non-Exporters: Adding Productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables ln(Loan) ln(Loan) ln(Loan) ln(Loan)
Goods 0.312*** 0.156*** 0.164*** 0.027***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010)
ln(Productivity) 0.043*** 0.034*** 0.048*** -0.019***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
ln(Sales) 0.074*** 0.086*** 0.052***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
ln(Age) 0.160*** 0.149*** 0.044
(0.003) (0.004) (0.031)
Multi-plant -0.552*** -0.459*** 0.022**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.010)
ln(Fdi) -0.019*** -0.008*** -0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
ln(Equity) 0.179*** 0.167*** -0.011***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE No No Yes Yes
Legal FE No No Yes Yes
Bank FE No No Yes Yes
Firm FE No No No Yes
Observations 665,105 665,105 665,105 665,105
R2 0.066 0.118 0.205 0.749
Notes: OLS estimation. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes
significance at 1%, ** significance at 5% and * significance at 10%.
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Table C.4: Goods vs. Non-Exporters: Before Q3/2008
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables ln(Loan) ln(Loan) ln(Loan) ln(Loan)
Goods 0.322*** 0.170*** 0.181*** 0.027*
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.014)
ln(Sales) 0.066*** 0.078*** 0.036***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.006)
ln(Age) 0.131*** 0.121*** 0.226***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.050)
Multi-plant -0.532*** -0.440*** 0.065***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.016)
ln(Fdi) -0.017*** -0.010*** -0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
ln(Equity) 0.175*** 0.166*** -0.014***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE No No Yes Yes
Legal FE No No Yes Yes
Bank FE No No Yes Yes
Firm FE No No No Yes
Observations 389,618 389,618 389,618 389,618
R2 0.061 0.106 0.194 0.767
Notes: OLS estimation. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes
significance at 1%, ** significance at 5% and * significance at 10%.
120
C. Appendix of Chapter 5
Table C.5: Goods vs. Non-Exporters: After Q2/2008
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables ln(Loan) ln(Loan) ln(Loan) ln(Loan)
Goods 0.332*** 0.153*** 0.147*** 0.006
(0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.016)
ln(Sales) 0.064*** 0.074*** 0.035***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.007)
ln(Age) 0.164*** 0.142*** -0.111*
(0.005) (0.006) (0.066)
Multi-plant -0.532*** -0.442*** 0.047**
(0.010) (0.010) (0.019)
ln(Fdi) -0.007** 0.003 -0.017***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
ln(Equity) 0.193*** 0.180*** -0.0131***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE No No Yes Yes
Legal FE No No Yes Yes
Bank FE No No Yes Yes
Firm FE No No No Yes
Observations 304,733 304,733 304,733 304,733
R2 0.064 0.120 0.217 0.831
Notes: OLS estimation. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes
significance at 1%, ** significance at 5% and * significance at 10%.
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Table C.6: Goods vs. Non-Exporters: Loans ≤ 2 million euro
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables ln(Loan) ln(Loan) ln(Loan) ln(Loan)
Goods 0.174*** 0.203*** 0.245*** 0.045***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.015)
ln(Sales) 0.012*** 0.020*** 0.034***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.007)
ln(Age) 0.160*** 0.156*** 0.253***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.046)
Multi-plant -0.845*** -0.693*** -0.022
(0.009) (0.010) (0.017)
ln(Fdi) -0.055*** -0.030*** 0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
ln(Equity) -0.007*** 0.006*** -0.006
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE No No Yes Yes
Legal FE No No Yes Yes
Bank FE No No Yes Yes
Firm FE No No No Yes
Observations 327,609 327,609 327,609 327,609
R2 0.023 0.051 0.140 0.739
Notes: OLS estimation. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes
significance at 1%, ** significance at 5% and * significance at 10%.
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Table C.7: Goods vs. Non-Exporters: Loans > 2 million euro
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables ln(Loan) ln(Loan) ln(Loan) ln(Loan)
Goods 0.056*** -0.048*** -0.069*** 0.004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
ln(Sales) 0.018*** 0.027*** 0.020***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
ln(Age) 0.009*** 0.008*** -0.041***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.012)
Multi-plant 0.183*** 0.120*** 0.009**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
ln(Fdi) 0.015*** 0.007*** 0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
ln(Equity) 0.106*** 0.100*** -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE No No Yes Yes
Legal FE No No Yes Yes
Bank FE No No Yes Yes
Firm FE No No No Yes
Observations 366,742 366,742 366,742 366,742
R2 0.092 0.188 0.300 0.889
Notes: OLS estimation. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes
significance at 1%, ** significance at 5% and * significance at 10%.
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Table C.8: Goods vs. Non-Exporters: On Balance Sheet
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables ln(On Balance) ln(On Balance) ln(On Balance) ln(On Balance)
Goods 0.143*** 0.072*** 0.093*** 0.048***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.013)
ln(Sales) 0.062*** 0.065*** 0.035***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005)
ln(Age) 0.130*** 0.140*** 0.079**
(0.004) (0.005) (0.034)
Multi-plant -0.756*** -0.564*** 0.022*
(0.008) (0.009) (0.012)
ln(Fdi) -0.071*** -0.043*** -0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
ln(Equity) 0.106*** 0.097*** -0.031***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE No No Yes Yes
Legal FE No No Yes Yes
Bank FE No No Yes Yes
Firm FE No No No Yes
Observations 694,351 694,351 694,351 694,351
R2 0.107 0.126 0.253 0.788
Notes: OLS estimation. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes
significance at 1%, ** significance at 5% and * significance at 10%.
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Table C.9: Goods vs. Non-Exporters: Off Balance Sheet
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables ln(Off Balance) ln(Off Balance) ln(Off Balance) ln(Off Balance)
Goods 0.440*** 0.348*** 0.296*** 0.011
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010)
ln(Sales) 0.007*** 0.026*** 0.026***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
ln(Age) 0.136*** 0.093*** 0.123***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.027)
Multi-plant -0.001 -0.119*** 0.018*
(0.007) (0.007) (0.003)
ln(Fdi) 0.060*** 0.042*** -0.002
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
ln(Equity) 0.070*** 0.094*** 0.007***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE No No Yes Yes
Legal FE No No Yes Yes
Bank FE No No Yes Yes
Firm FE No No No Yes
Observations 694,351 694,351 694,351 694,351
R2 0.117 0.124 0.280 0.837
Notes: OLS estimation. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes
significance at 1%, ** significance at 5% and * significance at 10%.
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Table C.10: Goods vs. Non-Exporters: Loan/Total Debt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables ln(Loan/Debt) ln(Loan/Debt) ln(Loan/Debt) ln(Loan/Debt)
Goods -0.017*** 0.003*** 0.005*** -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
ln(Sales) -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.001***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
ln(Age) -0.005*** -0.003*** -0.012***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Multi-plant -0.056*** -0.045*** -0.001*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
ln(Fdi) -0.003*** -0.002*** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
ln(Equity) -0.012*** -0.011*** 0.001***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE No No Yes Yes
Legal FE No No Yes Yes
Bank FE No No Yes Yes
Firm FE No No No Yes
Observations 694,351 694,351 694,351 694,351
R2 0.074 0.221 0.317 0.872
Notes: OLS estimation. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes
significance at 1%, ** significance at 5% and * significance at 10%.
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Table C.11: Goods vs. Non-Exporters: Loan/Total Assets
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables ln(Loan/Assets) ln(Loan/Assets) ln(Loan/Assets) ln(Loan/Assets)
Goods -0.015*** 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
ln(Sales) -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.001
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
ln(Age) -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.011***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Multi-plant -0.040*** -0.033*** -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
ln(Fdi) -0.002*** -0.001*** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
ln(Equity) -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE No No Yes Yes
Legal FE No No Yes Yes
Bank FE No No Yes Yes
Firm FE No No No Yes
Observations 694,351 694,351 694,351 694,351
R2 0.089 0.268 0.357 0.887
Notes: OLS estimation. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes
significance at 1%, ** significance at 5% and * significance at 10%.
127
C. Appendix of Chapter 5
Table C.12: Goods vs. Non-Exporters: Lagged Explanatory Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables ln(Loan) ln(Loan) ln(Loan) ln(Loan)
Goods 0.296*** 0.147*** 0.147*** 0.001
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011)
ln(Sales) 0.056*** 0.067*** 0.042***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
ln(Age) 0.123*** 0.103*** -0.155***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.025)
Multi-plant -0.560*** -0.475*** 0.001
(0.007) (0.007) (0.011)
ln(Fdi) -0.015*** -0.005** 0.005
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
ln(Equity) 0.195*** 0.184*** 0.008**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE No No Yes Yes
Legal FE No No Yes Yes
Bank FE No No Yes Yes
Firm FE No No No Yes
Observations 563,245 563,245 563,245 563,245
R2 0.062 0.114 0.202 0.761
Notes: OLS estimation. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes
significance at 1%, ** significance at 5% and * significance at 10%.
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Table C.13: Goods vs. Non-Exporters: Industry-time and Bank-time FE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables ln(Loan) ln(Loan) ln(Loan) ln(Loan)
Goods 0.326*** 0.162*** 0.164*** 0.033**
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.013)
ln(Sales) 0.065*** 0.076*** 0.041***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004)
ln(Age) 0.145*** 0.130*** 0.013
(0.003) (0.003) (0.031)
Multi-plant -0.534*** -0.441*** 0.010
(0.007) (0.006) (0.013)
ln(Fdi) -0.013*** -0.005** -0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
ln(Equity) 0.184*** 0.174*** -0.016***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
Industry-time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE No No Yes Yes
Legal FE No No Yes Yes
Bank-time FE No No Yes Yes
Firm FE No No No Yes
Observations 694,351 694,351 694,351 694,351
R2 0.064 0.113 0.226 0.482
Notes: OLS estimation. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes
significance at 1%, ** significance at 5% and * significance at 10%.
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Table C.14: Service vs. Goods Exporters: Export Share
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables ln(Loan) ln(Loan) ln(Loan) ln(Loan)
ln(Export Share) 0.038*** 0.002 -0.015 0.041
(0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.033)
ln(Sales) 0.000 0.109*** 0.207***
(0.012) (0.013) (0.041)
ln(Age) 0.284*** 0.154*** -0.119
(0.013) (0.014) (0.240)
Multi-plant 0.285*** 0.040 -0.032
(0.029) (0.029) (0.038)
ln(Fdi) -0.011*** -0.012*** 0.000
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
ln(Equity) 0.132*** 0.096*** -0.003
(0.009) (0.009) (0.011)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE No No Yes Yes
Legal FE No No Yes Yes
Bank FE No No Yes Yes
Firm FE No No No Yes
Observations 63,759 63,759 63,759 63,759
R2 0.039 0.055 0.236 0.698
Notes: OLS estimation. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes
significance at 1%, ** significance at 5% and * significance at 10%.
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Table C.15: Service vs. Goods Exporters: Employment as Firm Size
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables ln(Loan) ln(Loan) ln(Loan) ln(Loan)
Service 0.539*** 0.154*** 0.148*** 0.005
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.022)
ln(Employment) 0.077*** 0.096*** 0.058***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.009)
ln(Age) 0.224*** 0.161*** 0.059
(0.005) (0.006) (0.066)
Multi-plant -0.301*** -0.338*** 0.055***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.016)
ln(Fdi) -0.021*** -0.013*** -0.009***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
ln(Equity) 0.120*** 0.126*** -0.010**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE No No Yes Yes
Legal FE No No Yes Yes
Bank FE No No Yes Yes
Firm FE No No No Yes
Observations 321,073 321,073 321,073 321,073
R2 0.030 0.060 0.178 0.695
Notes: OLS estimation. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes
significance at 1%, ** significance at 5% and * significance at 10%.
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Table C.16: Service vs. Goods Exporters: Adding Productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables ln(Loan) ln(Loan) ln(Loan) ln(Loan)
Service 0.545*** 0.184*** 0.179*** 0.035
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.022)
ln(Productivity) -0.024*** 0.034*** -0.007 -0.032***
(0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.007)
ln(Sales) 0.056*** 0.068*** 0.086***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.017)
ln(Age) 0.242*** 0.186*** 0.041
(0.005) (0.006) (0.065)
Multi-plant -0.327*** -0.360*** 0.045***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.016)
ln(Fdi) -0.027*** -0.019*** -0.010***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
ln(Equity) 0.133*** 0.136*** -0.014***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.005)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE No No Yes Yes
Legal FE No No Yes Yes
Bank FE No No Yes Yes
Firm FE No No No Yes
Observations 312,277 312,277 312,277 312,277
R2 0.029 0.060 0.176 0.698
Notes: OLS estimation. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes
significance at 1%, ** significance at 5% and * significance at 10%.
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Table C.17: Service vs. Goods Exporters: Before Q3/2008
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables ln(Loan) ln(Loan) ln(Loan) ln(Loan)
Service 0.507*** 0.167*** 0.156*** 0.029
(0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.029)
ln(Sales) 0.050*** 0.060*** 0.146***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.029)
ln(Age) 0.209*** 0.155*** 0.461***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.102)
Multi-plant -0.345*** -0.366*** 0.092***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.025)
ln(Fdi) -0.024*** -0.018*** -0.021***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
ln(Equity) 0.127*** 0.134*** -0.002***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.008)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE No No Yes Yes
Legal FE No No Yes Yes
Bank FE No No Yes Yes
Firm FE No No No Yes
Observations 174,483 174,483 174,483 174,483
R2 0.026 0.051 0.174 0.722
Notes: OLS estimation. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes
significance at 1%, ** significance at 5% and * significance at 10%.
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Table C.18: Service vs. Goods Exporters: After Q2/2008
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables ln(Loan) ln(Loan) ln(Loan) ln(Loan)
Service 0.574*** 0.170*** 0.191*** -0.036
(0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.033)
ln(Sales) 0.054*** 0.063*** 0.124***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.025)
ln(Age) 0.290*** 0.228*** 0.095
(0.008) (0.009) (0.141)
Multi-plant -0.271*** -0.334*** 0.049*
(0.016) (0.016) (0.027)
ln(Fdi) -0.027*** -0.019*** 0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
ln(Equity) 0.141*** 0.145*** -0.013**
(0.003) (0.004) (0.007)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE No No Yes Yes
Legal FE No No Yes Yes
Bank FE No No Yes Yes
Firm FE No No No Yes
Observations 146,590 146,590 146,590 146,590
R2 0.037 0.074 0.207 0.795
Notes: OLS estimation. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes
significance at 1%, ** significance at 5% and * significance at 10%.
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Table C.19: Service vs. Goods Exporters: Loans ≤ 2 million euro
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables ln(Loan) ln(Loan) ln(Loan) ln(Loan)
Service -0.393*** -0.277*** -0.204*** -0.039
(0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.034)
ln(Sales) -0.043*** -0.016*** 0.123***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.023)
ln(Age) 0.199*** 0.178*** 0.267***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.089)
Multi-plant -0.660*** -0.604*** 0.039
(0.014) (0.015) (0.028)
ln(Fdi) -0.043*** -0.025*** -0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
ln(Equity) -0.005 -0.016*** -0.004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.008)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE No No Yes Yes
Legal FE No No Yes Yes
Bank FE No No Yes Yes
Firm FE No No No Yes
Observations 150,212 150,212 150,212 150,212
R2 0.020 0.041 0.168 0.725
Notes: OLS estimation. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes
significance at 1%, ** significance at 5% and * significance at 10%.
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Table C.20: Service vs. Goods Exporters: Loans > 2 million euro
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables ln(Loan) ln(Loan) ln(Loan) ln(Loan)
Service 0.461*** 0.231*** 0.196*** 0.003
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008)
ln(Sales) 0.043*** 0.030*** 0.037***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.008)
ln(Age) 0.011*** 0.016*** -0.113***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.028)
Multi-plant 0.144*** 0.073*** -0.001
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
ln(Fdi) 0.009*** 0.003*** -0.003**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
ln(Equity) 0.093*** 0.114*** -0.008***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE No No Yes Yes
Legal FE No No Yes Yes
Bank FE No No Yes Yes
Firm FE No No No Yes
Observations 170,861 170,861 170,861 170,861
R2 0.115 0.194 0.381 0.854
Notes: OLS estimation. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes
significance at 1%, ** significance at 5% and * significance at 10%.
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Table C.21: Service vs. Goods Exporters: On Balance Sheet
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables ln(On Balance) ln(On Balance) ln(On Balance) ln(On Balance)
Service -0.245*** -0.428*** -0.326*** -0.053*
(0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.028)
ln(Sales) -0.019*** 0.011*** 0.050**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.028)
ln(Age) 0.294*** 0.245*** 0.270***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.076)
Multi-plant -0.473*** -0.392*** 0.080***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.020)
ln(Fdi) -0.072*** -0.053*** -0.016***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
ln(Equity) 0.085*** 0.051*** -0.032***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE No No Yes Yes
Legal FE No No Yes Yes
Bank FE No No Yes Yes
Firm FE No No No Yes
Observations 321,073 321,073 321,073 321,073
R2 0.047 0.059 0.226 0.761
Notes: OLS estimation. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes
significance at 1%, ** significance at 5% and * significance at 10%.
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Table C.22: Service vs. Goods Exporters: Off Balance Sheet
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables ln(Off Balance) ln(Off Balance) ln(Off Balance) ln(Off Balance)
Service 0.636*** 0.507*** 0.437*** 0.096***
(0.016) (0.017) (0.015) (0.022)
ln(Sales) 0.084*** 0.070*** 0.086***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.016)
ln(Age) 0.108*** 0.087*** -0.039
(0.007) (0.007) (0.059)
Multi-plant -0.122*** -0.215*** -0.020
(0.013) (0.013) (0.016)
ln(Fdi) 0.038*** 0.024*** -0.011***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
ln(Equity) 0.013*** 0.091*** 0.009*
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE No No Yes Yes
Legal FE No No Yes Yes
Bank FE No No Yes Yes
Firm FE No No No Yes
Observations 321,073 321,073 321,073 321,073
R2 0.087 0.093 0.320 0.844
Notes: OLS estimation. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes
significance at 1%, ** significance at 5% and * significance at 10%.
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Table C.23: Service vs. Goods Exporters: Loan/Total Debt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables ln(Loan/Debt) ln(Loan/Debt) ln(Loan/Debt) ln(Loan/Debt)
Service -0.057*** -0.019*** -0.018*** 0.001**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
ln(Sales) -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.006***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
ln(Age) -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.003*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002)
Multi-plant -0.050*** -0.044*** 0.001*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
ln(Fdi) -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ln(Equity) -0.011*** -0.010*** 0.001***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE No No Yes Yes
Legal FE No No Yes Yes
Bank FE No No Yes Yes
Firm FE No No No Yes
Observations 321,073 321,073 321,073 321,073
R2 0.138 0.292 0.362 0.877
Notes: OLS estimation. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes
significance at 1%, ** significance at 5% and * significance at 10%.
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Table C.24: Service vs. Goods Exporters: Loan/Total Assets
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables ln(Loan/Assets) ln(Loan/Assets) ln(Loan/Assets) ln(Loan/Assets)
Service -0.043*** -0.009*** -0.009*** 0.001***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
ln(Sales) -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
ln(Age) 0.001*** -0.001*** -0.04***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Multi-plant -0.036*** -0.032*** 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
ln(Fdi) -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ln(Equity) -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE No No Yes Yes
Legal FE No No Yes Yes
Bank FE No No Yes Yes
Firm FE No No No Yes
Observations 321,073 321,073 321,073 321,073
R2 0.137 0.322 0.391 0.887
Notes: OLS estimation. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes
significance at 1%, ** significance at 5% and * significance at 10%.
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Table C.25: Service vs. Goods Exporters: Lagged Explanatory Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables ln(Loan) ln(Loan) ln(Loan) ln(Loan)
Service 0.538*** 0.150*** 0.154*** 0.024
(0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.024)
ln(Sales) 0.045*** 0.052*** -0.014
(0.002) (0.002) (0.010)
ln(Age) 0.223*** 0.165*** -0.013
(0.006) (0.006) (0.055)
Multi-plant -0.360*** -0.394*** 0.009
(0.011) (0.011) (0.017)
ln(Fdi) -0.026*** -0.018*** -0.005*
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
ln(Equity) 0.147*** 0.149*** 0.012**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE No No Yes Yes
Legal FE No No Yes Yes
Bank FE No No Yes Yes
Firm FE No No No Yes
Observations 267,847 267,847 267,847 267,847
R2 0.032 0.064 0.184 0.714
Notes: OLS estimation. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes
significance at 1%, ** significance at 5% and * significance at 10%.
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Table C.26: Service vs. Goods Exporters: Industry-time and Bank-time FE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables ln(Loan) ln(Loan) ln(Loan) ln(Loan)
Service 0.537*** 0.166*** 0.169*** 0.011
(0.012) (0.013) (0.015) (0.027)
ln(Sales) 0.053*** 0.064*** 0.063***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.014)
ln(Age) 0.242*** 0.185*** 0.121**
(0.005) (0.006) (0.061)
Multi-plant -0.321*** -0.355*** 0.044**
(0.010) (0.012) (0.020)
ln(Fdi) -0.027*** -0.020*** -0.010***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
ln(Equity) 0.135*** 0.143*** -0.004
(0.002) (0.003) (0.007)
Industry-time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE No No Yes Yes
Legal FE No No Yes Yes
Bank-time FE No No Yes Yes
Firm FE No No No Yes
Observations 321,073 321,073 321,073 321,073
R2 0.035 0.065 0.224 0.436
Notes: OLS estimation. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes
significance at 1%, ** significance at 5% and * significance at 10%.
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Figure D.1: Share of Education (University) in the Four Industries
Figure D.2: Share of Education (Apprenticeship) in the Four Industries
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Table D.1: R&D Expenditures and Education (University)
(1) (2) (3)
Variables expend expend expend
team 8,041*** (2,204) 3,373 (3,067) 3,427 (2,980)
nat 2,019 (3,198) 4,572 (2,572) 275 (2,847)
mathinf 373 (2,997) -1,516 (1,745) -1,157 (1,672)
eng 1,861 (3,328) 2,968 (2,092) 2,272 (2,203)
other 4,351 (4,602) -624 (3,597) 1,463 (3,425)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
Entrepreneur FE No Yes Yes
Firm FE No No Yes
Observations 2,198 965 943
R2 0.016 0.028 0.062
Notes: OLS regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes
significance at 1%, ** significance at 5% and * significance at 10%.
Table D.2: Newness and Education (University)
(1) (2) (3)
Variables new new new
team 0.201*** (0.064) -0.037 (0.096) -0.102 (0.101)
nat 0.250** (0.101) 0.293** (0.128) 0.264** (0.133)
mathinf 0.000 (0.102) -0.027 (0.126) -0.043 (0.128)
eng 0.081 (0.085) 0.108 (0.105) 0.141 (0.107)
other 0.094 (0.124) -0.003 (0.162) 0.031 (0.170)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
Entrepreneur FE No Yes Yes
Firm FE No No Yes
Observations 1,617 1,045 1,021
Log-likelihood -1,529.01 -938.74 -865.93
Notes: Ordered probit regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***
denotes significance at 1%, ** significance at 5% and * significance at 10%.
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Table D.3: Product Innovation and Education (University)
(1) (2) (3)
Variables prod prod prod
team -0.012 (0.024) -0.041 (0.046) -0.053 (0.046)
nat -0.014 (0.040) 0.026 (0.063) 0.032 (0.063)
mathinf -0.090** (0.040) -0.079 (0.062) -0.068 (0.061)
eng -0.075** (0.033) -0.064 (0.053) -0.070 (0.052)
other 0.049 (0.050) 0.037 (0.077) 0.040 (0.077)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
Entrepreneur FE No Yes Yes
Firm FE No No Yes
Observations 1,734 730 716
Log-likelihood -1,153.88 -484.01 -467.47
Notes: Probit regressions. Marginal effects reported at the mean values. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes significance at 1%, ** significance at
5% and * significance at 10%.
Table D.4: Process Innovation and Education (University)
(1) (2) (3)
Variables proc proc proc
team 0.051** (0.022) 0.003 (0.043) -0.024 (0.043)
nat -0.053 (0.037) -0.061 (0.061) -0.081 (0.058)
mathinf -0.009 (0.038) -0.025 (0.060) -0.029 (0.058)
eng -0.039 (0.031) -0.035 (0.050) -0.027 (0.048)
other -0.061 (0.046) -0.047 (0.072) -0.033 (0.071)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
Entrepreneur FE No Yes Yes
Firm FE No No Yes
Observations 1,739 733 719
Log-likelihood -1,044.25 -463.45 -439.09
Notes: Probit regressions. Marginal effects reported at the mean values. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes significance at 1%, ** significance at
5% and * significance at 10%.
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Table D.5: R&D Expenditures and Education (Apprenticeship)
(1) (2) (3)
Variables expend expend expend
team 5,788*** (1,696) 2,918*** (1,131) 3,048*** (1,183)
tech -5,370 (3,342) -1,238 (1,062) -1,112 (1,097)
social -11,844* (6,683) -4,216** (1,845) -3,996** (1,875)
other serv -5,369** (2,608) -1,023 (1,289) -1,213 (1,376)
other job -4,499 (3,510) 1,465 (3,892) 1,923 (4,189)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
Entrepreneur FE No Yes Yes
Firm FE No No Yes
Observations 2,205 1,033 998
R2 0.025 0.070 0.101
Notes: OLS regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes
significance at 1%, ** significance at 5% and * significance at 10%.
Table D.6: Newness and Education (Apprenticeship)
(1) (2) (3)
Variables new new new
team 0.348*** (0.071) 0.170 (0.107) 0.078 (0.114)
tech -0.081 (0.093) -0.109 (0.111) -0.021 (0.116)
social -0.582*** (0.157) -0.465*** (0.181) -0.339* (0.183)
other serv 0.287 (0.213) 0.386* (0.227) 0.487** (0.220)
other job 0.292 (0.187) 0.134 (0.214) 0.277 (0.218)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
Entrepreneur FE No Yes Yes
Firm FE No No Yes
Observations 1,585 1,075 1,038
Log-likelihood -1,240.23 -839.44 -777.08
Notes: Ordered probit regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***
denotes significance at 1%, ** significance at 5% and * significance at 10%.
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Table D.7: Product Innovation and Education (Apprenticeship)
(1) (2) (3)
Variables prod prod prod
team 0.082*** (0.025) 0.046 (0.047) 0.020 (0.048)
tech -0.055* (0.032) -0.064 (0.047) -0.047 (0.048)
social -0.005 (0.049) 0.017 (0.074) 0.032 (0.075)
other serv 0.079 (0.081) 0.031 (0.125) 0.038 (0.126)
other job -0.006 (0.067) 0.011 (0.103) 0.028 (0.103)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
Entrepreneur FE No Yes Yes
Firm FE No No Yes
Observations 1,708 738 714
Log-likelihood -1,115.05 -485.71 -452.37
Notes: Probit regressions. Marginal effects reported at the mean values. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes significance at 1%, ** significance at
5% and * significance at 10%.
Table D.8: Process Innovation and Education (Apprenticeship)
(1) (2) (3)
Variables proc proc proc
team 0.071*** (0.023) 0.111*** (0.043) 0.072 (0.045)
tech -0.040 (0.030) -0.010 (0.046) 0.023 (0.046)
social 0.067 (0.043) 0.114 (0.071) 0.140* (0.072)
other serv 0.009 (0.076) 0.051 (0.118) 0.063 (0.126)
other job -0.144* (0.066) -0.078 (0.096) -0.058 (0.098)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
Entrepreneur FE No Yes Yes
Firm FE No No Yes
Observations 1,716 744 718
Log-likelihood -985.40 -455.29 -425.73
Notes: Probit regressions. Marginal effects reported at the mean values. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes significance at 1%, ** significance at
5% and * significance at 10%.
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Table D.9: R&D and Education (University)
(1) (2) (3)
Variables r&d r&d r&d
nat 0.106* (0.057) 0.120 (0.086) 0.129 (0.085)
mathinf -0.012 (0.052) 0.008 (0.075) 0.018 (0.074)
eng -0.018 (0.044) -0.002 (0.065) 0.031 (0.064)
other -0.063 (0.071) -0.067 (0.100) -0.056 (0.097)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
Entrepreneur FE No Yes Yes
Firm FE No No Yes
Observations 1,259 559 547
Log-likelihood -788.22 -338.97 -324.26
Notes: Probit regressions. Single entrepreneurs only. Marginal effects reported at
the mean values. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes significance
at 1%, ** significance at 5% and * significance at 10%.
Table D.10: Market Release and Education (University)
(1) (2) (3)
Variables mrel mrel mrel
nat 0.074 (0.062) 0.165** (0.071) 0.180*** (0.066)
mathinf -0.142** (0.058) -0.081 (0.067) -0.078 (0.061)
eng -0.063 (0.049) -0.003 (0.057) 0.043 (0.051)
other -0.074 (0.079) 0.148 (0.106) -0.074 (0.098)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
Entrepreneur FE No Yes Yes
Firm FE No No Yes
Observations 849 545 533
Log-likelihood -487.07 -289.99 -259.85
Notes: Probit regressions. Single entrepreneurs only. Marginal effects reported at
the mean values. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes significance
at 1%, ** significance at 5% and * significance at 10%.
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Table D.11: R&D and Education (Apprenticeship)
(1) (2) (3)
Variables r&d r&d r&d
tech -0.066** (0.030) -0.090** (0.042) -0.069 (0.044)
social -0.212*** (0.052) -0.131* (0.077) -0.134* (0.078)
other serv 0.037 (0.075) 0.114 (0.112) 0.143 (0.116)
other job -0.019 (0.065) 0.024 (0.092) 0.032 (0.095)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
Entrepreneur FE No Yes Yes
Firm FE No No Yes
Observations 1,596 740 711
Log-likelihood -852.21 -402.88 -379.95
Notes: Probit regressions. Single entrepreneurs only. Marginal effects reported at
the mean values. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes significance
at 1%, ** significance at 5% and * significance at 10%.
Table D.12: Market Release and Education (Apprenticeship)
(1) (2) (3)
Variables mrel mrel mrel
tech -0.014 (0.037) -0.037 (0.042) -0.017 (0.041)
social -0.078 (0.060) -0.049 (0.069) -0.049 (0.066)
other serv 0.096 (0.081) 0.135 (0.101) 0.162 (0.102)
other job 0.088 (0.075) 0.050 (0.086) 0.054 (0.081)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
Entrepreneur FE No Yes Yes
Firm FE No No Yes
Observations 1,093 738 709
Log-likelihood -552.65 -359.25 -318.13
Notes: Probit regressions. Single entrepreneurs only. Marginal effects reported at
the mean values. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes significance
at 1%, ** significance at 5% and * significance at 10%.
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Table D.13: Propensity Score Matching (University)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables nat mathinf eng all
r&d -0.033 (0.171) 0.256** (0.121) 0.151 (0.131) 0.163 (0.111)
mrel 0.167 (0.164) 0.146 (0.112) 0.135 (0.117) 0.176* (0.098)
expend 11,507*** (4,053) 3,642 (2,671) 3,858 (3,500) 4,324 (2,945)
new 0.467 (0.386) 0.390* (0.208) 0.327 (0.274) 0.396* (0.218)
prod 0.067 (0.170) -0.122 (0.138) -0.107 (0.132) -0.150 (0.114)
proc 0.050 (0.171) -0.146 (0.133) 0.060 (0.132) 0.065 (0.112)
Untreated 60 60 60 60
Treated 60 82 318 460
Observations 120 142 378 520
Notes: Nearest neighbor matching. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes
significance at 1%, ** significance at 5% and * significance at 10%.
Table D.14: Propensity Score Matching (Apprenticeship)
(1)
Variables tech
r&d -0.048 (0.076)
mrel -0.003 (0.070)
expend 805 (1,622)
new -0.020 (0.156)
prod -0.075 (0.079)
proc 0.040 (0.074)
Untreated 107
Treated 399
Observations 355
Notes: Nearest neighbor matching. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***
denotes significance at 1%, ** significance at 5% and * significance at 10%.
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